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Abstract 
RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Researchers have found mixed evidence of how the level of competition affects bids in auctions. 
According to conventional economic theory, an increase in competition should make bids more 
competitive. However, the winner’s curse phenomenon calls for less aggressive bids in common-
value auctions. Bidders may become less aggressive also due to the entry effect, since an increase 
in the number of potential bidders decreases the likelihood of winning the contract, yet 
participation costs remain constant. Rational bidders should take this into account by bidding less 
aggressively. Which of the effect dominates differs between different types of auctions. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
In this thesis, was empirically studied using Finnish data, how the level of competition affects bids 
in auctions for public construction projects. Moreover, the relation between bid prices and budget 
overruns was also studied. The data for studying the effect of competition on bid prices contained 
information of 496 auctions of various kinds of projects, whereas the data for studying budget 
overruns contained information of 183 auctions. The data was analyzed using statistical methods 
such as multivariate regression analysis. The competitiveness of bids was measured as the relation 
between the pre-bid cost estimation and the lowest bid. Budget overruns were measured as the 
difference between the final cost of the contract and the lowest bid relative to the lowest bid. If the 
final cost of the project was not available, the relative amount of change orders and extra works 
was used as a proxy for budget overruns. 
 
FINDINGS 
Per each additional bid received, the lowest bid decreases significantly when compared with the 
pre-bid cost estimation. However, the winner’s curse and the entry effect significantly impact bids 
upward. Two solutions were provided: the release of information about the pre-bid cost estimation 
and the use of the second-price sealed-bid auction method. An economic downturn was found to 
be associated with the higher number of bids, lower bid volatility and more competitive bids. The 
timing of procurement is therefore important. Larger contracts were found to be associated with 
more accurate pre-bid cost estimations. The costs of small contracts are estimated roughly, but 
conservatively to avoid budget overruns. Bids were moreover found to be negatively correlated 
with budget overruns. 
Keywords  Common-Value Auction, Private-Value Auction, Affiliated-Value Auction, Winner’s 
Curse, Entry effect, Budget Overrun, Public Procurement, Construction Project 
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TUTKIMUSONGELMA 
Tutkijat ovat löytäneet monenlaista todistusaineistoa kilpailun vaikutuksesta huutokaupoissa 
jätettyihin tarjouksiin. Perinteisen talousteorian mukaan kilpailun lisääntymisen tulisi tehdä 
tarjouksista kilpailukykyisempiä. Voittajan kirous -ilmiö sen sijaan kannustaa tarjoamaan 
vähemmän aggressiivisesti huutokaupoissa, joissa huutokaupattavan kohteen arvo sama kaikille 
ostajille, mutta osallistujat eivät tiedä kohteen arvoa. Tarjoajat voivat tulla vähemmän 
aggressiivisiksi myös, kun potentiaalisten tarjoajien määrä kasvaa. Tämä johtuu siitä, että 
tarjoajien määrän kasvu vähentää todennäköisyyttä voittaa kilpailu tarjouskustannusten pysyessä 
vakiona. Rationaalisesti käyttäytyvä tarjoaja ottaa tämän huomioon tarjoamalla vähemmän 
aggressiivisesti. Huutokaupat eroavat sen suhteen, kuinka voimakkaita edellä mainitut ilmiöt ovat. 
 
AINEISTO JA MENETELMÄT 
Tässä työssä tutkitaan empiirisesti, kuinka kilpailun taso vaikuttaa jätettyihin tarjouksiin 
huutokaupoissa, joiden kohteena ovat julkiset rakennushankkeet Suomessa. Tutkimuskohteena on 
myös tarjoushintojen ja budjetin ylitysten relaatio. Aineisto kilpailun vaikutuksesta 
tarjoushintoihin sisältää tiedot 496 huutokaupasta ja aineisto tarjoushintojen ja budjetin ylitysten 
tutkimiseksi tiedot 183 huutokaupasta. Aineiston analysointiin käytetään tilastotieteellisiä 
menetelmiä kuten monimuuttujaregressioanalyysia. Tarjousten kilpailukykyä mitataan 
vertaamalla alhaisinta tarjoushintaa urakasta tehtyyn kustannusarvioon. Budjetin ylitys 
määritetään urakan lopullisten kustannusten ja alhaisimman hinnan välisen erotuksen suhteena 
alhaisimpaan hintaan. Mikäli lopullista kustannusta ei ole saatavilla, käytetään budjetin ylityksen 
määrittämiseen lisä- ja muutostöiden määrää suhteessa alhaisimpaan tarjoushintaan. 
 
TULOKSET 
Tutkimuksen perusteella jokainen saatu lisätarjous laskee alinta tarjousta merkittävästi suhteessa 
urakan kustannusarvioon. Voittajan kirous ja potentiaalisten tarjoajien lisääntyminen nostaa 
kuitenkin tarjouksia merkittävästi. Ongelmaan esitetään kaksi ratkaisua: kustannusarvion 
ilmoittaminen tarjoajille etukäteen ja suljetun toisen hinnan huutokaupan käyttäminen. Talouden 
taantuman havaittiin olevan yhteydessä suurempaan määrään tarjouksia, matalampaan 
tarjoushajontaan sekä kilpailukykyisempiin tarjouksiin. Suurempien urakoiden 
kustannusarvioiden havaittiin olevan tarkempia kuin pienempien urakoiden. Pienempien 
urakoiden kustannukset arvioidaan karkeasti, mutta konservatiivisesti budjetin ylitysten 
välttämiseksi. Suhteellisten tarjousten havaittiin korreloivan negatiivisesti budjetin ylitysten 
kanssa. 
Avainsanat Yhteisten arvostusten huutokauppa, Yksityisten arvostusten huutokauppa, Voittajan 
kirous, Budjetin ylitys, Julkinen rakennushanke 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In Finland, public procurements accounted for about 15% of the gross domestic product; GDP, in 
2014
1
 and about one third of these procurements were construction projects.
2
 Public construction 
procurements hence represented a major part of public spending, but at the same time were an 
important source of revenue and income to the companies and workers in the industry. Moreover, 
whenever there is a debate about public resuscitation to stimulate the economy, discussion often 
turns in to large infrastructure projects, which emphasizes the importance of public construction 
projects for the overall economy. Even though public construction projects have such a large impact 
on the economy and society, very little empirical research has been done regarding the topic in 
Finland. Most of the previous studies have concentrated mainly on the legislative aspects of public 
construction projects as well as the quantities of these projects, but not many if any studies have 
been made related to the nature of these projects. With this, I mean that no one has profoundly 
studied, how well public construction projects have stayed in the budget and schedule, how publicly 
funded projects have performed in comparison with privately funded projects, are there systematic 
patterns in terms of budget or schedule overruns, how bid prices have behaved during different 
economic times, what is the relationship between unexpectedly low bid prices and budget overruns, 
etc. 
 
According to Public Procurement Act, public construction procurements have to be procured 
through competitive bidding, i.e. auctions, to ensure that tax payers’ money is used efficiently. 
Researchers have however found miscellaneous evidence of how the number of bidders affects bids 
in auctions. According to conventional economic theory, competition should increase buying bids 
(decrease selling bids), since it is more difficult to win the competition when there are more 
bidders. See that I am referring to buying bids, when bidders are trying to buy something from an 
auctioning seller e.g. a piece of Picasso, and selling bids, when bidders are seeking to sell 
something to an auctioning buyer, say, a construction service. In a bidding contest, where 
continuous bids are allowed, a dominant strategy for a bidder is to keep bidding until the price 
reaches the bidder’s opportunity cost. When the number of bidders’ reaches infinity, the bid price 
should approach a perfectly competitive outcome. Afterwards in this study, I will call this 
phenomenon as the competition effect, the term I loosely borrowed from the study of Hong and 
Sum (2002). The competition effect seems plausible also in the light of empirical evidence (e.g. 
                                                 
1 http://www.hankinnat.fi/en/Pages/default.aspx (31.1.2015) (Public Procurement Advisory Unit) 
2 http://www.hankintailmoitukset.fi/fi/docs/tilastot_2011 (HILMA - declaration system for public procurements) 
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Brannman et al. 1987; Giliberto and Varaiya 1989; Goeree and Offerman 2003; Paul and Carr 
2005). However, it appears that competition leads to higher buying bids (lower selling bids) more 
likely in auctions, where each bidder knows how much he values the object, but his value is private 
information and unaffected by the information about other bidder’s valuation i.e. private-value 
auction (see e.g. Hong and Sum 2002). 
 
In auctions, where the value of the object is the same for all bidders, but bidders have different 
views of that value, i.e. common-value auction, the winner of the auction, might be the bidder with 
the most overly optimistic view and she is likely to end up paying too much for the object 
auctioned. This phenomenon was first called as the winner’s curse by Capen et al. (1971), who 
claimed that oil companies had paid too much for the oil drilling rights in Outer Continental Shelf 
(OCS) oil lease auctions in the 1960s and 1970s.
3
 However, in equilibrium rational bidders should 
take this into account by bidding less aggressively, which is in fact something that has been found 
in several studies since Capen et al. (see e.g. Kagel and Levin 1986, and Kagel et al. 1989). Hong 
and Shum (2002) studied a data set of construction procurement auctions run by the New Jersey 
Department of Transportation, NJDOT, in the years 1989-1997 and found that if the winner’s curse 
effect is strong enough, it can outweigh the competition effect and prices could actually rise as the 
number of bidders increases. Thus competition might in some cases actually increase selling bids 
(decrease buying bids), which is the opposite of the common believe that competition is always 
good and desirable. 
 
Most of the auctions are neither pure common-value nor pure private-value value auctions; instead, 
have elements from both of these extreme cases. Such auctions are generally called affiliated-value 
auctions. Construction project auctions are typically affiliated-value auctions; however some 
construction projects have more common value elements than others and vice versa. Participating in 
an auction incur real costs to a bidder. Li and Cheng (2006) argue that bidders may become less 
aggressive also in private-value auctions, when the number of potential bidders increases, due to the 
entry effect. This is because an increase in the number or bidders decreases the likelihood of 
winning the contract, but the participation cost, i.e. entry cost, remains the same. In equilibrium, 
rational bidders should take this into account by bidding less aggressively or by withdrawing from 
the competition. There are thus three simultaneous effects, all related to competition, affecting bids 
in auctions for construction projects. The competition effect affects bids downward, whereas the 
                                                 
3 Since Capen et al. (1971) evidence of the winner’s curse phenomenon have found e.g. Cassing and Douglas (1980), 
Lorenz and Dougherty (1983), Roll (1986) 
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winner’s curse effect and the entry effect affect bids upward. Which of the effect dominates 
depends on the type of contract and the competitive environment. 
 
In this thesis, I will study empirically whether the number of bidders affects the lowest bid in 
auctions for public construction projects in Finland. Moreover I will study whether this effect 
differs between different types of contracts. Hong and Shum (2002) have found evidence from the 
U.S. market that an increasing number of bidders affects the lowest bid upward in auctions for 
highway projects, but downward in auctions for bridge construction and repairing and paving 
contracts. These results suggest that the winner’s curse effect and the entry effect are particularly 
strong in terms of general highway projects. According to Hong and Sum, public authorities should 
favor negotiations over auctions for works, where the winner’s curse effect is particularly strong. In 
this thesis, I will widen the scope of Hong and Shum (2002) to include not only infrastructure 
projects, but also building construction. 
 
I will also seek to find out, whether there are systematic patterns between budget overruns and 
certain types of projects. Furthermore, I will study if low bid prices, possibly caused by the 
winner’s curse, are correlated with budget overruns. For example, if a contractor realizes that they 
have made a too generous bid due to the winner’s curse, they may initiate a further claim strategy 
for seeking additional revenues through change orders and extra works. In turn, the contractor 
might has spotted inconsistencies in the tender documents, and decides to submit a very aggressive 
bid deliberately by simultaneously knowing that they can seek more profit afterwards through 
change orders and extra works. Also, if a contractor runs into financial problems due to a too low 
bid, it can afterwards lead to disputes, poor co-operation, delays, bad quality and so on. If the client 
is not able to negotiate proper contract terms that effectively transfer these costs to the contractor, 
the client may have to bear at least a share of them. 
 
For the clarification, a budget overrun in this thesis is defined as the amount of final costs above the 
lowest bid relative to the lowest bid. Due to industrial reasons, the costs of construction are 
generally expected to be higher than the original contract price or the lowest bid.
45
 This is true in 
almost all types of projects. Since cost overruns are expected, the term “budget overrun” does not 
accurately describe the matter being studied. The chosen proxy, however, captures the relative 
change in budget overruns very effectively. Since, I am interested in factors affecting budget 
                                                 
4 It is more than a rule that changes will be made in original contract documents during the construction. 
5 The lowest bid does not always equal the original contract price due to contract negotiations 
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overruns not on absolute levels of budget overruns, the chosen variable suits well for the purpose. 
Similar approach was followed by Love et al. (2013) in their study.  
1.1 Motivation and background 
According to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD, public 
procurements accounted for about 29% of total general government expenditures and 13% of the 
GDP in OECD member countries in 2011.
6
 While these are astonishing figures, they were even 
higher for European Union, EU, countries. In 2011, total expenditure on works, goods and services 
in EU 27 countries was over €2,400 billion, accounting for approximately 19% of the GDP in the 
area.
7
 Public procurements thus represented a large part of the total demand in EU countries and 
have certainly been one of the key economic drivers in the area in recent years. There is no reason 
to expect that the importance and magnitude of public procurements have dramatically changed 
since 2011. 
 
In Finland, the annual value of public procurements was about €36 billion in 2011, see Table 1. In 
total, public procurements accounted for about 19.2% of the GDB in 2011, thus represented a 
considerable amount of the total demand. Moreover, the number and value of public procurements 
have been somewhat upward trending in past years. 
 
 
Public procurements in Finland 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Number of contracts 2198 2746 2963 3193 3252 
Total expenditure (billion €) 29.46 32.40 34.08 35.06 36.31 
GDP (%) 16.4 17.5 19.8 19.6 19.2 
The data is collected from the publication “Public Procurement Indicators 2011” published by the European 
Commission in 2012. About one third of the procurements are construction projects. 
 
Although the value of public procurements has somewhat decreased since 2011, and accounts now 
about 15% of the GDP
8
, it is obvious that public procurements still represent a major part of public 
spending and play an important role in the economy. Since public procurements are financed by tax 
                                                 
6 http://www.oecd.org/corruption/ethics/integrityinpublicprocurement.htm 
7Public Procurement Indicators 2011, published by the European Commission in 2012 
8http://www.hankinnat.fi/en/Pages/default.aspx (31.1.2015) (Public Procurement Advisory Unit) 
Table 1 
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payers’ money and have such a large impact on the economy, it is extremely important that 
procedures to allocate these procurements are as effective as possible. If the qualification criteria 
are set too high, it may restrict competition unnecessarily, which would be reflected in higher bids. 
In turn, if the qualification criteria are set too low, the entry cost and the winner’s curse may cause 
bidders to bid less aggressively. In theory, there is an optimal level of competition for each project 
in a given competitive environment. In practice, it is not easy to reach the optimum. With more 
knowledge, it is though possible to get closer to the optimum. Even a slight improvement in auction 
arrangements for public construction procurements would be worth millions of euro. 
 
Very often one hears that public construction projects are prone to budget overruns. Sweeney 
(2009) studied over 200 public construction projects in Australia and found a positive correlation 
between estimated costs and relative budget overruns. The average budget overrun for the projects 
of more than 100 million Australian dollars in value was as high as 20%, whilst for all projects 
10.7%. In another Australian study called “In pursuit of additional value. A benchmark study into 
alliancing in the Australian public sector.” performed by the Department of Treasury and Finance, 
Victoria, in 2009, the average budget overrun in traditional public construction projects was 
regarded to be something around 20%. In the light of these studies, the general belief that budget 
overruns are very common in public construction projects is not very surprising.  
 
Risto Pennanen, a reporter in Taloussanomat, wrote about the issue in his column in 6/12/13.
9
 
Pennanen referred to quite recent budget overruns in Finland: Ring Rail Line from €300 million to 
€738 million, the House of Parlament from €100 million to €235 million and Western Metro from 
€450 million to €800 million. Pennanen rhetorically argued that public procurers should be put 
responsibly for bad purchasing. He moreover questioned the whole importance of competitive 
bidding in public procurements if the agreements never hold. Although Pennanen’s argument may 
not hold if inspected more deeply, it reflects the opinion of the general public. 
 
There are various reasons for budget overruns. One could also argue that many of these reasons are 
logical and perhaps even acceptable. For instance, public projects are often large and complex, as 
were those referred by the reporter Pennanen in Taloussanomat. The mere size and complexity of 
these projects make the estimation of the final costs very difficult. In many behavioral economics 
related studies, people are found to be inherently and massively overconfident and overoptimistic in 
various decision making situations. The following quote is from the paper of DeBondt and Thaler 
                                                 
9http://www.taloussanomat.fi/kolumnit/2013/06/12/holmoys-maksaa-julkisessa-rakentamisessa/20138292/145 
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(1995) “Perhaps the most robust finding in the psychology of judgment is that people are 
overconfident.” Following the argument of DeBondt and Thaler, it is reasonable to assume that 
overconfidence and over optimism applies also to construction cost projections. This argument is 
furthermore supported by the findings of Sweeney (2009), mentioned earlier. Thus budget overruns 
might be due to human err of which we are all prone, not intentionally and deliberately made false 
forecasts motivated by dubious reasons. Moreover, a large size of a project creates room for 
continuing appeals performed by various external parties affected by the project. These appeals can 
delay the project significantly and increase the overall costs of the project. This type of cost is very 
difficult to model and to be included in initial cost projections. In addition, the production of a large 
project is frequently kicked off with unfinished drawings to speed up the schedule and it often 
follows that significant changes must be made in the plans and drawings during the construction, 
which can be very costly. 
 
In addition to the aforementioned reasons, there are also more suspicious explanations for budget 
overruns. For example, a competing contractor might intentionally appeal for its competitor’s 
project in order to deteriorate its rival’s profits and reputation. In the worst case, the company hires 
a person or even a group of people to make continuing appeals purposely and professionally. 
Moreover, some public agents may have somewhat vague motives to deliberately underestimate 
construction costs in order to ensure the permission of starting the preparations of a certain project. 
It is also a well-justified question, whether public procurers have as high incentives to cooperate 
with the contractor as their private counterparts, since they are not using their own money. If 
problems arise, someone else pays the price. Moreover, since legislation, directives and norms that 
guide public procurements have various other objectives than just overall costs, the hands of the 
public officials working with projects are at times tied behind their back. For example, if a public 
official is found to be cutting corners, he might be prosecuted, even if he acted in noble reasons and 
his actions were in the interest of the tax payers and the general public. Thus officials might be 
unwilling to compromise even if it would be in everyone’s interest. This kind of stiffness, inherent 
to public projects, can accelerate problems and cost overruns compared with privately funded 
projects. 
 
Despite the various reasons for budget overruns, frequent and often large scale budget overruns 
ultimately raise concerns about an opportunistic behavior. It is possible that the market views 
complex projects associated with high uncertainty very lucrative in terms of further claims. 
Contractors may submit low bids in order to win the contract, but have a hidden agenda to adopt a 
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claim strategy after the agreement to increase profit, resulting in a high number of change orders 
and extra works. Dyer et al. (1989) studied experimentally in laboratory environment a group of 
construction firm managers, who had lots of experience in low bid auctions. They found that these 
highly experienced construction managers were as much subjected to the winner’s curse as were 
college students in their previous studies. Construction companies would soon go bankrupt or stop 
bidding completely for contracts if they fell into the winner’s curse over and over again. 
Contractors must have either learned through a trial and error process to avoid the winner’s curse by 
bidding less aggressively when it comes to real projects not laboratory tests, or they have developed 
a strategy for renegotiating the contract afterwards, i.e. a claim strategy. Another explanation could 
be that when underpricing becomes evident, contractors try to raise their profits by lowering the 
quality of the work, saving in manpower, etc. These cost cuts may eventually prove to be very 
costly for the client in terms of delays, poor collaboration, repair works and so on. Moreover, 
contractors under limited liability might go bust, in which case the client must hire another 
contractor to finish the job, but also to pay the costs associated with the contractor’s bankruptcy. 
This problem is tough usually minimized by setting the pre-qualification criteria high enough or 
trough contracts terms e.g. by requiring the contractor to set up collateral. 
 
All in all, the main goal of the competitive bidding should be the finding of the most economically 
advantageous option, not the cheapest one. The most economically advantageous contractor may be 
left with nothing together with taxpayers if the contract is awarded to the contractor, who 
underestimates the costs the most or acts opportunistically. 
1.2 Research problem 
As mentioned before, not many if any studies have been made in Finland regarding the topic. Some 
minor studies might have been made by individual constructors or contractors, but to my 
knowledge, no one has profoundly studied the topic empirically and published it. There are 
however a somewhat rich literature around the topic in the U.S. and other foreign countries. These 
studies can be used to construct proper research questions and hypotheses, and to compare methods 
and findings to prior works. It is, though, worth mentioning that most of the academic studies are 
built on theoretic models, not on empirical research. There is thus a major need for empirical 
research, and not only in Finland.  
 
It would certainly be good if public procurers had more empirical evidence to justify their 
decisions. I do not consider reasonable the suggestion by Hong and Sum (2002) that public 
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procurers should favor negotiations over auctions for certain type of projects, since it could lead to 
corruption and inefficiencies in the long run. Rather, I think that better equipped public procurers 
would make better decisions regarding the designing of auctions. With more knowledge, public 
procures would be better able to determine the level of pre-qualification requirements for the 
contractors, to optimize the number of bidder’s asked to submit bids, time procurements more 
wisely and to choose the best contract form for the project, just to name a few.  
 
Moreover, if the winner’s curse effect and the entry effect were tackled away, at least to some 
extent, bids would be more accurate, since contractors would not need to add speculative risk 
contingencies in their bids in order to compensate the negative impact of the winner’s curse and the 
entry effect. More accurate bids would furthermore increase the predictability of the construction 
costs and reduce budget overruns in general, which would make public budgets more stable and 
enhance the reputation of the whole construction industry. Efficient contractors would also benefit 
from more effective bidding competitions, as unjustifiably low bids submitted by opportunistic 
contractors or contractors under limited liability would be reduced. Finally, information about 
public construction procurements could also benefit the designing of private construction 
procurements or even for some other type of procurements such as IT system or health care 
procurements. 
 
In this thesis I will primarily try to answer to the following questions: 
 
1. How does the level of competition affect the lowest bid in auctions for public construction 
projects? Are there differences either in the sign or the magnitude of this effect between 
different types of contracts? 
2. Do relatively low bids correlate with relative budget overruns? Are there differences in the 
magnitude of this effect between different types of contracts? 
3. What are the characteristics that affect competitive behavior? 
 
Research questions will be first studied by examining the existing literature and research findings. 
Based on these findings more sophisticated research hypotheses will be developed, which are then 
tested empirically by analyzing data using statistical methods such as multiple regression analysis. 
Data, for the empirical part of this thesis, will be collected by hand from multiple public sources as 
well as from the archives of various public procurers in Finland. Moreover, some of the data is 
provided by individual employees working in these public entities. 
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1.3 Main findings 
The findings of the thesis are presented very roughly in this sections. For a more detailed 
description of the results see Chapter 7. 
  
Each additional bid received seems to be associated with about 1.5% to 2.5% decrease in the lowest 
bid on average when compared to the pre-bid cost estimate. This is due to the competition effect. 
The client cannot benefit from seeking more bids sheer by asking for more, since per each 
additional bid sought, the lowest bid increases about 1.0% to 1.5%. This is due to the entry effect 
and the winner’s curse effect. The number of bids sought is the most important determinant of how 
many bids will be received. Of the all bids sought, 48.2% will be received on average. Because, just 
about 50% of contractors asked to submit bid, eventually submit it, the two outcomes outweigh 
each other. Two possible solutions for the problem were provided: the releasing of information 
about the pre-bid cost estimation in advance and the use of the second-price sealed-bid auction type. 
Both of the methods decrease common uncertainty and therefore the negative impacts of the 
winner’s curse effect and the entry effect. Provided solutions are most effective in projects where 
the common uncertainty is the greatest. Good candidates are large renovation projects mixed with a 
lump sum price or projects that are technically very challenging. Of the two solutions provided, the 
first one is easier to implement. 
 
An economic downturn seems to be associated with higher number of bids received, lower bid 
volatility and more competitive bids. Clients received on average 0.777 more bids during an 
economic downturn in 2009 and 2010, and bids were about 3.2% less volatile during the crisis 
when compared with the years before the crisis. The average difference in the lowest bid between 
crisis and the years before the crisis was 6.7%, when compared to the pre-bid cost estimate. The 
difference between the crisis and the years after the crisis was 5.7%. The impact is similar in 
magnitude than getting about three additional bids. The difference between crisis times and normal 
times was almost negligible in the group of large contracts, but very strong in the groups of small 
contracts. A possible explanation is that competition between large contractors is fiercer in normal 
times than competition between smaller contractors. This is because larger companies have very 
effective procurement systems and can utilize the economies of scale. The margins of material 
suppliers and subcontractors may thus be at a very competitive level not only during crisis times. 
 
Larger contracts seem to be associated with more accurate pre-bid cost estimation. Per each 
additional million in contract value, the accuracy of the pre-bid cost estimation improves by 0.3%. 
A likely explanation is that more effort is put on cost estimations when the contract size increases. 
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This is because an equal mistake in relative terms, incurs larger impact in absolute terms when the 
contract size increases. The cost estimations of small contracts and renovation contracts are 
calculated roughly, but conservatively to avoid budget overruns. 
 
Budget overruns do not seem to be greater in larger projects or in renovation projects contrary to the 
expectations. However, the lower the lowest bid, the higher the relative budget overrun. One 
percent drop in the lowest bid, increases budget overruns by 0.162%. A likely explanation is that 
the contractor initiates a claim strategy for seeking additional profit through change orders and extra 
works when they noticed to have submitted a too low bid. An alternative though not mutually 
exclusive explanation is that contractors act opportunistically when the quality of the contract 
documents happens to be poor and the contractor knows they can seek additional revenue through 
change orders and extra works. 
1.4 Limitations 
This study is limited to handle public construction procurements in Finland. The data is collected 
from the province of Uusimaa, and within the province of Uusimaa mainly from the metropolitan 
area of Finland, covering the area of municipalities Helsinki, Espoo and Vantaa. Limitation was 
done in the purpose of minimizing sample variation and the effect of unobserved factors caused by 
the geographical location that could have induced unnecessary noise in the results. Such noise could 
have been caused e.g. by differences in the competitive behavior in different geographical locations, 
different ground conditions, or cultural differences. Moreover, since Finland is a small country with 
a relatively low number of construction companies, focusing on the Metropolitan area better 
ensured enough bids for each of the auction included in the sample. 
1.5 Structure of the study 
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a quick glance into the construction industry 
in general. The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader the necessary background 
information for understanding the rest of the thesis in the right context. It should also ease the 
assessing of assumptions and limitations made in the thesis, but also the suitability of the chosen 
methods, and the interpretation of the results. After that, a broader look into the theoretical 
background of auctions and earlier findings is presented in Chapter 3. The purpose of this chapter is 
to clarify the assumptions and theoretical background behind the research hypotheses and to 
provide tools for further discussion. Chapter 4 presents the research hypotheses studied in the 
empirical part of this thesis, whereas Chapter 5 and 6 presents the data and the methodology used to 
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analyse the data, respectively. Chapter 7 provides the findings of the statistical analysis performed 
whilst Chapter 8 provides further discussion and concludes the study. 
2 THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
The following chapter explains the overall framework of the construction industry. The chapter 
begins by the definition of different parties commonly involved in a construction project. After that, 
a typical construction process and the most used contract types are presented. The standard Finnish 
General Condition for Building Contract is covered thereafter, which is followed by the general 
definition of change orders and extra works. Public procurements and market characteristics are 
examined thereafter whilst the final section of the chapter explains the bidding process in more 
detail. 
2.1 Key partners involved 
A typical construction project involves a number of different parties, which can be either from the 
public sector or the private sector. The most influential parties are the client, constructor, 
contractors and consultants such as the architect and engineers. There are also other important 
parties such as end-users, the owner, authorities, and construction inspectors, but I will not cover 
their roles in this thesis, because it is not critical in the context of this thesis. 
In some cases, the owner of the project might work simultaneously as the client, constructor and 
even the contractor. For example, major contractors in Finland construct hundreds of apartments by 
their own account every year, which they sell to interested buyers later. However, this thesis is 
about traditional design-bid-build projects, where an external contractor is selected through an 
auction to take care of the construction activities in accordance with pre-determined design 
documents. Therefore, I will focus on explaining the roles of different parties from the perspective 
of the traditional design-bid-build project. 
2.1.1 Client 
The client is naturally the most important party involved in a construction project. The client has 
something to be built, the vision and the need for certain functionalities, and she or he needs 
someone to fulfil those needs. The client decides what they want to build, when they need the final 
product to be finished, and how much they are willing to pay for it. Some clients have the ability to 
manage construction projects themselves, and some even have designing or contracting capability, 
but in many cases the client employs a construction consultant or a contractor to take care of the 
process in exchange of monetary compensation. (Kankainen & Junnonen 2001: 12) It is also 
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possible that the client is not the owner of the project, but due to simplicity, I will later on use only 
the term “client” to refer to the party, who initiates the project. 
2.1.2 Constructor 
The constructor is an organization, who is given the responsibility of managing the project. The 
constructor can be either the client himself or an external party contracted by the client to undertake 
the project on behalf of the client. In many cases, major clients such as municipalities have separate 
organizational departments for this purpose. The constructor represents the client and takes care of 
the client’s interests e.g. in the negotiations with the designers, contractors and other construction 
parties. The client is still responsible for the investment decisions and funding, but the constructor 
takes care of the project management on a more technical level. (Kankainen & Junnonen 2001: 13) 
 
The typical tasks of a constructor include the defining of quality, scope, schedule and cost 
objectives as well as monitoring the realization of these objectives. Moreover, the constructor is 
responsible for selecting the designers, applying for building permits, selection of contractors, 
construction supervision, coordinating, acceptances, warranty period tasks, etc. Furthermore, the 
constructor produces the necessary project reports, financial statements, technical documents, and 
plans that fall within the responsibility of the client and are necessary for completing the project. 
(Kankainen & Junnonen 2001: 13) 
 
Since the constructor works in favor of the client and in many cases is actually the same agent, I 
will later on use these words in parallel when referring to the agent, who sits on the opposite side of 
the table against the contractor, who is in charge of the actual construction work at the site. 
2.1.3 Designers and other consultants 
In most cases, clients or constructors do not have all the necessary skills needed for managing major 
construction projects successfully, thus they hire consultants, who are experts in particular fields, 
for example in designing or costing. Consultants are often employed quite early in the project life 
cycle to advice on design and cost matters. Commonly involved consultants are: architects, 
structural engineers, building services engineers and cost consultants or quantity surveyors. 
(Kankainen & Junnonen 2001: 13) 
 
Architects are in charge of designing the appearance and the functionality of the building to meet 
the requirements of the client and the building permit. Moreover, the architect often leads and 
coordinates the overall design work including the activities of other designers such as structural 
engineers and building services engineers. Structural engineers are responsible for designing the 
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structures and foundations that support the various loads on a building, whereas building services 
engineers design the systems that control the internal environment of the building such as heating 
and ventilation system, water supply and drainage, lighting, power supplies and 
telecommunications. Cost consultants prepare the estimates of how much the project will cost to 
build and sometimes monitor the actual costs during the construction. (RT- ohjekortti 10-10387 
Talonrakennushankkeen kulku 1989: 7) 
2.1.4 Contractor 
When sufficient design information is available, the constructor calls for tenders from contractors, 
who then submit bids for the actual construction work. How much is sufficient design information 
depends on the contract type, explained in more detail later in this chapter.  
 
The main task of the contractor is to complete the project in accordance with the contract 
documents, in the allowed time frame and for the agreed price. Moreover, the project must meet the 
required quality level set for the project. Other responsibilities include taking care of the safety, 
health and welfare of the workforce and the public, the protection of the environment and 
minimising disruption. Contractors usually do not have all the necessary skills to build all the works 
by themselves with reasonable costs, thus they subcontracts some parts of the work to various 
subcontractors. Typical subcontract works include e.g. plumbing, heating, ventilation and electrical 
works. In many cases, subcontractors have specialist design knowledge of their area of work and 
are therefore given some design responsibility as well. (Kankainen & Junnonen 2001: 13-14) 
 
The contractor, who is in charge of the overall construction work and is in a direct contractual 
relationship with the client, is called the main contractor also known as the prime contractor or the 
general contractor. It is also possible that there are several main contractors working side by side on 
an equal basis. In that case the client is responsible for coordinating the works. The client may also 
subordinate some or all of the other contractors to one contractor, who is then responsible for 
coordinating the overall work. (Kankainen & Junnonen 2001: 13-14) For the simplicity, 
subordinated contractors are later on in this thesis called side-contractors
10
.  
2.2 Construction process  
It is quite difficult to describe a common process for construction projects, since there are no two 
alike projects. Moreover, different countries have slightly different practices and legislative 
                                                 
10 Side-contractor is a direct translation from Finnish due to the absence of English equivalent for the term “sivu-
urakoitsija” 
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requirements that somewhat guide the process. Figure 1and Figure 2 present one way of defining a 
typical life cycle of a traditional design-bid-build project. The example is from the U.S. perspective, 
but the process is, apart from some small details, very similar in Finland. 
 
Typical life cycle of a traditional design-bid-build project (Mehta 2012:  3-19) 
 
 
 
Sequence of operations in the traditional design-bid-build project (Mehta 2012: 20) 
 
 
Phase 1 
• Pre-design or Programming 
•Building program definition, Economic feasibility assessment, Site assessment and 
selection, Governmental constraints assessment, Design team selection, etc. 
Phase 2 
• Design 
• Schematic design, Design development, Construction documents, etc. 
Phase 3 
• Pre-construction (Bid Negotiation) 
•Bidding documents, Selection of contractor(s), Contract negotiations, etc. 
Phase 4 
• Construction 
• Construction of the building, Change orders and extra works, Inspections, etc. 
Phase 5 
• Post-construction (Project Closeout) 
•Substantial completion, Certificate of final completition, Record documents, 
Commissioning, Occupancy, Warranty period, etc. 
Figure 1 
Figure 2 
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The process begins with the pre-design that includes tasks such as the building program definition, 
economic feasibility assessment, site assessment and selection, governmental constraints 
assessment and design team selection. At this phase, the client defines what they want to build and 
how much they are willing to pay for it. It is not unusual for the client to hire an architect and other 
consultants already at this phase, since developing a program for a large and complex project might 
be a very difficult task. (Mehta 2012: 4-5) 
 
The pre-design phase is followed by the design phase, which can furthermore be divided into 
multiple stages including schematic design, design development, and the construction document 
stage. In short, the architect develops the graphical illustration of the client’s program in the 
schematic design stage. Usually several revisions are needed, since the client rarely accepts the first 
proposal. Rough estimations of the likely cost and schedule are moreover produced at this stage. In 
the next stage, i.e. the design development stage, the architect involves other designers in the 
process for designing the building in greater detail. Decisions are made e.g. concerning products, 
materials, and equipment’s. Alternative design proposals and more detailed estimations of the likely 
cost and schedule are also prepared. After the design development stage, the architect and other 
designers together prepare the construction documents required by the contractor to construct the 
building. These documents include detailed construction drawings and specifications. (Mehta 2012: 
6-8) 
 
The design phase is followed by the pre-construction i.e. the bid negotiation phase. There are a 
couple of methods that can be used in selecting the contractor(s). Most projects, especially publicly 
funded projects, are awarded to contractors through auctions. Furthermore, auctions can be open or 
restricted. In an open auction, all contractors interested in the project can submit bids, whereas in a 
restricted auction, the constructor calls for bids from a pre-determined group of contractors. The 
contractor(s) can also be selected through negotiations. In this method, the client negotiates with the 
contractor(s) for the contract price, schedule, and other details. (Mehta 2012: 12-14) The 
negotiation method is rarely used for public projects, but frequently for private projects.  
 
The construction work usually starts right after the client have chosen the contractor(s) through a 
competitive bidding process or negotiations. The work is performed in accordance with the contract 
documents that are virtually the same as the bidding documents, especially in public projects. If 
changes are made in the original contract documents during the construction, these works are 
carried out as change orders and extra works. The constructor, designers and authorities furthermore 
  
 
16 
 
carry out various kinds of inspections during the construction to make sure that everything is built 
in accordance with the building permit and contract documents. (Mehta 2012: 15-18) 
 
The construction phase is followed by the pre-construction or close-out phase. This phase includes 
two major milestones, which are the substantial completion inspection and the certificate of final 
completion. The substantial completion inspection is performed when the work is complete for the 
most parts so that the client can start using the facility. A list of incomplete works referred as the 
punch list is filled during the inspection. Punch list items will be completed until the final 
inspection of the project will be held. If the final inspection passes, the certificate of final 
completion will be issued and the contractor(s) is given the final payment. Responsibilities and the 
liability of running costs such as maintenance costs will be transferred to the client. The 
contractor(s) moreover prepares record drawings and specifications to the client. These documents 
include all the changes made during the construction. The warranty period will also begin. (Mehta 
2012: 18-19) 
2.3 Contract types  
Construction projects differ significantly from each other in terms of how much risk is associated 
with the project, but also the expertise and experience level of different parties to respond to these 
risks varies. There are several different ways to cope with risks related to construction projects: 
initial preparations can be performed more thoroughly, drawings checked multiple times, ground 
conditions and existing structures inspected more deeply and so on. However, in many cases the 
most effective way to deal with these issues is to choose the right contract type for the project, so 
that the party, who has the best ability to bear the risk, bears it. Moreover, contract types differ not 
only in terms of how they transfer risks from one party to another, but also in terms of how they 
impact the overall project schedule and the quality of the work. The client must define the most 
important objectives for the project, and choose the contract type that serves those objectives the 
best. 
 
A typical construction contract contains all kinds of issues from delay damages and insurances to 
the length of warranty periods, but the two most critical issues to ponder when determining the 
contract type are: how responsibilities are divided and the method of payment. 
2.3.1 Division of responsibilities 
There are various different ways how responsibilities can be divided in a construction project. In 
order to limit the overall length and scope of the thesis, I will, however, concentrate just on the most 
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basic ones, which are the main contract, the multiple prime contract, the D&B contract, and 
multiple versions of project management contracts. There are also other contract types such as 
Public Private Partnership (PPP) or Integrated Project Delivery (IPD), but they are much rarer and 
furthermore excluded from the empirical part of this thesis, which is why there is no need to cover 
them here.   
 
Main contract 
In the main contract, the client prepares plans and drawings for the construction work beforehand, 
and contracts with just one contractor, i.e. the main contractor, to undertake the whole construction 
work usually with a lump sum price i.e. fixed price. The main contractor is allowed to use 
subcontractors, but these contractors are not in a contractual relationship with the client instead with 
the main contractor. Figure 3 presents the contractual hierarchy of a typical main contract. 
(Junnonen 2009: 17) 
 
Contractual hierarchy of a typical main contract (Junnonen 2009: 17) 
 
 
 
The main contract is very clear in terms of how responsibilities are divided. The client is 
responsible for the designing of the building, whereas the contractor has the overall responsibility of 
the implementation of the project in accordance with the drawings provided by the client. The 
contractor’s responsibility moreover lasts until the end of the warranty period. Although the client is 
responsible for the design, the cost and schedule risks are bore by the contractor, which is why the 
main contract is often viewed as a relatively simple contract form for the client. The client’s risks 
are related to the accuracy and the quality of the drawings and other documents, unforeseen items 
e.g. ground conditions and the efficiency of the competition in order to ensure a competitive price 
for the work. (Urakointiohje: Ohje rakennustöiden teettäjille. Liikenneviraston julkaisut 2009: 11) 
Figure 3 
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In an auction for a main contract, contractors compete with the price sufficient for them to be able 
to undertake the project the client has pre-determined. Contractors compete with the effectiveness 
of the implementation i.e. working methods, coordination and management skills, as well as 
procurements, but not with technical or functional solutions. The main contract is best suited for 
small and medium size projects, where the scope of the project and technical details are rather easy 
to determine. It does not suit so well for projects, where the scope of the contract is difficult to 
define e.g. due to insufficient mass data or incomplete plans. (Urakointiohje: Ohje rakennustöiden 
teettäjille. Liikenneviraston julkaisut 2009: 12) 
 
Multiple prime contract 
In a multiple prime contract, the client prepares plans and drawings for the construction work 
beforehand as in a main contract, but instead of contracting just one contractor, the client sings 
multiple agreements with many contractors to undertake different parts of the overall work usually 
against a lump sum price. The client often subordinates some or all the other contractors to one 
contractor, who is usually the contractor responsible for the structural works of the project. This 
contractor works then as the main contractor of the project and coordinates the works of other 
contractors, called side-contractors. Although side-contractors are subordinated to the main 
contractor, they are not in a contractual relationship with the main contractor, instead with the 
client. Each contractor can moreover use specialized subcontractors for works they desire under 
their scope of works. Figure 4 presents the contractual hierarchy of a typical multiple prime 
contract. (Junnonen 2009: 18) 
 
Contractual hierarchy of a multiple prime contract (Junnonen 2009: 18) 
 
 
 
The multiple prime contract can be viewed as an alternative for the main contract. This contract 
type however requires more expertise from the client. The client is responsible for the quality and 
accuracy of the construction documents provided for the contractors as in the main contract, but the 
Figure 4 
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contract type is not so clear in terms of how responsibilities are divided. Unless other contractors 
are not subordinated to one of the contractors, the client is responsible for coordinating the works. 
The client must also manage multiple agreements and might easily fall into difficulties if the works 
of different contractors do not proceed as planned. The multiple prime contract however enables the 
use of different types of contracts for different parts of the work and the utilization of contractors’ 
specialized expertise. It can also enhance competition. Furthermore, different parts of the work 
might be interleaved with each other, thereby shortening the duration of the project. The contract 
type suits the best for medium and large scale projects, which can be divided into clear and well 
defined subsystems. (Urakointiohje: Ohje rakennustöiden teettäjille. Liikenneviraston julkaisut 
2009: 12-13) 
 
Design and build contract 
In the design and build contract, D&B, the main contractor is responsible for both the design and 
the construction work. The design may include not just detailed design, but also functional design. 
In most cases the client though provides the concept or the schematic designs and the contractor is 
responsible for preparing a more detailed design. The contractor usually hires specialized experts 
for the design work, but in some cases the designing can be made in-house. Figure 5 presents the 
contractual hierarchy of a typical D&B contract. (Junnonen 2009: 14-17) 
 
Contractual hierarchy of a typical D&B contract (Junnonen 2009: 14) 
 
 
 
There are a couple of advantages to a D&B contract compared with traditional contracts such as 
main contracts or multiple prime contracts. A team consisting of experts in both designing and 
implementing can find innovative ways to reduce construction costs, while at same maintaining the 
quality and the functionality of the final product. (Junnonen 2009: 14) Since bids can be asked from 
Figure 5 
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contractors already in the schematic design phase, construction activities can proceed 
simultaneously with the design, contrary to traditional contracts. This shortens the duration of the 
overall project. (Peltonen & Kiiras 1998: 50) Moreover, since the contractor is responsible for the 
design, claims regarding inconsistencies in the drawings are eliminated. (Urakointiohje: Ohje 
rakennustöiden teettäjille. Liikenneviraston julkaisut 2009: 13-14) A close connection of the design 
and implementation can thus lead to overall economic gains and shorter duration of the project.  
 
However, there are pitfalls as well. D&B contracts are inherent to conflict of interest, since the 
contractor may try to increase profit by cutting corners in the designing. Furthermore, the contractor 
may use products of lower quality than determined in the plans and drawings. In a traditional 
contract, the designer contracted by the client, monitors and oversees the contractor’s work, which 
reduces opportunistic behavior. Comparison of D&B tenders and design alternatives also require 
more expertise from the client. Contractors also take into account in their bids, the overall cost, 
quantity and schedule risks they bear, which is why D&B contract is not always the most 
economical option for the client. (Urakointiohje: Ohje rakennustöiden teettäjille. Liikenneviraston 
julkaisut 2009:13-14) 
 
In a D&B contract, contractors compete not only in terms of price, but also with the functionality 
and quality of the overall product. That is to say that efficiency is not the only thing that matters, 
technical, functional and even esthetical solutions are of interest as well. D&B contract is best 
suited for large projects, where it is possible to find time or cost advantages by combining the 
designing and construction. It is also useful if the client wants for some reason to avoid a separate 
planning process. (Urakointiohje: Ohje rakennustöiden teettäjille. Liikenneviraston julkaisut 2009: 
13-14) 
 
Project management contracts 
Project management contracts are fee-based procurement forms in which the client buys 
construction services or construction management services from an external party. The construction 
manager contracted by the client acts in the favor of the client and gives his or her expertise in 
certain areas such as costs directing, scheduling or site operations in the use of the client. Project 
management contracts can be roughly divided into two categories: Construction Management (CM) 
and Management Contracting (MC). Categories differ in terms of how much responsibilities are 
transferred from the client to the construction manager, and how contractual agreements are 
arranged with other parties involved in the project. In the construction management contract, CM, 
subcontractors are in a contractual relationship with the construction manager, whereas in the 
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management contracting, MC, they are in a contractual relationship with the client. (Peltonen & 
Kiiras 1998: 17-18) The contractual hierarchies of these two contract types are presented in Figure 
6 and Figure 7, respectively.  
 
Contractual hierarchy of a typical construction management contract (Peltonen & Kiiras 
1998: 18) 
 
 
 
Contractual hierarchy of a typical management contracting (Junnonen 2009:  23) 
 
 
 
Common to both contract types is that the client pays the actual cost of the construction work, 
which includes direct costs plus a compensation for the construction manager’s overheads and a 
fixed fee. In a construction management contract, the client pays directly to the contractors on the 
basis of invoices, whereas in a management contracting, the construction manager pays the 
subcontractors after they have finished their work, and the client later compensates these costs to 
the construction manager in exchange of receipts and other documents. (Aaltonen 2009: 8-9) 
Figure 6 
Figure 7 
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Project management contracts are used especially in projects that require special expertise or strong 
guidance from the client during the construction. The aim of using project management contracts is 
usually to save costs and shortening the duration of the project. The client also retains a great deal 
of decision power with regard to procurements. All procurements must be accepted by the client, 
which distinguishes project management contracts from traditional contracts such as main contract. 
Usually the interest of the construction manager and the client are aligned by using a target price as 
an incentive mechanism in the contract. If the total cost remains under or exceeds the target price, 
the construction manager and the client share these saving or losses in accordance with pre-agreed 
proportions. (Aaltonen 2009: 8-12) 
2.3.2 Method of payment 
The client can choose the method of payment for the contract freely, regardless of how 
responsibilities are divided in the contract. Choosing the right method of payment for the contract is 
a very important task in the process of defining the right contract type for the project. There are four 
basic methods used in the industry, in which I focused in the following section. 
Guaranteed maximum price contract 
A guaranteed maximum price contract, GMP, is a form of agreement in which the contractor 
guarantees that the contract costs will not exceed a specified maximum. A contractor is 
compensated for the actual costs incurred plus a fixed or a cost based percentage fee subjected to 
GMP. If the actual cost of the works is higher than the guaranteed maximum price, the contractor is 
responsible for the cost overrun, unless the GMP has been increased due to changes in the content 
or the scope of the work. (Winch 2002: 129) For example, suppose a contractor agrees to build an 
office building in exchange for actual costs and €2,000,000 flat fee with a GMP of €10,000,000. If 
the contractor's actual costs are €9,000,000, the contractor is not paid €11,000,000 (€9,000,000 + 
€2,000,000), instead, €10,000,000. Again, if actual costs are €7,000,000, contractor will be paid 
€9,000,000.  
GMP contract effectively transfers risks  from the client to the contractor, since the client can cap 
his costs, whilst the contractor cannot. As a consequence, the contractor is likely to bid a higher 
price by adding a risk contingency into the bid. However, if the client has e.g. a fixed budget that 
cannot be exceeded, a higher price might be acceptable. GMP moreover allows the client to benefit 
from any cost savings founded during the construction. However, if savings are not split with the 
contractor, there is not much of an incentive for the contractor to seek them in absolute terms. The 
contractor can though lever gross margin by reducing costs. 
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Target cost contract 
The target cost contract is a contract form, where the contractor and the client agree on a specific 
target cost for the work. If total costs, i.e. the combined sum of direct costs plus a fixed or a cost 
based percentage fee, incurred to be lower than the target price, the contractor would get a share of 
these savings. Again, if total costs incurred to be higher than the target price, the client and the 
contractor would split these costs. (Urakointiohje: Ohje rakennustöiden teettäjille. Liikenneviraston 
julkaisut 2009: 17) Savings under or cost over the target price can be shared e.g. in 50/50 basis.  
 
The target cost contract is usually mixed with GMP. In this contract form, the contractor guarantees 
that the contract sum will not exceed a specified maximum, but there is also a specific target price 
to create incentives for the contractor to look for savings. For instance, suppose a contractor agrees 
to build an office building with a GMP of €10,000,000 and a target price of €8,000,000. Moreover, 
costs under or over the target price are agreed to be split in 50/50 basis. If the actual cost happens to 
be €9,000,000, the contractor is not paid €9,000,000, instead, €8,500,000. Again, if the actual cost 
is €7,000,000, contractor will be paid €7,500,000, not €7,000,000. There is thus a pain and gain 
mechanism in the contract. The logic of a target cost contract mixed with GMP is presented 
graphically in Figure 8. 
 
Risk structure of a target cost contract mixed with GMP. (Winch 2002: 140) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 
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The principal benefit of the target cost contract is its ability to align the objectives of the client and 
the contractor. Both can benefit from cost savings founded during the project. However, there is a 
risk that expectations about the quality of the work are conflicting, since the contractor’s incentive 
is to find savings, whereas the client desires as high quality as possible with minimum costs. 
Moreover, since the contractor is compensated based on actual costs, they have to give the client 
access to their accounts and other records on an “open book” basis, which requires a high level of 
trust between the parties. During the construction, the target and the maximum costs are adjusted 
with change orders and extra works to respond the changed situation (Junnonen 2009: 26). 
 
The target cost contract is often used for large or complex projects, usually combined with D&B or 
Construction Management responsibilities. Competitive bidding is usually arranged so that the 
client sets the target and maximum costs for the contract, and contractors compete by offering their 
own target cost for the project. Also the fee matters. (Urakointiohje: Ohje rakennustöiden teettäjille. 
Liikenneviraston julkaisut 2009: 17) The client may also evaluate some other criteria e.g. reference 
works or team work ability. 
 
Lump sum 
In a traditional lump sum contract, the contractor promises to complete the job with a lump sum 
price. Payments are received usually in advance and in stages during the construction. The 
contractor bears the risk with regard to quantities, subcontract prices, material procurements, etc. 
However, it can be agreed, and practically always is, that the client bears certain type of risks, even 
if the contractor promises to do the work with a lump sum price. For example, the contractor is 
usually compensated for costs caused by force major events such as natural catastrophic or strikes. 
The contractor must also be able to trust the information provided by the client in a timely manner. 
Hence, the client bears the risk of errors in the construction documents, not the contractor. Changes 
in the scope or the content of the project during the construction are taken into account as change 
orders and extra works. The better the work is defined in the tender phase, the less likely it is that 
the contract sum will change during the construction. (Peltonen & Kiiras 1998: 20) 
 
Lump sum contracts are often used for projects, where the scope and schedule can be defined 
clearly so that the contractor can fully estimate project costs. The lump sum contract transfers more 
risks to the contractor than other types of contracts. The client can be quite certain about the likely 
cost of the works if the project is well defined and the construction documents are accurate. 
However, the defining of tender documents requires a great deal of time and effort. Moreover, a 
lump sum contract can easily lead to disputes about the quality of the work, since the aim of the 
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client is to have as high quality as possible with the agreed price, while the contractor bears the 
risks of implementation costs. (Urakointiohje: Ohje rakennustöiden teettäjille. Liikenneviraston 
julkaisut 2009: 16) 
 
Unit price 
In a unit price contract, the client promises to pay the contractor a fixed unit price for each unit of 
some item constructed by the contractor. The final price of the project is therefore dependent on the 
quantities needed to carry out the work, but also the unit price for one item. The client bears the 
quantity risk whilst the contractor bears the price risk. In order to estimate the final costs of the 
project, the client must estimate quantities and multiply quantities with unit prices. (Ahokas et. al. 
2009: 39) Some parts of the works can though be carried out with a lump sum price.  
 
The unit price contract is suitable for projects, where the different types of items can be reasonably 
well identified, but there is a major uncertainty about the number of these items. Unit price 
contracts are often used for infrastructure works such as ground works or paving, where the 
amounts can change significantly during the construction. The unit price contract also requires 
careful preparation and comprehensive determination of how items are measured to prevent future 
disputes. The benefit of this payment method is its flexibility for changes in plans during the 
construction. Moreover, competitive unit prices are used to price change orders and extra works. 
(Urakointiohje: Ohje rakennustöiden teettäjille. Liikenneviraston julkaisut 2009: 16-17) 
 
Cost plus 
In a cost plus contract, the client agrees to pay all the costs of the work, including direct costs plus a 
compensation for the contractor’s overheads and profit margin. The client effectively bears all the 
risks related to the project. A cost plus contract is often used for renovation projects, where the 
scope of the work cannot be determined, or in emergency situation, where the works must be started 
as quick as possible. (Ahokas et. al. 2009, 39-40) Sometimes not even the kinds of labor, material, 
or equipment needed for the work is known before starting the construction. If a lump sum contract 
were used for such a project, the contractor would need to add significant risk contingencies in their 
bid, which would raise the price unnecessarily. The cost plus contract also eliminates conflicting 
views about the quality of the work. The contractor though does not have much incentive to find 
savings in this contract form.  
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2.3.3 Comparison of different contract types 
Contracts are commonly viewed from the perspective of how much they transfer risks and 
responsibilities from the client to the contractor. Two representations of this approach are shown in 
Figure 9 and Figure 10, where the contractor’s risk increases as a function of responsibilities. 
 
Risk balances of different contract types (Lowe & Whithworth 1996: 895) 
 
 
 
The relation of risk and responsibilities in different contract types (An owner’s guide to 
project delivery methods 2012: 7
11
) 
 
 
                                                 
11 https://cmaanet.org/files/Owners%20Guide%20to%20Project%20Delivery%20Methods%20Final.pdf (5/7/2015) 
Figure 9 
Figure 10 
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Price 
risk 
Quantity 
risk 
Contract types can also be seen from the point of view how different methods of payments divide 
quantity and price risks between the client and the contractor. The firmer the contract sum, the more 
risks the contractor bears. Representation of this approach is shown in Figure 11.  
 
Method of payments and risk balances (Peltonen & Kiiras 1998: 21) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contractor 
 
Client 
 
 
How certain risks are divided between parties is however not the only thing to consider, when 
choosing the right contract type for a project. There is usually other than monetary objectives as 
well. Other objectives might be related e.g. to the quality, functionality, or schedule. Moreover, 
economic cycle or location may affect input prices in a way that further influence the selection of 
the contract type. For example, during an economic upturn, the client might want to slow down the 
process by choosing a contract type that effectively separates the design and the construction 
processes from each other. This way the client may benefit from a possible decrease in input prices 
i.e. lower bids in the coming years, when the economy eventually turns to a downturn. In turn, the 
client might want to speed up the schedule in a recession when input prices are low by choosing a 
contract type that allows the design and the construction to proceed simultaneously. In Figure 12 is 
shown how economic cycle affects the costs of different contract types. 
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The impact of economic cycle on the costs of different contract types (Peltonen & Kiiras 1998: 
72) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The more risk the contractor bears in terms of method of payment, the longer the schedule. This is 
because tender documents must be prepared carefully to ensure that the contractor is able to price 
the contract effectively and to avoid future disputes. The impacts of the different methods of 
payments on the overall schedule of the project are shown in Figure 13. 
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The impact of contract type on the overall schedule (Peltonen & Kiiras 1998:  52) 
 
METHOD OF PAYMENT SCHEDULE 
Lump sum 
       Schematic design 
       Detail design 
       Tender procedures 
       Construction 
 
Target price 
       Schematic design 
       Detail design 
       Tender procedures 
       Construction contract 
       Construction 
 
Cost plus 
       Schematic design 
       Detail design 
       Tender procedures 
       Construction 
 
 
Contract types differ also in terms of how much they align the incentives of the client and the 
contractor. For example, in the target cost contract, the monetary incentives of the client and 
contractor are well in line, but expectations about the quality of the final product may conflict. The 
client desires to have as high quality as possible with minimum costs whilst the contractor gains 
only through cost cuts. In the cost plus contract, instead, quality objectives are not conflicting, but 
the contractor does not have much incentive to cut costs. In the main contract, in turn, monetary 
incentives are very much contradicting, which can lead to serious quality problems. However, the 
client can be pretty sure about the costs of the project given that the construction documents are 
well defined. 
 
As evident, different contract types serve for different objectives, and the client must decide, which 
objectives he or she values the most and choose the contract type that best serves those objectives. 
Moreover, the special features of the project and the overall economic cycle must be considered and 
taken into account when determining the right contract type. Furthermore, contractors naturally add 
risk contingencies in their bid, depending on how much risks they have to bear. The client must 
therefore evaluate whether or not the contractors are uncertain about their ability to avoid or bear 
Figure 13 
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these risks, which would be reflected as higher bids. Risks are not worth to be transferred to a party, 
who does not have sufficient capabilities or resources to manage those risks. 
 
Risks arising from divergent views are typically minimized through contract negotiations before 
signing the actual contract agreement. In the contract negotiations, any ambiguities about the 
content of the work or conditions for the selection of the contractor are reviewed. At this point, it is 
also checked if the contractor has understood the tender documents right. 
2.4 The Finnish General Conditions for Building Contracts (YSE 1998) 
The Finnish General Conditions for Building Contracts (Rakennusalan yleiset sopimusehdot, YSE 
1998) form the basis of the Finnish contract jurisprudence. YSE 1998 concerns issues such as how 
to deal with changes to building plans during the construction, liabilities and obligations of different 
parties, damages, warranties, etc. The YSE terms have been prepared in cooperation between 
constructors and contractors, thus they take more or less equally into account the various and often 
opposing interests of different parties involved in the project. The use of standardized and widely 
recognized terms speeds up the agreement process, as counterparties can focus on more important 
issues in the process of determining the contract for the project. YSE 1998 terms are usually 
attached to contract documents and they form the core of the most construction contracts in Finland. 
Even though YSE 1998 terms are widely used, contracting parties can agree not to use YSE 1998 as 
a basis of their contract, since YSE 1998 is not a compulsory law. Contracting parties may also 
agree to deviate from YSE 1998 terms in some individual matters. 
2.5 Change orders and extra works 
It is almost impossible to agree the content of a construction work so that there would not occur 
needs for changes in plans during the construction. Changes in the original design and plans or the 
scope of the work are more the rule than the exception. Changes may arise e.g. due to errors or 
inconsistencies in contract documents such as drawings, changes in government regulations, 
changes proposed by the contractor or client, or due to incomplete plans that must be completed 
during the construction process. These changes are carried out as change orders and extra works. 
Laine (2005: 30) Complementary designs such as installation drawings are though not seen as 
change orders or extra works. Moreover, a diligent contractor is expected to follow good 
construction methods, thus some works can be required, even if they are not explicitly mentioned in 
the contract documents (Laine 2005: 16). 
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YSE 1998 defines extra work as follows: 
 The work is not included in the original contract documents 
 The work does not change the content of the contract, but it is done in addition to the agreed 
work 
 The work is not subjected to any agreed work performances. (Ahokas et al. 2009: 198) 
 
In other words, an extra work is a building block or an obligation of the contractor to do something, 
which is not mentioned or included in the original contract documents, and is made in addition to 
the agreed work. Thus, if a street is agreed to be paved, but later on the client wants an adjacent 
street to be painted as well, this work will be carried out as an extra work. 
 
Change orders are works that are caused by changes in the content of the agreed contract. YSE 
1998 defines change orders as follows: 
 The work is not included in the original contract documents 
 The work changes the content of the contract or is subjected to the agreed work, but does 
not change the content of the work. (Ahokas et al. 2009: 198) 
 
Thus, if a street is agreed to be paved with regular asphalt, but later on the client wants it to be 
paved with acid-proof asphalt, this work will be carried out as change order. (Laine 2005: 15) 
 
According to YSE 1998, the contractor is obliged to carry out change orders, clearly indicated by 
the client, unless these works significantly alter the nature of the work (Ahokas et. al. 2009: 199). 
This obligation ensures that the contractor cannot refuse to carry out change orders necessary or 
essential for the completion of the project (Ahokas et. al. 2009: 197). Since the client has been 
given such a unilateral right, YSE 1998 furthermore defines that the contractor is entitled to 
additional time and compensation for carrying out change orders if these orders increase costs or 
extend the schedule. In turn, the client is entitled to compensation if change orders lead to lower 
costs. The contractor must submit a tender for the change work, which must be further approved by 
the client, until actual construction works can be started. The work must be priced in accordance 
with the contract documents or other agreements between the parties. Ultimately, if the price cannot 
be derived from contract documents or equivalent, nor a consensus about the price can be reached, 
the contractor must carry out change orders, at the client’s request, based on actual costs plus 12 
percent compensation for overheads and profit margin. The contractor is also entitled to a 
reasonable extension in the construction schedule due to changes. The client may alternatively hire 
another contractor to carry out the change order. (Ahokas et. al. 2009: 207-212)  
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The contractor must carry out required works, even if parties cannot agree whether the works are 
included in the original contract or are change orders unless these changes alter the nature of the 
work significantly. Open issues and disputes will be solved later, either in the final inspection or the 
economic clearance of the project, or ultimately in the district court. (Ahokas et. al. 2009: 199) 
According to YSE 1998, the contractor is not however obliged to implement any extra works. The 
client and the contractor can freely agree on the price, the time of completion and the impact of 
extra works on the overall project schedule and other liabilities. Extra works must also be agreed, 
before the works can start. (Ahokas et. al. 2009: 215-217) 
2.6 Public procurement 
Countries have commonly enacted laws to regulate public procurements. In Finland, public 
procurements are subjected to national procurement legislation, Public Procurement Act, which is 
conducted from the European Community directives on public procurement. According to the 
legislation, public sector procurements must follow transparent and open procedures. Moreover, fair 
and non-discriminatory conditions of competition must be ensured. The primary objective of the 
legislation is to ensure that tax payers’ money is used efficiently, and secondly, to enhance 
competition in the market and competitiveness of the companies. In the legislation, public 
procurement units are forced to utilize existing market structures and to improve the functioning of 
markets whenever possible, when procuring goods, services or works.
12
 The law however applies 
only for construction contracts above €150,000 in value in Finland. 
 
Although Public Procurement Act provides minimum requirements for public procurements in 
terms of openness, transparency, efficiency and non-discriminatory treatment, the law leaves room 
for ad hoc discretion. In terms of construction contracts, public procurers can set, and practically 
always do, certain minimum pre-qualification requirements for the contractors to ensure that 
companies considered for the work, really have adequate resources and skills for the job. Thus, 
public procurers have the right and possibility to restrict competition by pre-qualifying companies 
that can submit bids.
 13
 Whether this right to restrict competition is good or bad, is not so clear. As 
mentioned earlier, academic research is mixed though not inconsistent when it comes to the effect 
of competition on bid prices. At least, the expertise and knowledge levels of the officials, who make 
                                                 
12 http://www.hankinnat.fi/en/Pages/default.aspx (31.1.2015)  (Public Procurement Advisory Unit) 
13http://www.hankinnat.fi/fi/hankintaprosessi/ehdokkaiden-ja-tarjoajien-soveltuvuus/Sivut/default.aspx (31.1.2015) 
(Public Procurement Advisory Unit) 
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these decisions, should be very high. Otherwise, there is a risk that competition is restricted too 
heavily or that companies without sufficient resources or skills are not blocked away efficiently. 
 
There are several options of how public procurements can be acquired. These options are: open 
procedure, restricted procedure, competitive dialogue procedure, and negotiated procedure. The 
nature of the project defines which of the options is the most appropriate.
14
 The contract must be 
awarded based on either the most economically advantageous tender or the lowest price. If the 
contract is awarded based on the most economically advantageous tender, tenders must be 
evaluated against pre-announced criteria.
15
 Criteria can consist of measures for the overall schedule, 
quality, experience level, references or even for balance sheet structures. 
 
In the open procedure, the public procurement unit announces a notice of contract and all interested 
contractors can submit a tender. In Finland, the notice of contract must be announced in HILMA 
declaration system for public procurements. Whether or not contractors are qualified for the work is 
checked afterwards.
 16
 Qualification criteria must be attached in the notice of contract. The open 
procedure is suitable for simple and well defined procurements.  
 
The restricted procedure has two steps. First the procurer announces the notice of contract in 
HILMA, and contractors will then send a letter of interests to the procurer based on this 
information. The procurer then selects among interested contractors those whom it will send 
invitations to tender. The procurer must, however, ask bids from at least five companies. Yet, if 
there are not enough qualified companies, the procurer can continue the process with the qualified 
candidates. The procurer must specify the qualification requirements in the notice of contract. 
Moreover, if the procurer wants to limit the number of contractors, selection criteria as well as the 
selected number of bidders must be specified in the notice of contract.
 17
 The restricted procedure is 
suitable for large procurements, which can though be defined rather well, so that bidders can deliver 
a fully priced bid.
 
 
 
In the competitive dialogue procedure, the procurer negotiates with qualified candidates about the 
content of the project in order to find out one or more solutions that meet the requirements of the 
                                                 
14 http://www.hankinnat.fi/fi/hankintaprosessi/hankintamenettelyt/Sivut/default.aspx (31.1.2015) (Public Procurement 
Advisory Unit) 
15 https://www.tem.fi/en/consumers_and_the_market/public_procurement (31.1.2015) (Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy) 
16http://www.hankinnat.fi/fi/hankintaprosessi/hankintamenettelyt/avoin-menettely/Sivut/default.aspx (Public 
Procurement Advisory Unit) 
17http://www.hankinnat.fi/fi/hankintaprosessi/hankintamenettelyt/Sivut/default.aspx (31.1.2015) (Public Procurement 
Advisory Unit) 
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client. Contractors are then asked to submit bids for that particular solution. The competitive 
dialogue procedure is used for particularly complex projects, where the defining of the project in 
advance is very difficult.
18
 
 
The negotiated procedure is rarely used for public procurements, since its usage requires a specific 
justification that can be derived from the Public Procurement Act. In this procedure, the procurer 
announces the notice of contract in HILMA, and chooses among interested contractors those, who it 
will start negotiations with about the contract terms.
19
 
2.7 Competitive environment and bidding strategy 
The competitive environment of the construction industry contains all kinds of factors affecting the 
bidding decisions of individual contractors. These factors include general issues such as legislation 
and economic cycles, which are applicable to all contractors, but also individual issues such as 
financial constraints, managerial capabilities, resources availability, differing technologies, which 
are unique to each contractor. The market has low entry and exit barriers with low capital 
requirements, which is why the industry is highly fragmented and characterized by small 
contractors. Most contractors cannot operate in all sectors of the market, thus they define a strategic 
domain in which they operate. The strategic domain can be defined broadly to contain certain 
market areas such as civil engineering, building construction, or renovation, but it can be defined 
also more specifically. (Drew and Skitmore 1997) Some small company may e.g. decide to focus on 
infrastructure works, which are worth between €100,000 and €500,000, and located in eastern 
Finland. In contrast, major construction companies frequently operate in all of the market segments, 
but generally stick to larger contracts in which they have competitive advantage against smaller 
rivals. 
 
According to Drew and Skitmore (1997), bidding is a two stage strategic decisions process. First, 
the contractor must choose whether or not to bid. At this stage, the contractor has to consider their 
current and future workloads, but also the likelihood of being the lowest bidder, since preparing the 
bid requires time and effort, and ties up resources. Moreover, the contractor must assess whether the 
given contract is in line with the chosen strategy. Second, the contractor must decide the mark up 
                                                 
18http://www.hankinnat.fi/fi/hankintaprosessi/hankintamenettelyt/Sivut/default.aspx (31.1.2015) (Public Procurement 
Advisory Unit) 
19http://www.hankinnat.fi/fi/hankintaprosessi/hankintamenettelyt/Sivut/default.aspx (31.1.2015) (Public Procurement 
Advisory Unit) 
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level, which is high enough to cover overheads and risks, and to yield a profit, but low enough to 
win the competition. 
 
Several studies about the factors affecting the bidding decision have been conducted in the past 
decades (e.g. Shash 1993 and Wanous et al. 2000). Based on these studies, there seems to be a few 
recurring factors that influence the bidding decision. According to Flanagan and Norman (1982) 
these factors are: 
1. Contract size and complexity 
2. Regional market conditions 
3. Current and future workload 
4. Type of client 
5. Type of project 
 
Hillebrandt and Cannon (1990) moreover identified that managerial capacity and capability are very 
important determinants in the bidding decision process. According to Hillebrandt and Cannon, 
contractors do not give much importance to the availability of resources, because they can easily 
overcome such resource constraints by subcontracting, leasing or hiring, whereas managerial skills 
and resources are more limited. 
 
The pricing of the bid starts with a baseline estimate, which is conducted at the operational business 
level. Johnson and Scholes (1993) have identified four sources of cost efficiency: the economies of 
scale, supply costs, product process design, and experience. When the baseline estimate is ready, 
the process is fed back to the business strategy level, where the senior management decides the 
mark up level which is expected to maximize the company’s expected payoff. Male (1991), 
however, argues that bidder may from time to time attempt to fulfill other objectives such as 
minimizing the profits of competitors, or obtaining a contract even at a loss in order to maintain 
production. The senior management may also be more concerned with acquiring greater resource 
control than with optimally allocating resources, i.e. empire building. 
 
According to Drew and Skitmore (1997), contractors seem to require less risk premium if they have 
experience in undertaking similar types of contracts. Moreover, Hillebrandt and Cannon (1990) 
state that companies undertaking a large number of smaller projects are likely to require lower risk 
premiums than companies with just a few large contracts, since the former has more diversified 
project portfolios than the latter. 
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It is not an easy task for a contractor to know, whether they have an efficiency advantage with 
regard to some particular project. The company’s management might have a sophisticated view of 
the strength of each player in the industry or the company might have got certain information, say, 
about prices indirectly from the market, but the company still cannot be a hundred percent sure 
about its putative efficiency advantage. Thus even though the company might have a strong 
perception about its own and its rivals’ strengths, the company has to take into account the 
possibility that they have made an error, and finally end up giving a too low bid. Moreover, what 
makes construction project auctions even more complicated for bidders is that these auctions are 
usually first-price sealed-bid auctions i.e. each contractor gives its price in a sealed letter of which 
the lowest bidder will be chosen for the job at the price they bid. Thus contractors are not able to 
see other players’ bids at any point in time and are not able to adjust their bids or change their 
strategy during the auction. This is different from a typical auction for merchandise and goods, 
where bidders can see other bidders’ bids and are allowed to make continuous bids. 
3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The following chapter begins with a quick look in to the most used auction methods. The history of 
the auction theory and the game theoretic models of auctions are presented thereafter. After that, the 
main findings and theories with regard to the competition effect, winner’s curse and the entry effect 
are explored. Finally, the main findings with regard to the construction industry are presented.  
 
For a more detailed description of auctions see e.g. Klemperer (1999) or Easley & Kleinberg 
(2010). In turn, a very good game theoretic approach to auctions is provided by Chatterjee 
& Samuelson (2001). 
3.1 The standard auction methods 
The two most commonly used auction methods and perhaps the most familiar to laymen are the 
ascending auction and the first-price sealed-bid auction. Other important auction methods are the 
descending auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction. Although the descending and the 
second-price sealed-bid auctions are less known than the first mentioned, they are very important in 
terms of auction theory, and form the body of the auction theory together with the ascending and 
the first-price sealed-bid auctions. There are also other auction methods such as “all pay” and the 
Japanese auction, but since these methods are rarely used and furthermore conducted from the four 
basic auction methods, I will not handle them in this study. Due to simplicity, auction methods 
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described in the coming sections are moreover presented mainly from the buying perspective, but 
could equally well be explained from the selling perspective. 
3.1.1 The ascending auction (English auction) 
Perhaps the best known auction method in use is the ascending auction, also known as the English 
auction. In this auction method, the bidding starts with a low price, and is raised gradually as higher 
bids are submitted until only one bidder remains. The highest bidder gets the object at the final 
price she bid. The English auction is commonly used to sell merchandise and goods e.g. antique. 
(Easley & Kleinberg 2010: 250) 
3.1.2 The descending auction (Dutch auction) 
In the ascending auction, also called Dutch auction, the bidding starts with a high price, and is 
decreased gradually until someone expresses her willingness to pay the price. The bidder gets the 
object at the current price. The auction is called Dutch auction since tulips have long been sold in 
the Netherlands using this method. However, the method is rarely used for other type of products. 
(Easley & Kleinberg 2010: 250) 
3.1.3 The first-price sealed-bid auction 
In the first-price sealed-bid auction bidders submit sealed bids individually without seeing other 
bidders’ bids. The object is awarded to the bidder, who submits the highest bid with the price he 
bid. The first-price sealed-bid auction is commonly used by public procurers to buy products or 
services from private companies. Of course, the pricing logic then goes the other way around. The 
prize is awarded to the lowest bidder, not the highest bidder. (Easley & Kleinberg 2010: 250)   
3.1.4 The second-price sealed-bid auction (Vickrey auction) 
In the second-price sealed-bid auction, also known as Vickrey auction, bidders submit sealed bids 
individually without seeing other bidders’ bids as in the first-price sealed auction. However, the 
bidder who submits the highest bid gets the object at the price of the second highest bid. The 
auction is called Vickrey auction in the honor of William Vickrey, who was the first researcher 
analyzing auctions from a game-theoretic point of view. Vickrey won the Nobel Prize for his work 
in 1996. (Easley & Kleinberg 2010: 250) 
3.2 Different characteristics of auctions 
Auctions can roughly be divided into three classes based on the characteristics of the object 
auctioned. These classes are private-value, common-value and affiliated-value auctions. 
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3.2.1 Private-value auction 
Private-value auction is a term used to describe an auction, where each bidder knows his own 
valuation of the object auctioned, but not the valuations of other bidders. Moreover, the value of the 
object for each bidder is different and unaffected by the information about other bidders’ valuation. 
It is not easy to come up with the examples of a pure private-value auction, but an auction for some 
consumption item could be pretty close to pure a private-value auction. The buyers’ values reflect 
how much they each would enjoy consuming the item. (Easley & Kleinberg 2010: 252) 
 
An example from a corporate world could be a corporate takeover. In a business auction, the value 
of the business for sale is usually different for each bidder due to differences in possible synergies 
or strategic reasons. A business auction is, though, not a very good example, since one bidder’s 
valuation is usually somewhat valuably to another bidder and vice versa. Nevertheless, it gives 
some grasp to the idea of private-value auctions. 
 
In a pure private-value auction, where continuous bids are allowed, a bidder’s optimal strategy is 
simple. The bidder does not have to worry about other bidders’ bids, rather, she just keeps bidding 
until she either wins the object, or the price of the object rises above or falls below her personal 
valuation, in which case she stops bidding. 
3.2.2 Common-value auction 
In the common-value auction, the value of the object is the same for all bidders in the, but bidders 
know just their own valuations, not the valuations of other bidders. Thus variance in bids can arise 
only due to differences in opinions about the real value of the object. The valuation of each bidder 
is also affected by the information about other bidder’s valuation. (Easley & Kleinberg 2010: 252)  
 
An artificial example of a pure common-value auction is a jar full of €1 coins. The value of the jar 
is the same for all bidders, but each bidder has its own opinion about how many coins the jar 
contains. A more real life example, close to a common-value auction, is an auction for oil drilling 
rights. The price of such a right depends on geological surveys, future oil prices, future technology, 
etc. All the bidders have different views of these influential factors, thus different valuations for the 
oil drilling right, although the actual price is about the same for each bidder. 
 
In the common-value auction, a bidder’s optimal strategy is not as clear as it was in the private-
value auction. The bidder must take into account the fact that if he ultimately wins the object, he 
might be paying too much for it, since the value of the object for sale is the same for each bidder, 
but no one else was willing the pay as high a price for it. 
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3.2.3 Affiliated-value auction 
Most of the auctions are something between pure private-value and common-value auction. These 
auctions are generally called as affiliated-value auctions in auction literature. Like in the private-
value auction, the value of the object for sale is different for each bidder; however, these valuations 
are positively correlated with each other. The valuation of one bidder is valuable to another bidder 
and affects his valuation of the object. For example, a painting may have some private value for a 
bidder, but other bidders’ valuations affect his valuation as well, since they reveal information 
about the resale value of the painting i.e. common value element. 
3.3 Auction theory 
Auction theory is concerned with how the design of auctions affects people’s behavior. Since 
auctions can be designed in several ways, researchers are typically interested in studying the 
efficiencies of different auction types. Other typical issues studied include optimal and equilibrium 
bidding strategies and revenue comparisons. Vickrey’s study “Counterspeculation, auctions and 
competitive sealed tenders”, 1961, can be seen as a pioneer work of theoretical auction modeling. 
Vickrey used a game theory to explain the dynamics of auctions and provided the early results of 
the revenue equivalence theorem, RET. According to RET, if all bidders are risk neutral and their 
valuations are distributed independently and identically across bidders, then any such mechanism, 
where the object is always allocated to the bidder with the highest value or bid, and bidder with the 
lowest value expects zero utility, has the same expected revenue (Klemperer 1999). Under these 
conditions, both, the auctioneer and the bidders are indifferent between the auction mechanisms 
used. Vikrey noted that Dutch auction was strategically equivalent to the standard first-price sealed-
bid auction. He also proposed a new auction model, the second-price sealed-bid auction, in which 
the highest bidder wins the object with the price determined by the amount of the second highest 
bid. According to Vickrey, the second-price sealed-bid auction should produce equivalent results to 
the traditional English auction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
40 
 
Strategic equivalence of different auction types 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The revenue equivalence theorem (RET) remains to be the centerpiece of modern auction theory 
and much of auction theory can be understood by the means of the theorem. RET however applies 
only if certain conditions are fulfilled. For example, consider a common-value auction with three 
bidders where each bidder can bid a random amount between 0 and 1. Moreover, suppose that every 
value between 0 and 1 is equally likely, such that the expected value of the object on sale is .50. 
Without additional information, risk neutral bidders will bid .50, whilst risk averse bidders will bid 
less than .50. The risk aversion thus affects the valuation of an object on sale. RET will no longer 
holds; because bids will not only be a function of expected value, they are also affected by the 
information revealed during bidding. 
 
Myerson (1981), Milgrom and Weber (1982), and Maskin and Riley (1984) provided further 
analysis of RET when one or more of these conditions are relaxed. Myerson analyzed what is the 
optimal auction type when the assumption of symmetry fails, whereas Milgrom and Weber showed 
that if the assumption of independent valuations does not hold i.e. valuations are somewhat 
correlated, the most profitable standard auction is the ascending auction. Maskin and Riley, instead, 
reasoned that if bidders are risk-averse, the optimal auction to maximize the seller's expected 
revenue is the first-price sealed-bid auction. 
 
Common 
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RET is very sensible to the assumption of the private-value auction, however, virtually every 
auction violates these assumptions. A bidder is often uncertain about the value of the asset and 
valuations of individual bidders are usually correlated with each other i.e. one bidder’s valuation is 
valuable to another bidder. These aspects gave rise to the development of the common-value 
auction model. (Harstad and Pekec 2008) The studies of Wilson (1967, 1969) and Rothkopf (1969) 
are pioneer works of common-value auction modeling. 
3.4 Walrasian auction 
In 1877, Léon Walras, a French mathematical economist, published a study called “Elements of 
Pure Economics”, in which he constructed his basic theory of general equilibrium. This study is 
often viewed as the first theoretical work considering the general equilibrium theory, a center piece 
of modern economics. In his work, Walras presented a model of an auction, where there is perfect 
information and no transaction costs, i.e. the features of perfect competition. Each agent in this 
setting submits their demand at every possible price to an auctioneer, who then sets the clearing 
price so that the total demand equals the total amount of the object auctioned. The clearing price in 
a Walrasian auction thus perfectly matches the supply and the demand and produces a perfectly 
efficient outcome. 
 
A Walrasian auction assumes perfect competition and information, a finite number of identical 
items offered for sale, and that bidders are price takers, which is however rarely the case in the real 
world. Even though the Walrasian mechanism might work in private-value auctions, in which a 
bidder’s valuation is affected only by his own perceptions and not by the perceptions of others, it 
does not necessarily work in common-value auctions where bidders are differentially informed 
about the value of the auctioned item. (Hong and Shum, 2002) This is due to the winner’s curse 
problem discussed in more detail in the next section. 
3.5 Winner’s curse 
In 1971, three petroleum engineers, Capen, Clapp, and Campbell (1971) claimed that oil companies 
had paid too much for the oil drilling rights in Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil lease auctions in 
the 1960s and 1970s, and had suffered unexpectedly low rates of returns due to that. Capen et al. 
reasoned that overpaying was caused by the winner’s curse affiliated with the common-value 
auctions. In a common-value auction, the real value of the project is the same to all bidders, but all 
the bidders have different views of that value. Thus the highest bidder i.e. the winner of the auction 
tends to be the bidder with the most overly optimistic view. In other words, although your valuation 
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might be correct on average, you win the auction only when your estimate is the highest and 
ultimately find yourself overpaying. Similar findings to those of Capen et al. have been found in 
many studies. The field evidence of the winner’s curse phenomenon has been found e.g. in auctions 
for baseball players (Cassing and Douglas 1980); publishing rights (Dessauer 1981); offshore oil 
leases (Lorenz and Dougherty 1983); corporate takeovers (Roll 1986). 
 
The winner’s curse has been a somewhat controversial topic among scholars since Capen et al. 
(1971), as it implies that bidders do not learn from their mistakes, which severely violates the idea 
of rationality, the very basic assumption of many economic theories. For example Cox and Isaac 
(1984) argue that if all the bidders are rational, winner’s curse cannot occur. In equilibrium, rational 
bidders should take the winner’s curse into account by bidding less aggressively i.e. bid sufficiently 
less than one’s estimate. Moreover, because it is quite difficult to dismiss alternative explanations 
for overbidding when using field data, some researchers have presented alternative explanations for 
the winner’s curse. For instance, Hendricks et al. (1987) found that average profits in early OLS 
leases were negative in auctions with seven or more bidders, but they argued that this was more 
likely to be caused by the uncertainty of bidders’ about the number of bidders attending the 
competition rather than the winner’s curse. According to Hendricks et al. most auctions in the 
sample received less than six bids, thus bidders might have fully accounted for the winner’s curse 
effect of less than six bidders, but not for the auctions with seven or more bidders. Furthermore, it 
has been argued that the findings of Capen et al. (1971) could be explained by an attempt of oil 
companies to collude for lower prices. However, this argument does not exclude the possibility that 
oil companies really suffered from the winner’s curse. If Capen et al. have not published their 
findings; instead, had utilized the information against their competitors, their company would not 
have won any auctions, because in order to avoid losses, they would have had to reduce their bids 
whilst their competitors would not have. A more rational solution is, to publish your findings, and 
hope that your competitors also reduce their bids, and this is exactly what Capen et al. did.   
 
In order to solve the problem of unreliable data and alternative explanations for findings supporting 
the winner’s curse, researchers have studied the topic experimentally in laboratory environment. 
Bazerman and Samuelson (1983) showed that inexperienced bidders are susceptible to the winner's 
curse in a corporate takeover game. Moreover, Kagel and Levin (1986) found that bidding is more 
aggressive in auctions with large numbers of bidders (6-7) than with small numbers (3-4), causing 
negative profits. According to Kagel and Levin, bidders do adjust their bids to the winner’s curse 
problem in auctions with large numbers on bidders (6-7), but the adjustment is not large enough to 
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fully compensate the negative effects of the winner’s curse. They reasoned that bidders have 
learned to avoid the winner’s curse in small groups through trial and error, but have not fully 
understand the mechanics of the winner’s curse, thus are not able to avoid it when the situation 
changes i.e. the competition intensifies. In addition, Kagel et al. (1989) found that experimental 
auction markets are associated with a strong winner’s curse phenomenon, and that bidders learn 
through experience to adjust their bids in order to mitigate the winner’s curse, but do not 
sufficiently adjust their bids to reach the Nash equilibrium. Similar findings have found Dyer, 
Kagel, & Levin (1989); Garvin and Kagel (1994); Kagel & Richard (2001). A significant amount of 
evidence thus indicates that bidders are in fact susceptible to the winner’s curse, but continuous 
exposure to common-value auctions seems to reduce the impact of it. 
 
Rational bidding can be very difficult. The bidder must estimate the value of the object on sale, but 
also the expected value conditioned on winning the auction and the magnitude of the winner’s curse 
adjustment. Hence, it should not be so strange that bidders do make mistakes. In fact, it seems that 
the winner’s curse is a rather common phenomenon in common-value auctions. Or as Richard 
Thaler (1988) neatly put it “I think it is important to keep in mind that rationality is an assumption 
in economics, not a demonstrated fact. Given the results of the experimental studies, isn’t it possible 
that some bidders make mistakes in these auctions? It is also interesting to note a peculiar tendency 
among many economic theorists. A theorist will sweat long and hard on a problem, finally 
achieving a new insight previously unknown to economists. The theorist then assumes that the 
agents in a theoretical model act as if they also understood this new insight.” Today, it is a widely 
accepted fact that people do not always act rationally. A whole new field of study, behavioral 
economics, has emerged to explain how and why people sometimes make irrational decisions. 
 
As a side note, a book called “Common Value Auctions and the Winner’s Curse” written by Kagel 
and Levin, 2002, is a very good piece to the topic. 
3.6 Entry effect 
Participating in an auction incur real costs to the bidders. These costs are generally called entry 
costs in the auction literature. Li and Zheng (2006) argue that bidders may become less aggressive 
also in private value auctions, when the number of potential bidders increases, due to the entry 
effect caused by the entry cost, which is always positive and may dominate the negative 
competition effect. This is because the likelihood of winning the contract decreases when the 
number of potential bidders increase, yet the participation cost, i.e. the entry cost, remains the same. 
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In equilibrium, rational bidders should take this into account by bidding less aggressively, or 
deciding not to bid at all. Only bidders with sufficiently favorable signals will actually participate. 
Similar arguments have provided e.g. Xu (2013) and Roberts and Sweeting (2010). 
 
Xu (2013) argues that clients should make the entry costlier in order to intensify competition. 
According to Xu, discouraging actual participation makes the marginal participant in the auction of 
a better type. Xu’s argument is based on the assumption that the entry decision is made after the 
bidders know their valuations. In such a setting, discouraging actual participation can be optimal for 
the government. Making entry costlier screen less favorable bidders and increase competition 
among participants. Most of the papers dealing with the entry effect employ however the model of 
Levin and Smith (1994) to describe bidders’ entry decisions. In this model bidders make entry 
decisions before knowing their own valuations. In such a setting an increase in the entry cost 
reduces both the probability of entry and the expected number of actual bidders. In turn, the actual 
bidders face less competition and bid less aggressively. It is thus not clear whether the client should 
reduce the entry cost or make it costlier. The auctioneer can reduce the impact of the entry effect 
also by restricting the number of qualified bidders, who can submit bids. 
3.7 Findings in the construction industry  
3.7.1 Affiliated value actions 
Auctions for construction projects usually consist of both private and common value elements. 
Based on academic research, there are three different factors related to competition affecting bids 
simultaneously in such an auction. On the one hand, the Walrasian view of the market suggests that 
the bid price should approach a more competitive outcome when the competition intensifies, i.e. 
competition effect. On the other hand, the more competitors there are, the stronger the winner’s 
curse effect. Rational bidders should take this into account by bidding less aggressively. Finally, 
there is also the entry effect affecting the bid price upward. If the winner’s curse effect and the entry 
effect are strong enough, they can ultimately outweigh the competition effect and prices could 
actually rise when the competition intensifies. (see e.g. Pinkse and Tan, 2000, 2005, Hong and Sum 
2002, Menicucci 2009)  
 
According to Brannman et al. (1987) optimal bids in an affiliate-value auction depend on both the 
number of bidders and the accuracy of the cost estimations. More bidders or greater uncertainty in 
cost estimations calls for more conservative bids in order to avoid the winner's curse. Goeree and 
Offerman (1999) moreover argues that in an affiliated-value auction, a bidder with a moderate 
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private value and an overly optimistic estimate of the common value may outbid a rival with a 
superior private value, but a more realistic estimate of the common value. Inefficiencies are thus be 
expected to occur in construction project auctions. 
 
Paul and Carr (2005) studied the impact of reduced competition on bid prices. They controlled 
model variance by selecting a single building type, designed by a single firm, with pre-bid estimates 
prepared from the same estimating database, over a limited time period. The data consisted of 19 
major public educational facilities projects in New York State. The final sample contained 438 bids 
and over $158 million in construction value. Researchers found evidence of a strong nonlinear 
relationship between the number of contractors attending the bidding competition and the lowest 
bid price. According to the researchers, there will be a 3.79% increase in project costs, on average, 
for each bidder lost. This finding was statistically significant at .003 level, suggesting a very strong 
relationship. The effect diminishes when more and more contractors take part in the competition 
and is almost negligible after the ninth contractor. 
 
Paul and Carr (2005) however did not find evidence of statistically significant correlation between 
the number of bids and the average bid price. They neither provided an explanation for this finding. 
Perhaps their highly controlled sample was strongly characterized by common value auctions, 
whose value bidders had, on average, evaluated correctly, but the winners of the auctions failed to 
take the negative impact of the winner’s curse into account in their bidding.  
 
Hong and Shum (2002) studied the topic using a complex simulation model, which they constructed 
by utilizing bid data from construction procurement auctions run by the New Jersey Department of 
Transportation, NJDOT, in the years 1989-1997. The data consisted of 767 auctions of which 423 
were general highway projects, 194 bridge construction and repairing projects, and 150 grading and 
paving projects. Based on simulations, the number of bidders is positively correlated with the 
lowest bid in terms general highway projects. According to Hong and Sum, the optimal number of 
bidders in these auctions would be three. Hong and Sum moreover argued that the government 
could lower the expected procurement costs of general highway projects by about 15% by reducing 
the number of bidders from 6 to 3. However, Hong and Sum found opposite results for other types 
of projects in their sample. In terms of bridge construction and repairing projects, and grading and 
paving projects, the number of bidders was negatively correlated with the lowest bid. 
 
Many academic papers have argued that the release of information regarding the seller’s valuation 
of the object in sale may cause bidders to bid more aggressively in common value auctions (see 
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Milgrom and Weber 1982, Harstad 1990, and Campbell and Levin 2000). De Silva et al. (2008) 
tested this theory empirically buy examining the impact of a policy change by the Oklahoma 
Department of Transportation to the release the state’s internal cost estimations of highway 
projects. De Silva et al. performed a differences-in-differences analysis comparing bidding in 
Texas, in which the cost information was released throughout the entire period, to bidding in 
Oklahoma, where the policy was changed during the period. The data contained over 13,000 bids in 
Oklahoma and Texas over the period 1998-2003. De Silva et al. found evidence that the average 
level of bids was lower after the release of additional information as suggested by the theory. 
Researchers also found that the standard deviation of bids fell after the change in policy, but they 
did not find evidence that releasing the information would result in statistically significant lower 
winning bids.  
 
De Silva et al. split their sample in two groups, of which they argue to differ significantly in the 
level of common cost uncertainty. These project types were asphalt paving projects and bridge 
construction/repair works. According to researchers, bridgework projects contain more uncertainty, 
common to all bidders, whereas asphalt paving projects possess more private value characteristics. 
They find that both, the average level of bids and the standard deviation of bids, fell more strongly 
for bridgework projects. The average bid for bridgeworks fell by about 9.6% after the policy change 
in Oklahoma. Moreover, the lowest bid fell about 9.0%, but this finding was statistically significant 
only at 10% level. The effect on paving projects was statistically insignificant, suggesting that the 
releasing of cost estimation did not have any impact on the average bid price for paving projects. 
The number of bidders seems to reduce the average bid and the lowest bid for all projects in their 
sample. 
3.7.2 Budget overruns 
 
Ganuza (2007) developed a model where cost overruns, i.e., the difference between the final price 
and the price announced when the project is initially awarded, arise as a consequence of 
renegotiation of the initial contract. Ganuza argue that low investment by the client in the 
specification of the initial design is the main reason for cost overruns, since it increases the 
likelihood of significant changes in the design after the contract is signed. According to Ganuza it 
can though be in the interest of the client to under invest in the initial design, since it intensifies 
competition and lowers rents by making contractors more homogenous. In other words, although a 
more accurate initial design increases the likelihood of awarding the project to the most efficient 
  
 
47 
 
contractor, it also increases the rents of that contractor. Under perfect competition, under 
investment in the design specification does not occur since rents are eliminated. 
 
Ganuza however did not take into account in his reasoning, the negative impact of the winner’s 
curse. Rational bidders should take the under investment in the initial design into account by 
bidding less aggressively. One could also argue that if the bid is too generous due to the winner’s 
curse effect, the company chosen for the work may run into financial difficulties or lack of 
resources during the construction, which instead can lead to disputing with the client, poor co-
operation, delays in the schedule, bad quality, etc. If the client has not been able to take these 
problems into account properly, for example in the form of efficient contract terms, a very low bid 
price that looked good at first glance, may prove to be very costly at the end of the project. Even if 
the client is able to manage these problems properly and to receive the project with the original bid 
price, there might be indirect costs in form of bad relations, lost brand value, exhausted personnel, 
bad press, lost revenue, and so on. 
 
Bajari and Tadelis (2001) studied the contractual arrangements used in the construction industry. 
According to them, there is a tradeoff between transaction costs caused by changes and incentives 
to reduce costs. Bajari and Tadelis developed a model, which they used to show that although a 
cost-plus contract does not create incentives for cost reduction, it is superior to a lump sum contract 
when a project is more complex. This is because the cost of renegotiating a lump sum contract is 
very high if the initial design is incomplete. 
 
As mentioned earlier Sweeney (2009) studied 234 public construction projects in Australia and 
found that the average budget overrun for the projects of more than 100 million Australian dollars 
in value was as high as 20%, whilst the average of all projects was 10.7%. Moreover, just 12% 
percent of the projects in Sweeney’s sample were delivered on budget. 
 
In a study called “Analysis of WSDOT Construction Cost Overruns”, the Washington State 
Department of Transportation studied a total of 433 unit price contracts completed between 1985 
and 1989. Researchers found evidence that construction cost overruns are associated with project 
complexity and a large number of bidders. Complex projects were moreover strongly characterized 
by large projects. Researchers argued that since the competition forces contractors to lower their 
rents, some contractors may initiate a claim strategy, i.e. an aggressive pursuit of change orders and 
extra works, after signing the contract. Moreover, researchers claimed that formal claims, strongly 
associated with large projects, were one of the reasons for cost overruns. All in all, these findings 
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suggest that cost overruns are associated with common value auctions. However, it seems that 
bidders were not able to take into account the negative impact of the winner’s curse effect by 
bidding less aggressively, instead, initiated a claim strategy when the underpricing became evident.   
 
Love et at. (2013) provide an analysis of cost overruns of 276 Australian construction and 
engineering projects. Construction projects, 161 units in their sample, ranged from banks to 
hospitals and hotels. Civil engineering projects, 115 units, ranged from tunneling to road 
construction and sewer treatment plants. Love et al. used the contract award as the reference point 
for budget overruns and found a mean cost overrun of 12.22%. No significant differences for cost 
overruns were found among procurement method, project type, and contract size 
 
Odeck (2004) investigated the relationship between actual and estimated costs 
of road construction in Norway over the years 1992-1995 and found a mean cost overrun of 7.9% 
ranging from -59% to +183%. Interestingly, cost overruns appeared to be more predominant among 
smaller projects. According to Odeck, the greatest potential for cost savings lies in exerting pressure 
on smaller projects to control their costs. The completion time of the projects and the regions where 
projects are situated were also found to affect the size of cost overruns. However, Odeck did not 
find that the project type would influence the level of cost overrun.  
3.7.3 Other findings 
Calveras et al. (2004) argue that limited liability may cause firms in a bad financial situation to bid 
more aggressively than financially healthy firms, thus there might be a high probability of 
bankruptcy of the company submitting the lowest bid. Similar findings have found e.g. Waehrer 
(1995), Zheng (2001), Parlane (2003), Engel and Wambach (2006) and Board (2007). Bankruptcy 
would instead lead to cost overruns eventually, since the client has to hire another contractor to do 
finish the work, but also to bear bankruptcy related costs such as delays, litigation, and new 
procurement process. According to the researchers, this fear is realistic, especially for smaller 
projects, where there are more unknown and small contractors submitting bids. However, I do not 
regard this fear realistic, at least not in Finland, since public procurers are allowed to set pre-
qualification requirements for the contractor to ensure the quality of the participating companies. 
According to YSE 1998, contractors are moreover required to provide a collateral worth of 10% of 
the contract amount, which mitigates the problem further. 
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4 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
The research hypotheses of the thesis are presented in this chapter. The chapter begins with a short 
recap to the research problem, which is followed by the actual research hypotheses. 
4.1 Recap 
Construction projects differ significantly from each other in various different ways. Some types of 
projects are technically more difficult to carry out than others. For instance, constructing a power 
plant or a dam requires a lot more technical expertise than constructing a children’s daycare center 
or an apartment building. Projects differ not only in terms of technical expertise required, but also 
in how much uncertainty the project contains. To recap, when the competition intensifies the 
competition effect affects the bids downward. However, the stronger the competition the stronger 
the winner’s curse effect affecting bid prices upward. Moreover, the entry effect affects the bid 
price upward depending on the number of potential bidders. In theory, there is an optimal level of 
competition for each project. The optimal level lies at the point, where the gain from an increase in 
competition caused by the competition effect equals the loss from an increase in competition caused 
by the winner’s curse effect and the entry effect. In other words, the optimal level of competition 
lies at the point, where the derivative of the utility function is zero. A graphical visualization of the 
research problem is shown in Figure 15. 
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The optimal level of competition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Hypothesis 1 
Renovation projects are in general viewed to be riskier than new construction projects, since it is 
impossible to be a hundred percent sure of what the existing structures will contain. Drawings of the 
existing structures might not be available at all or the structures might not have been made in 
accordance with the original drawings. Moreover, providing that there are damages in the existing 
structures, the scale of these damages might be difficult to observe. In contrast, new construction 
starts from an empty plot and structures are usually based on well-prepared drawings and other 
documents. Naturally, also new construction projects contain risks related e.g. to unforeseen factors 
such as ground conditions, but the probability and the magnitude of these risks are usually not as 
high as in renovation projects.  
According to Brannman et al. (1987) uncertainty in cost estimations strengthens the winner’s curse 
and calls for more conservative bids in order to avoid it. Auctions for renovation projects are thus 
expected to be closer to a common-value auction than auctions for new construction projects. One 
could though argue that renovation projects may require special expertise that can create efficiency 
advantage i.e. private-value element. Although this can be true to some extent, the general use of 
Figure 15 
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cost plus contracts indicates that renovation projects are in fact characterized more by common 
value elements. My first research hypothesis is therefore as follows. 
H1: The level of competition affects the winning bid downward more strongly in auctions for 
new construction projects than for renovation projects. 
4.3 Hypothesis 2 
Researchers in the study of Washington State Department of Transportation (1991) argue that larger 
projects, measured as the value of the lowest bid, are on average more complex than smaller ones. 
This is true, because complexity increases the cost of the construction work i.e. the baseline 
estimate, and therefore increases the lowest bid. The value of the project thus serves as proxy for 
the complexity of the project. Moreover, when projects are increased merely in size, complexity is 
added simply because the administration of a larger project becomes more complex. According to 
the researchers, the increase in staffing overweighs the increase in size in many cases. Complexity 
moreover increases the uncertainty in cost estimations, which in equilibrium, should be taken into 
account by bidders in the form of less aggressive bids in order to avoid the negative impact of the 
winner’s curse. Moreover, the entry cost is expected to be, on average, higher for larger and 
complex projects than for smaller and simpler ones. Thus my second hypothesis is as follows. 
H2: The level of competition affects the winning bid downward more strongly in auctions for 
small projects than for large projects. 
4.4 Hypothesis 3 
It is reasonable to assume that the client puts more effort in pre-bid cost estimations, when the 
project size is large. This is because the “cost” of being wrong in relative terms has greater impact 
in absolute terms when the project size increases. Following this reasoning, larger project should be 
associated with more accurate pre-bid estimates. Thus, my third hypothesis is as follows. 
 
H3: The larger the project, the more accurate the pre-bid cost estimate. 
4.5 Hypothesis 4 
It is quite difficult to estimate the number of potential bidders. However, in some cases the procurer 
announces in the notice of contract, the number of contractors, who will be send the tender 
documents. In that case, contractors know the level of competition in advance. Moreover, the 
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number of bids sought reflects the competitive environment.
 20
 That is to say that if there are a vast 
number of companies operating in a certain market segment, the procurer usually seeks to receive 
bids from more contractors than if there were just a few. Contractors are aware of the competitive 
situation in the market situation, thus can anticipate the level of competition. The number of bids 
sought thus serves as a proxy for the level of potential competition. The higher the number of 
potential contractors, the stronger the entry effect, which instead should be reflected by a relatively 
lower number of bids, received. In other words, the more bids you seek, the less you get in relative 
terms. Moreover, the entry effect should be associated with less competitive bids. Hence, my fourth 
hypothesis is as follows. 
H4: The number of potential bidders is negatively correlated with the relative bid price and 
the relative number of bids received. 
4.6 Hypothesis 5, 6 and 7 
According to Peltonen & Kiiras (1998: 71), contractors’ own production increases in an economic 
upturn, which decreases their willingness to submit tenders for public contracts. Bids become less 
competitive and the variance in bids becomes greater. In turn, contractor’s willingness to submit 
tenders for public contracts increases in an economic downturn, since there are less of other works 
available. Following the above reasoning, hypotheses five, six and seven are as follows.  
H5: The number of bids received is lower in an economic upturn.  
H6: Bids become less competitive in an economic upturn. 
H7: Volatility in bids becomes greater in an economic upturn. 
4.7 Hypothesis 8 
A contractor may seek additional profits by initiating a claim strategy if they notice to be exposed to 
the winner’s curse. Since the winner’s curse effect is expected to be stronger in larger projects, 
budget overruns are expected to be more common and greater in magnitude in larger projects than 
in smaller ones. This reasoning is also in line with the findings of earlier studies (e.g. Sweeney 
2009; Hinze and Selstead 1991). One could though argue that, in equilibrium, negative profits due 
to the winner’s curse should not occur. However, a significant amount of evidence indicates that 
bidders are in fact susceptible to the winner’s curse; yet, continuous exposure to common-value 
                                                 
20 The number of bids sought equals the number of contractors who were sent the tender documents in this thesis. 
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auctions seems to reduce the impact of it (e.g. Kagel et al. 1989; Kagel and Richard 2001). Thus it 
is reasonable to assume that although bidders may be able to take the winner’s into account in their 
bidding, they do not adjust their bids enough to reach the equilibrium. Moreover, there might be 
some novel players that have not yet accrued sufficient amount of knowledge to avoid the winner’s 
curse. Thus my eighth hypothesis is as follows. 
 
H8: Budget overruns are in relative terms greater in larger contracts than in smaller ones. 
4.8 Hypothesis 9 
It is an industrial fact that renovation projects are characterized by higher amount of change orders 
and extra works than new construction projects. This is because, it is very difficult to define 
accurate construction documents for these projects in advance, which is why a cost plus is often 
used as the method of payment in renovation contracts. Renovation projects are also more prone to 
the winner’s curse effect due to higher uncertainty, which might strengthen the contractor’s 
endeavors of pursuing additional profits through change orders and extra works. Thus my ninth 
hypothesis is as follows. 
H9: Budget overruns are in relative terms greater in renovation projects than in new 
construction projects. 
4.9 Hypothesis 10 
Based on many academic studies, we can expect that the average of all bids in a pure common-
value auction is pretty close to the real value of the object in sale. Major deviations from the 
average bid though occur and the reasons for this are diverse. Some bidders might have made 
miscalculations, or have underestimated the costs of construction in general. Moreover, companies 
under limited liability bid more aggressively than financially sound companies and might, in some 
circumstances, succeed in submitting bids. Since it is likely that a company, who has submitted an 
unexpectedly low bid, initiates a claim strategy or goes bankrupt during the construction, different 
countries and working groups have developed procedures to spot abnormally low tenders, which are 
then supposed to be rejected.
21
 Although all of these methods are more or less artificial, and cannot 
detect all the abnormally low bids, it is interesting to test whether relatively low bids are in fact 
                                                 
21 See e.g. ”Prevention, Detection and Elimination of Abnormally Low Tenders in the European Construction Industry”, 
DG III Working Group, 1999 
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negatively correlated with budget overruns. Following the above reasoning, my tenth hypothesis is 
as follows:  
H10: Relative bids are negatively associated with relative budget overruns. 
5 DATA 
The following chapter begins with a short description of the data sources and the sample selection 
procedures. After that the data is presented in more detail. 
5.1 Sources of data 
The primary sources of data for this study were the archives of the Centre for Economic 
Development, Transport and the Environment in Uusimaa (ELY centre), the Public Works 
Department of Helsinki, and several housing production entities: VAV Asunnot Oy, Espoon 
Asunnot Oy, The Helsinki Housing Production Department and Asuntosäätiö. 
 
The Centre for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment in Uusimaa is responsible 
for the regional implementation and development tasks of the central government. The department 
takes care of the roads and bridges and the maintenance of associated equipment’s and facilities in 
the province of Uusimaa.
22
 The Public Works Department of Helsinki instead takes care of the 
planning, construction and maintenance of streets, green areas and city premises in the city of 
Helsinki. The department is also responsible for parking control.
23
 
 
VAV Asunnot Oy and Espoon Asunnot Oy are public companies owned by the cities of Vantaa and 
Espoo, respectively.
2425
 The principal task of these companies is to provide high quality apartments 
and houses for the people in the area at a reasonable price. The Helsinki Housing Production 
Department is responsible for housing production in accordance of the objectives set by the city of 
Helsinki.
26
 Asuntosäätiö is a non-profit organization founded by six major non-governmental 
organizations in 1951. The aim of this organization is to provide good quality apartments for the 
people in the area.
27
 
 
                                                 
22 https://www.ely-keskus.fi/web/ely-en  
23 http://www.hel.fi/www/hkr/en/  
24 http://www.vav.fi/front_page    
25 http://www.espoonasunnot.fi/ 
26 http://www.att.hel.fi/en/att 
27 http://www.asuntosaatio.fi/main.php 
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Secondary sources of data were HILMA -declaration system for public procurements, Credita and 
various other internet sources.
28
 Secondary sources of data were used primarily to confirm certain 
information and to supplement missing parts of data. 
5.2 Sample selection 
The data of this study contains various kind of information about public construction projects and 
associated contracts and auctions. The sample includes information about infrastructure projects 
such as road and bridge works, residential projects, and public building projects such as schools, 
hospitals and fire stations. The following information was gathered from all of the projects included 
in the sample: the name and description of the project, the date the auction was held, and the type of 
contract. Depending on the availability of data, information about the number of bids sought, the 
number of bids received, the value of the lowest bid, the values of all bids, the pre-bid cost estimate, 
and the final costs of the projects or the amount of change orders and extra works were collected. 
5.2.1 Residential 
Information about residential projects was collected from the aforementioned housing production 
departments. If a multiple prime contract was used as the contract type, each of the contract was 
included in the sample separately. Contracts with design responsibility or other than a lump sum 
price were not included in the sample. 
 
Multiple prime contracts were commonly used for residential projects in the original data. However, 
due to the absence of pre-bid cost estimations for individual side-contracts, a large part of the 
multiple prime contracts could not be included in the final sample.
29
 Since most of the contracts 
within the group of residential projects were thus main contracts, the average contract size in the 
sample was relatively large. 
5.2.2 Public building 
Information about public building projects was collected from the archives of the Public Works 
Department of Helsinki. The sample contained projects of day care centers, schools, hospitals, fire 
stations, offices, etc. Parking facilities were also regarded as public buildings. Projects in this group 
were rather large on average, but since Public Works Department of Helsinki uses multiple prime 
contracts regularly in their projects and individual pre-bid cost estimations were available also for 
                                                 
28Credita is a private company that stores declarations of public procurements announced in HILMA. Credita’s 
“storage” contains public procurements notices from the beginning of 2003. 
29Pre-bid cost estimation is necessary information fort the most hypothesis being studied 
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side-contracts, the average contract size in the sample remained relatively small. Contracts with 
design responsibility or other than a lump sum price were not included in the sample. 
5.2.1 Infrastructure 
The data regarding infrastructure projects was collected from the archives of the Centre for 
Economic Development, Transport and the Environment in Uusimaa, and the Public Works 
Department of Helsinki. Infrastructure projects contained all kinds of works from pedestrian light 
installations to road construction and bridge repairing. Due to the heterogeneous project base, 
statistical results regarding this group were expected to be somewhat noisy. However, adding of 
infra works increased the full sample size significantly and was therefore a justified course of 
action. 
 
Statistical noise with regard to infrastructure projects may arise also due to the use of unit price and 
D&B contracts within the sample. To recall, the client bears more risk in a unit price contract than 
in a lump sum contract. This is because the client has to bear the risk with regard to the number of 
items performed. In turn, the contractor bears more risk in terms of D&B contract compared with 
traditional contracts, since the contractor is liable also for the designing of the structures. However, 
due to the relatively rare use of other than lump sum price within the sample, the method of 
payment was not chosen to be controlled in the regression analysis. Moreover, dummy variables of 
different types of projects are included in the regression primarily in controlling means, in which 
case there would not be as much need for the type of controlling. When interpretations of the results 
are made, one just has to remember that dummy variable for infrastructure works captures all 
uncontrolled effects within the group. Therefore, results might be somewhat noise for project 
dummies explained in more detail in Chapter 6. 
 
A typical infrastructure project in the sample was rather small. This is because the Finnish 
Transport Agency is responsible for major road, railway and waterway projects in Finland, whereas 
ELY centres take care of smaller projects. Projects of the Finnish Transport Agency were not 
included in the sample, because they would have differed significantly by nature from the rest of the 
projects within the sample. A typical highway project takes several years, even decades, to be 
completed. Moreover, the contracts of these projects usually consist of special features that would 
have impacted the results in a way that could not have been controlled properly. Furthermore, there 
are a very limited number of companies than can undertake major highway projects in Finland. 
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5.3 Sample characteristics 
5.3.1 Sample for hypotheses 1 to 6 
A construction auction does not always lead to a construction contracts and even if it does, the final 
contract price might not equal the lowest bid. However, due to simplicity, I will later use the term 
“contract” to refer the data points in the sample. 
 
Figure 16 presents the sample for studying hypotheses 1 to 6. 
 
The distribution of the sample contracts with regards to different types of projects 
 
 
The original sample for studying hypotheses 1 to 6 contained 504 contracts. Since outliers of more 
than three standard deviations apart from the mean relative bid value were removed, the sample 
reduced to 496 contracts. What is meant by the mean relative bid value is explained in Chapter 6. 
As evident from Figure 16, building construction dominates the sample quite heavily. About 80% 
of the contracts within the sample were related to residential or public building projects. The 
relatively high number of contracts for public buildings is however somewhat misleading, since 
multiple prime contracts were commonly used for these projects. Several contracts were thus 
received for individual projects within this group.  
 
Figure 17 shows how contracts were divided between renovation and new construction.  
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The division of contracts between renovation and new construction 
 
 
 
The vast majority of the contracts for public buildings were related to renovation projects, whereas 
two third of the contracts for apartment projects were related to new construction projects. 
Contracts of infrastructure works divided more evenly. Many of the projects contain both 
renovation and new construction works. The criteria for the division of contracts between 
renovation and new construction are provided in Chapter 6. 
 
Figure 18 and Figure 19 show the time distribution of the sample contracts. 
 
The distribution of contracts over time 
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The distribution of the sample contracts around the financial crisis in 2009 and 2010 
 
 
Due to a small amount of data available before the financial crisis, the sample had to be collected 
over a relatively long time period from 2001 to 2014. A long time period was necessary to ensure 
sufficient amount contracts before the financial crisis in 2009 and 2010. A long time period is 
hardly a problem, because the pre-bid cost estimation provided by the client is used as the 
denominator of the dependent variable in most of the regressions. Therefore, if there were e.g. some 
legislative changes during the chosen time period, the dependent variable would capture the impact 
of these changes. This is because it is reasonable to assume that cost consultants or any other expert 
who is preparing cost estimations, is able to include in their cost estimations the impact of changes 
in the legislative environment. 
 
Figure 20 shows the distribution of the sample contracts with regard to the amount of the lowest bid 
in millions of euro.  
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The distribution of the sample contracts with regards to the amount of the lowest bid 
 
 
 
Obviously, the sample is strongly skewed towards smaller contracts. About 57% of the contracts 
were worth less than 2 million euro, and about 86% of the contracts less than 10 million euro. In 
turn, 17 contracts were worth more than 20 million euro, whilst the largest contract was worth over 
50 million euro. The large number of small contracts in the sample is partly explained by the fact 
that projects of public buildings in the sample were often divided into multiple pieces, instead of 
awarding the whole project to just one contractor. Typically these projects were divided into five 
separate contracts: structural work, electricity, plumbing, heating and ventilation, and automation. 
Roughly speaking, structural works represented about 60-80% of the total construction costs whilst 
electricity works were worth about 7-15%. Plumbing and heating and ventilation contracts 
represented both about 5-10%, whereas an automation work was worth about 1% of the total 
construction costs. 
5.3.1 Sample for hypothesis 7 
In order to study bid variance, all individual bids per each of the contract were collected. Figure 21 
shows the sample divided into different types of projects. 
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Contracts for studying bid variance 
 
 
As evident, contracts for public buildings dominate the sample quite heavily. This must be taken 
into account when interpreting the results with regards to bid variance. Figure 22 shows the time 
distribution of the sample contracts for studying bid variance. 
 
The time distribution of the sample contracts for bid variance 
 
5.3.2 Sample for hypotheses 8 to 10 
 
Figure 23 shows the sample for studying budget overrun hypotheses. 
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The sample for studying budget overruns 
 
 
The sample for studying budget overruns was relatively scarce due to limited amount of data 
available. Moreover, contracts for public buildings and renovation projects form the majority of the 
sample. This must be taken into account when interpreting the results. 
6 METHODOLOGY 
The following chapter explains the research methods used in this study. First, the means of 
controlling statistical noise arising from extraneous factors are presented. After that the dependent 
and independent variables of the regressions are presented. 
6.1 Controlling 
As mentioned earlier, there seems to be a few recurring factors that influence the bidding decision 
of contractors. According to Flanagan and Norman (1982) these factors are: 
1. Contract size and complexity 
2. Regional market conditions 
3. Current and future workload 
4. Type of client 
5. Type of project 
 
In addition to the above list, researchers have found evidence that managerial capacity and 
capability as well as competition affect the bidding behavior. The following two factors are thus of 
interest in this study as well: 
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6. Managerial capacity and capability 
7. Competitive environment 
 
To recall, the data for this study was collected from the province of Uusimaa and mainly from the 
metropolitan area. The limitation was done in the purpose of minimizing sample variation caused 
by the geographical location or the regional market conditions that could induce unnecessary noise 
in the results. Moreover, the data was gathered from highly prominent and well-known public 
procurers, which are more or less similar with each other. Thus, statistical noise arising from the 
variation in factor 2 and 4 in the list above was minimized already through sample selection. The 
rest of the factors are of interest in this study and captured using direct measures or proxies. 
Moreover, regressions of sub samples of data work also as a kind of controlling tool since variance 
is expected to be lower in a more homogeneous group of projects. 
 
6.2 Regression variables 
6.2.1 Dependent variables 
 
Relative bid price 
The dependent variable in the regressions (1-12) in Table 7 and Table 8 is the relative bid price, 
measured as the lowest bid divided by the pre-bid cost estimation provided by the client. To clarify 
this, if the pre-bid cost estimation was €10,000,000 and the lowest bid was €11,500,000 then the 
value of the variable would be 1.15 or 115%. Likewise if the lowest bid was €9,000,000 the value 
would be 0.90. The pre-bid cost estimates were prepared either by independent estimating firms 
regularly used by the constructors in the sample, or internally within the constructors’ 
organizations. If the cost estimation was given as a range, the mean of the range was used as the 
cost estimation. 
 
The time of the project preparation process when the cost estimation is made naturally affects the 
accuracy of the estimation. If cost estimations were prepared at different stages of the project 
preparation process, the latest was chosen for the sample. It is important to notice that even if cost 
estimations were inaccurate, it is not a problem for the matters being studied. This is because what 
we are interested here is the relative change in bids, not the absolute value of the pre-bid cost 
estimation. The pre-bid cost estimation works primarily as a bench mark value, enabling the 
studying of changes in bids. Inaccuracy is though a problem if cost estimations prepared at different 
stages of the project preparation process are systematically unbiased. For example, if cost 
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estimations are always more conservative at earlier stages of the process this may cause some bias 
in the results. This is actually true according to my discussion with the constructors. When the 
project development phase proceeds, the risk contingency in pre-bid cost estimation is gradually 
reduced. However, since a vast majority of the cost estimations in the sample are prepared more or 
less at the same stage, heteroscedasticity in this perspective is hardly a problem. 
 
Hypothesis 3 states that the larger the project, the more accurate the pre-bid cost estimate. The data 
is hence expected to be heteroscedastic at least between the value of the contract and the relative bid 
price. This can lead to a situation where a certain variable does not appear to be statistically 
significant even though it actually is. This problem is reduced by running regressions also for 
subsets of data. Regressions are run e.g. for groups with values close to each other, which should 
mitigate the heteroscedastic problem between the value of the contract and the relative bid price. 
 
Relative number of bids received 
The dependent variable in the regressions (13-18) in Table 9 is the relative number of bids received, 
measured as the number of bids received divided by the number of bids sought. The number of bids 
sought equals the number of contractors, who were sent the tender documents. To clarify this, if the 
number of bids sought was 10 and the number of bids received was 8, then the relative number of 
bids received would be 0.8. 
 
Bid variance 
The dependent variable in the regression (19) in Table 10 is the standard deviation of all bids per 
each of the contract. Standard deviation should be lower in an economic downturn. 
 
Accuracy of the pre-bid cost estimation 
The dependent variable in the regression (20) in Table 10 is the absolute value of the relative 
deviation of the lowest bid from the pre-bid cost estimation. To clarify this, if the pre-bid cost 
estimation was €10,000,000 and the lowest bid was €11,000,000 then the value of the variable 
would be 0.10 or 10%. Likewise if the lowest bid was €9,000,000 the value would be 0.10. As the 
variable always gets a positive value, a negative regression coefficient stands for better accuracy 
and a positive regression coefficient lower accuracy. 
 
Relative budget overrun 
The dependent variable in the regression (21) in Table 10 is the relative budget overrun, measured 
as the difference between the final cost of the project and the lowest bid divided by the lowest bid. 
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To clarify this, if the lowest bid was €10,000,000 and the final cost was €11,000,000 then the 
relative budget overrun would be 0.1 or 10%. 
 
If the final cost of the project is not available, the relative amount of change orders and extra works, 
measured as a percentage of the lowest bid, is used as proxy for budget overruns. To clarify this, if 
the lowest bid was €10,000,000 and the amount of change orders and extra works was €1,000,000, 
the relative budget overrun would be 0.1 or 10%. 
 
The using of change orders and extra works as a proxy for budget overruns, may cause some 
upward bias in the results, since it does not take into account e.g. damages paid to the client due to 
delays in the construction schedule. However, in most cases the amount of change orders and extra 
works forms the majority of the variance between the initial contract price and the final cost of the 
project, thus this upward bias is likely to be small in magnitude. 
 
Change orders and extra works are expected to occur in almost all construction projects, where the 
method of payment is a lump sum. This is general knowledge in the industry. Since budget overruns 
usually refer to unexpected cost overruns, the term does not accurately describe the situation 
studied. However, due to simplicity the difference between the final cost of the project and the 
value of the lowest bid is called budget overrun in this thesis. 
 
Number of bids received 
The number of bids received on each of the contracts forms the dependent variable of the regression 
(22) in Table 10Table 10. 
6.2.2 Independent variables 
 
Number of bids sought 
The number of contractors, who were sent the tender documents, i.e. the number of bids sought, is 
used as a proxy for the number of potential bidders. This is because the number of bids sought 
reflects the competitive environment. Typically more bids are asked if more contractors are 
operating in a certain market sector. 
 
Number of bids received 
The number of bids received on each of the contracts forms perhaps the most interesting variable of 
this study. 
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The number of bids sought and the number of bids received reflect both the level of competition in 
this study. This is a different compared with the previous studies that have used only the number of 
bids received as a proxy for the competition. The chosen approach takes more completely into 
account the effects of competition on bid prices. This is because, in order to receive more bids, the 
client has to seek more, which is expected to increase the entry cost and therefore bids. 
 
Value of the lowest bid 
The value of the lowest bid captures the effect of complexity of the project as well as size. This is 
because complexity and size increases the cost of the construction work and therefore increases the 
lowest bid. The value of the lowest bid is measured in millions of euro. To clarify this if the value 
of the lowest bid is €10,500,000 the value of the variable would be 10.5. 
6.2.2.1 Dummy variables 
The impact of categorical factors such as the type of contract is captured using dummy variables. 
Dummy variables take the value 0 or 1 to indicate the absence or presence of some categorical 
effect. The variable shows the impact of the effect when presence. 
 
Pre crisis 
Construction volume reflects the managerial capacity and capability of the companies, since current 
work load affects the availability of resources. When the construction volume is at high level, there 
are less and less skilled people available. On contrary, if the construction volume is at low level, 
there is an ample amount of skilled people without work. In Figure 24 is shown the yearly average 
of the new construction volume index in the past years. 
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The yearly average of the new construction volume index in Finland in 2000-2014 (2005=100) 
Source: Statistics Finland 
 
The construction industry is a late-cycle business, in which the impacts of the general 
macroeconomic events are shown with a delay, usually within one to two years. This is why the 
construction volume plummeted until in 2009 and 2010, due to the financial crisis in 2008 and 
2009. In order to capture the impact of the financial crisis compared with the time before the crisis, 
a pre-crisis dummy is put in place. The variable gets a value of 1 if the bid was received before 
2009 and 0 otherwise. 
 
After crisis 
In order to capture the impact of the financial crisis compared with the time after the crisis, an after-
crisis dummy is put in place. The variable gets a value of 1 if the bid was received after 2010, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Renovation 
The division of projects between renovation and new construction is made by interpreting the 
descriptions of the projects. If the project is considered as a renovation project, the variable gets a 
value of 1 and 0 otherwise. Projects regularly contain both renovation and new construction works. 
Due to simplicity, projects that contain both renovation and new construction works are considered 
as renovation projects. However, if the renovation part is trivial compared with the totality, the 
project is considered as a new construction project. Demolition works are considered as renovation 
works. Since, the division of projects between renovation and new construction is made by 
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interpreting the descriptions of the projects; there is a slight room for error. Yet, due to a relatively 
large sample size, possible errors have at most a minor effect on the overall results. 
 
Multiple prime contract 
If the contract type is a multiple prime contract, the variable gets a value of 1 and 0 otherwise. 
 
Side-contract 
If the contract is not a main contract nor for the structural works of a multiple prime contract, the 
variable gets a value of 1 and 0 otherwise. Multiple contracts are thus handled as they would all be 
subordinated to the contractor, who is responsible for structural works of the project. This approach 
enables the studying of different types of works within a larger totality. As mentioned earlier, the 
structural part of the work usually causes the majority of the construction costs. Moreover, it an 
industrial custom to subordinate other contracts to the contractor, who is in charge of the structural 
works and has the best ability to coordinate the works of other contractors i.e. side-contractors. 
 
In order to avoid multicollinearity caused by the high correlation between multiple prime contract 
and side-contract variables, side-contract variable is included only in the regression of the full 
sample. Correlation between the variables is then 0.681, which is low enough figure to avoid 
problems of multicollinearity.  
 
Residential 
If the project is considered as a residential building, the variable gets a value of 1 and 0 otherwise. 
 
Public building 
If the project is considered as a public building, the variable gets a value of 1 and 0 otherwise. As a 
side note, infrastructure projects do not have an own dummy variable. The values of the residential 
and public building dummies are relative to the infrastructure group. For example, suppose that the 
relative bid price for the residential dummy gets a value of 0.05. This would mean that the relative 
bid price is on average 0.05 higher for the group of residential buildings than for the group of 
infrastructure projects. 
6.3 Limitations 
One could argue that the variables chosen for the study are not sufficient to capture all the 
influential factors affecting bids during the chosen time period. This is a reasonable concern, 
especially; because the time span of the study is long and significant economic and legislative 
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turbulent have occurred during that time. For instance, the legislation that governs the construction 
industry might have changed in a way that has impacted bid prices. However, since the denominator 
of the dependent variable in most of regressions is the pre-bid cost estimation provided by the 
client, the impact of changes that are not captured by the independent variables are captured by the 
dependent variable. This is because it is reasonable to assume that the pre-bid cost estimation 
incorporates the impact of changes either in the legislative or the competitive environment. Thus the 
dependent variable itself works also as a control variable, reducing statistical noise in the results. 
 
Although the relative bid price is a useful variable to measure the price competitiveness of bids, it 
has pitfalls as well. A major concern of using it as a benchmark value is its non-standard nature. 
Since the properties of the projects are expected to affect bids, they may also affect the pre-bid cost 
estimation. For example, if the client expects the level of competition to be lower for some reason, 
this information is probably incorporated in the pre-bid cost estimation. Such a mechanism will 
decrease the statistical significance of the regression coefficients and increase the likelihood of type 
II error i.e. failing to detect an effect that is present, but would decrease the likelihood of type I 
error i.e. detecting an effect that is not present. Some findings may thus appear to be statistically 
insignificant even though they actually are. In the absence of better measures for the price 
competitiveness of bids, the pre-bid cost estimation though remains to be the best tool for this 
purpose. One just has to be cautious, when making interpretations about the results. 
 
A construction auction does not always lead to a construction contracts and even if it does, the final 
contract price might not equal the lowest bid. In many cases, the price is not the only criteria for 
awarding the contract. Due to simplicity, it was however assumed that a contract was agreed with 
the price of lowest bid. This might somewhat exaggerate budget overruns, but since the contract is 
awarded to the lowest bidder in vast majority of contracts, this is just minor bias in the data. 
Moreover, there is no need to assume that the bias would systematic by nature, thus the impact is 
likely to vanish when large amount of data is analyzed together. 
7 RESULTS 
7.1 Descriptive statistics  
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the samples for studying hypotheses 1 to 7. 
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Descriptive statistics of the sample for studying hypothesis 1 to 7 
Sample 
Total low 
bids (M€) 
Total pre-bid 
estimates (M€) 
Mean 
relative bid 
Number of 
contracts 
Mean value of the 
lowest bid (M€) 
Total number 
of bids sought¹ 
Total number of 
bids received 
Mean number of 
bids sought 
Mean number of 
bids received 
Full 2179 2273 
0.88 
(0.90) 
496 
4.39 
(1.28) 
4687 2656 9.45 5.35 
Renovation 580 644 
0.83 
(0.83) 
298 
1.95 
(0.79) 
3163 1806 10.61 6.06 
New construction 1599 1629 
0.95 
(0.97) 
198 
8.07 
(5.58) 
1524 850 7.70 4.29 
Residential 1702 1708 
1.01 
(1.01) 
164 
10.38 
(8.27) 
1205 609 7.35 3.71 
Public building 318 383 
0.79 
(0.78) 
230 
0.79 
(0.78) 
2569 1513 11.17 6.58 
Infrastructure 159 181 
0.89 
(0.88) 
102 
1.56 
(0.99) 
913 534 8.95 5.24 
Note: Median in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2  
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The full sample of the study contained 496 contracts, which received 2656 bids in total. The 
total value of the contracts was about €2,179 million whilst the smallest contract was worth 
€15,100 and the largest €50.420 million. The average contract size was €4.39 million, and the 
median €1.28 million. 
 
As can be seen from Table 2, the average relative bid of the full sample was 0.88. This means 
that the lowest bid was on average 12% lower than the pre-bid cost estimation prepared by the 
client. There are however major deviations between different types of projects. As expected, 
pre-bid cost estimations were more accurate for new construction projects than for renovation 
projects. Respective figures were 0.95 and 0.83. More interestingly, pre-bid cost estimations 
for residential projects seem to be much more accurate than estimations for other types of 
projects. The mean relative bid price of contracts for residential projects was 1.01 whilst the 
respective figures for public buildings and infrastructure projects were 0.79 and 0.89. Better 
accuracy might be explained by the fact that 66% of the contracts for residential projects were 
new construction projects, whereas comparable figures for public buildings and infrastructure 
projects were 18.3% and 46.1%.  
 
Interestingly, the total amount of low bids, €2,179 million, is actually pretty close to the 
estimated amount of low bids, €2,273 million. The difference is just 4.1% whilst the 
difference between arithmetic averages was 12%. This finding suggests that pre-bid cost 
estimations become more accurate when the project size increases. A possible explanation is 
that more effort is put on estimation when the contract size becomes larger. Figure 25 and 
Figure 26 show the relation between the value of the lowest bid and the relative bid price. 
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The relation between the value of the lowest bid and the relative bid price 
 
 
 
The relation between the value of the lowest bid and the mean relative bid price 
Note: Vertical line shows the 90% confidence interval of the mean. 
 
 
It seems that pre-bid estimates become more accurate and less volatile when the contract size 
increases. We cannot though be sure about this causality, since 76.8% of the contracts above 3 
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million euro in the sample were for residential projects. The relation between the relative bid 
price and the value of the contract may thus be explained by the higher accuracy of the cost 
estimations within the group of contracts for residential projects. Nonetheless, it seems that 
the accuracy of the pre-bid cost estimations becomes better also within a group of contracts 
with a value higher than 3 million euro. This finding suggests that pre-bid cost estimations 
really become more accurate when the contract size increases. This is supporting evidence of 
Hypothesis 3. Multiple regression analysis is though needed to confirm the finding. 
 
Contracts for residential projects are on average much larger in the sample than contracts for 
other types of projects. The mean contract size for residential projects was €10.38 million, 
whereas it was just €0.79 million for public buildings and €1.56 million for infrastructure 
projects as shown in Table 2. A part of the difference in the accuracy of pre-bid cost 
estimations may thus be explained by the sheer difference in contract sizes. The sample of 
contracts for public buildings contains a lot of small contracts such as automation, heating and 
ventilation, electricity and plumbing works. Since, the majority of the total construction costs 
come from the structural part of the work, pre-bid cost estimation efforts might have been 
divided unevenly between the contracts. The largest contract might have acquired most of the 
pre-bid cost estimation efforts, with the expense of other contracts. Smaller contracts may be 
estimated roughly, but conservatively to avoid budget overruns. This kind of behaviour would 
distort the arithmetic mean of the relative bid price downward, although the cost estimation 
for the whole project would be rather accurate in euro terms. This argument is supported by 
the fact that the weighted average of the relative bid price for public buildings is 0.86 whilst 
the arithmetic average was just 0.79. 
 
The sample of contracts for infrastructure projects is very heterogeneous including projects 
from bridge construction to pedestrian light installations. Due to a very mixed project base, 
reasonable interpretations of the results are difficult to be made. However, rather low 
accuracy of the pre-bid cost estimations within the group of infrastructure projects might be 
explained by the aforementioned arguments: small average contract size and a high number of 
renovation projects within the sample.  
 
All in all, it seems that pre-bid cost estimations of public buildings and infrastructure works 
are very much on the safe-side. This might be a deliberated decision. Different institutions 
have dissimilar budget constraints that call for different level of certainty from pre-bid cost 
estimations. For instance, if the budget is very flexible, there is less need for very accurate 
cost estimations. In turn, if the budget is very tight, accurate cost estimations are important. In 
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addition, there might be differences in the budget approval processes. For instance, the 
budgets of projects owned by the city of Helsinki must be approved by the city council until 
the procurement can begin. This may call for more conservative cost estimation so that the 
budget would not be exceeded later. The housing production entities do not have similar 
budget approval processes. Nevertheless, there is not much reason to compare different types 
of projects together. What is of interest in this study is how bids behave and how bids affect 
budget overruns. The accuracy of pre-bid cost estimates is of course an interesting by-product. 
 
The average amount of bids received for a contract in the sample was 5.35 whilst the amount 
of bids sought was 9.45. There is not much difference between different types of projects with 
regard to how many bids are received as a percent of the bids sought. Of the all bids sought, 
about 55% were received among all types of projects. The number of bids sought and 
received is however negatively correlated with the size of the contract. Figure 27 shows the 
relations between the value of the lowest bid and the number of bids. 
 
The relation between the value of the lowest bid and the number of bids 
 
 
It seems that there is a decent amount of competition around small contracts, but very little 
around large ones. The client received on average just 2.24 bids for contracts above 20 million 
euro in value. The figure is so low that it is reasonable to question whether we have a 
functional market at the moment. Since the level of competition seems to be very much 
correlated with the value of the contract, I will expect to find causality between the value of 
the contract and the relative bid price. 
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Figure 28 and Figure 29 show the relation between the number of bids received and the 
relative bid price. As expected, the relative bid price is negatively correlated with the number 
of bids received. Bids seem to become about 2.2% more competitive per each additional bid 
received, when compared with the pre-bid cost estimation. Although there seems to be a 
strong negative correlation between the variables, we cannot however confirm this finding 
until multiple regression analysis is performed.  
 
The relation between the number of bids received and the relative bid price 
 
 
 
Regression analysis used in this study assumes that the relation between the variables studied 
is linear. This is perhaps not the case as depicted in Figure 15. For example Paul and Carr 
(2005), who found that there will be 3.79% increase in project costs, on average, for each 
bidder lost, had R-square value of just 10.2% for the linear regression and 38% for the 
curvilinear regression. However, based on Figure 28 the assumption of linearity is justified. 
The relation seems to be linear at least between the number of bids received and the relative 
bid price. 
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The relation between the number of bids received and the mean relative bid price  
Note: Vertical line shows the 90% confidence interval of the mean. Projects with more than 13 bids were 
removed due to an insufficient number of data points. 
 
 
 
Table 3 shows the results of the correlation analysis between the relative bid price and the 
variables: the number of bids received, the number of bids sought and the value of the lowest 
bid.  
 
Pearson correlations - Deviation from the pre-bid cost estimate versus the number of 
bids received, the number of bids sought and the value of the lowest bid 
 
 
 
 
Number  
of 
bids received 
Number  
of  
bids 
sought 
Value  
of  
the lowest bid 
Relative bid price 
Pearson correlation  
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
-0.311¹ 
— 
496 
-0.182² 
— 
496 
0.307³ 
— 
496 
¹Correlation is significant at the 0.000000000002 level (2-tailed) 
²Correlation is significant at the 0.00005 level (2-tailed) 
³Correlation is significant at the 0.000000000003 level (2-tailed) 
 
Correlation results indicate that there is a statistically significant relation between all of the 
explanatory variables and the relative bid price. Of the 496 bids examined, there is practically 
a hundred percent probability that these relations did not occur by chance alone.  
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Correlation between the number of bids received and the relative bid price was -0.311. This 
finding strongly suggest that the higher the number of bidders participating, the lower the bid 
price. The correlation is very close to the correlation -0.320 found by Paul and Carr (2005). 
The number of bid sought and the relative bid price are also negatively and statistically 
significantly correlated with each other, which furthermore support the theory that 
competition decreases bids. The value of the lowest bid is positively and statistically 
significantly correlated with the relative bid price. This would indicate that the larger the 
contract, the less competitive the bid, when measured against pre-bid cost estimation. Again, 
multiple regression analysis is still needed to confirm the findings. 
 
Figure 30 and Figure 31 show the relation between the number of bids received and the mean 
relative bid price with regard to renovation and new construction projects.  
 
The relation between the number of bids received for renovation projects and the mean 
relative bid price  
Note: Vertical line shows the 90% confidence interval of the mean. Projects with more than 12 bids were 
removed due to an insufficient number of data points. 
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The relation between the number of bids received for new construction projects and the 
average relative bid price  
Note: Vertical line shows the 90% confidence interval of the mean. Projects with more than 13 bids were 
removed due to an insufficient of number data points. 
 
 
 
Correlation seems to be slightly stronger for renovation projects than for new construction 
projects based on Figure 30 and Figure 31. The lowest bid price becomes more competitive 
for both type of projects, when the number of bids received increase. The effect is however 
stronger for renovation projects than for new construction projects. This would indicate that 
auctions for new construction projects have more common value elements than auction for 
renovation projects. This is in contrast with Hypothesis 1 that states that the number of bids 
received affects the winning bid downward more strongly in auctions for new construction 
projects than for renovation projects. 
 
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of the samples for studying hypotheses 8 to 10. 
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Descriptive statistics of the sample for studying hypothesis 8 to 10 
Sample 
Number of 
projects 
Total low bids (M€) Total costs (M€) 
Mean budget 
overrun (%)¹ 
Full 183 570 650 
18.3 
(15.7) 
Renovation 128 245 295 
19.8 
(17.4) 
New construction 55 325 355 
14.8 
(6.6) 
Residential 21 202 205 
1.1 
(0.6) 
Public building 115 297 363 
22.3 
(18.2) 
Infrastructure 47 71 81 
16.1 
(10.5) 
Note: Median in parentheses 
¹ Costs above the lowest bid measured directly or using the amount of change orders and extra works as a proxy 
 
The average budget overrun in the sample was 18.3% above the lowest bid. However, the 
difference between the total costs of the contracts, €650 million, and the total amount of the 
lowest bids, €570 million, is just 14.0%. This would suggest that budget overruns are smaller 
in magnitude in larger contracts. This is in contrast with the earlier findings of Sweeney 
(2009) and with Hypothesis 8 that states that budget overruns are in relative terms greater in 
larger contracts. A possible explanation might be that projects studied in this thesis were on 
average much smaller than projects in the previous studies. The relation may change upside 
down when the scale of the projects increases significantly.  
 
Renovation projects seem to be associated with higher budget overruns than new construction 
projects. Respective figures were 19.8% and 14.8%. This finding is in line with Hypothesis 9 
that states that budget overruns are in relative terms greater in renovation projects than in new 
construction projects. This is because it much more difficult to define accurate contract 
documents for renovation projects than for new construction projects. Moreover it seems that 
a few very large budget overruns raised the arithmetic average of the new construction 
projects, because the median budget overrun within the group is just 6.6%. 
 
Budget overruns seem to be very small in contracts for residential projects, but rather large in 
contracts for public buildings and infrastructure works. The average budget overruns was just 
1.1% for residential projects, but 22.3% for public buildings and 16.1% for infrastructure 
projects. A part of this difference between the groups is probably explained by the fact that 
Table 4  
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contracts for residential projects in the sample are large and often for new construction 
projects. Contracts for public buildings and infrastructure project, instead, are smaller and 
frequently for renovation projects.  
 
To recall, relative bids were much lower for public buildings and infrastructure works than for 
residential buildings, see Table 2. Therefore, it is interesting to see the ratio between the total 
cost of the project and the pre-bid cost estimation. Table 5 shows the relation between the pre-
bid cost estimations and the total costs of the projects. 
 
The relation between pre-bid cost estimations and total costs of the projects 
Sample Mean relative bid Mean budget overrun 
Mean relative bid +  
mean budget overrun 
Full 
0.88 
(0.90) 
0.183 
(0.157) 
1.063 
(1.057) 
Renovation 
0.83 
(0.83) 
0.198 
(0.174) 
1.028 
(1.004) 
New construction 
0.95 
(0.97) 
0.148 
(0.066) 
1.098 
(1.036) 
Residential 
1.01 
(1.01) 
0.011 
(0.006) 
1.021 
(1.016) 
Public building 
0.79 
(0.78) 
0.223 
(0.182) 
1.013 
(0.962) 
Infrastructure 
0.89 
(0.88) 
0.161 
(0.105) 
1.051 
(0.985) 
 
Figures in Table 5 are calculated somewhat artificially by summing up the mean figures from 
Table 2 and Table 4. It should nevertheless give some grasp of the real phenomenon. It 
appears that pre-bid cost estimations are rather accurate for all types of projects when costs 
above the lowest bid price, mostly caused by change orders and extra works, are taken into 
account. Moreover, figures in the fourth column in Table 5 meet the real meaning of the term 
“budget overrun” better. However, the fact that this figure is not used as the measure for 
budget overrun in this study, is not a problem. This is because; we are not that much 
interested in the absolute levels of budget overruns, instead, the relative change in budget 
overruns. It does not matter, which of the figures is used for this purpose, but due to practical 
reasons it was easier to use the chosen one. 
 
Although the figure in column 4, in Table 5, seems rather accurate for public buildings, this is 
not the whole truth. Public Works Department of Helsinki adds provisions for change orders 
and extra works on top of their pre-bid cost estimations. These provisions are not included in 
Table 5  
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the figures of this study. A typical provision for change orders and extra works is about 10%. 
This means that although it seems that the total costs are just 1.3% above the pre-bid cost 
estimation, the real figure is somewhere around 8.7% less than the pre-bid cost estimation. 
Figure 32 shows a graphical illustration of the situation. 
 
Pre-bid cost estimation versus actual costs - public buildings 
 
 
Table 6 shows the results of the correlation analysis between budget overrun versus the 
relative bid price and the value of the lowest bid.  
 
Pearson correlations – Budget overrun versus the relative bid price and the value of the 
lowest bid 
 
 
 
 Relative bid price 
Value of the 
lowest bid 
Budget overrun 
Pearson correlation  
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
-0.197¹ 
— 
183 
-0.184² 
— 
183 
¹Correlation is significant at the 0.0075 level (2-tailed) 
²Correlation is significant at the 0.0127 level (2-tailed) 
 
Correlation results indicate that there is a statistically significant relation between the 
explanatory variables and budget overruns. Correlation between the relative bid price and 
budget overrun was -0.197 being statistically significant at .00075 level. This finding suggests 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
Pre-bid cost estimation Actual costs
CE works
Lowest bid
8.7% 
Figure 32  
Table 6 
  
 
82 
 
that the lower the bid, the higher the budget overrun, measured as costs above the bid. This is 
strong evidence of Hypothesis 10, which states that relative bids are negatively correlated 
with relative budget overruns. The value of the lowest bid and budget overruns are also 
negatively and statistically significantly correlated with each other. This would indicate that 
the larger the contract, the lower the budget overrun measured as cost above the bid. This 
finding is in contrast with the earlier findings e.g. Sweeney (2009) and with Hypothesis 8, 
which states that budget overruns are in relative terms greater in larger contracts than in 
smaller ones. 
7.2 Regression analysis 
The results of the regression analysis are presented in a row of four tables without any 
discussion between the tables. Although the chosen way to present the results is not perhaps 
the most visually stimulating, it is easiest for the reader. This is because due to a high number 
of regressions, I refer to multiple tables in the discussion part of the results. It is better if the 
tables are close to each other so that the reader has to jump between the pages as little as 
possible. 
 
Table 7 and Table 8 show the regression results of factors affecting the relative bid price, 
whereas Table 9 shows the regressions of factors affecting the relative number of bids 
received. Finally, Table 10 shows the results of factors affecting bid variance, bid accuracy, 
budget overruns and the number of bids received. 
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Regression analysis on factors affecting the relative bid level 
  Dependent variable: Relative bid price 
Regression  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent variable Exp. sign Full sample Renovation New construction Residential Public building Infrastructure 
Number of bids sought (+) 
0.011*** 
(3.40) 
0.011*** 
(3.08) 
0.016*** 
(2.63) 
0.013*** 
(3.18) 
0.012*** 
(2.82) 
0.011 
(0.94) 
Number of bids received (-) 
-0.021*** 
(-4.36) 
-0.024*** 
(-4.20) 
-0.022*** 
(-2.72) 
-0.018*** 
(-2.89) 
-0.027*** 
(-3.87) 
-0.015 
(-1.09) 
Value of the lowest bid (+) 
0.000 
(0.09) 
0.015*** 
(3.02) 
0.001 
(0.39) 
0.000 
(-0.01) 
0.018*** 
(3.21) 
0.009 
(1.09) 
Pre crisis (+) 
0.067** 
(2.54) 
0.002 
(0.06) 
0.108*** 
(2.78) 
-0.024 
(-0.76) 
0.102 
(1.57) 
0.150** 
(2.46) 
After crisis (+) 
0.057*** 
(2.90) 
0.046* 
(1.90) 
0.047 
(1.40) 
0.007 
(0.24) 
0.042 
(1.50) 
0.134** 
(2.34) 
Renovation (+/-) 
-0.046** 
(-2.28) 
  
-0.005 
(-0.18) 
-0.066* 
(-1.94) 
-0.046 
(-0.94) 
Multiple prime contract (-) 
-0.025 
(-0.91) 
-0.084** 
(-2.27) 
-0.035 
(-0.86) 
-0.006 
(-0.20) 
-0.104** 
(-2.20) 
0.016 
(0.19) 
Side-contract (-) 
-0.077*** 
(-2.72) 
     
Residential (+/-) 
0.086*** 
(3.15) 
0.088** 
(2.09) 
0.093** 
(2.15) 
   
Public building (+/-) 
-0.011 
(-0.33) 
-0.020 
(-0.50) 
-0.007 
(-0.09) 
   
Intercept  
0.895*** 
(27.90) 
0.868*** 
(22.14) 
0.845*** 
(16.39) 
0.988*** 
(22.27) 
0.925*** 
(12.71) 
0.793*** 
(9.38) 
N  496 298 198 164 230 102 
Adjusted R2  0.277 0.269 0.159 0.034 0.137 0.046 
Significance F  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.087 0.000 0.134 
Note: OLS regressions,  t-statistics in parentheses: *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10% (p<0.1), 5% (p<0.05), and 1% (p<0.01) levels, respectively. 
Table 7 
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Regression analysis on factors affecting the relative bid level 
 Dependent variable: Relative bid price  
Regression  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)  
Independent variable Exp. sign 1 Quarter in size 2 Quarter in size 3 Quarter in size 4 Quarter in size Less than median size More than median size 
 
Number of bids sought (+) 
0.011 
(1.46) 
0.012** 
(1.99) 
0.007 
(1.22) 
0.010* 
(1.81) 
0.009** 
(1.98) 
0.007* 
(1.84) 
 
Number of bids received (-) 
-0.036*** 
(-2.96) 
-0.013 
(-1.55) 
-0.019** 
(-2.15) 
-0.026*** 
(-3.81) 
-0.021*** 
(-2.98) 
-0.023*** 
(-4.03) 
 
Value of the lowest bid (+) 
0.236 
(1.33) 
0.053 
(0.72) 
0.001 
(0.09) 
-0.001 
(-0.43) 
0.130*** 
(3.09) 
0.000 
(-0.32) 
 
Pre crisis (+) 
0.077 
(0.79) 
0.217*** 
(4.22) 
-0.033 
(-0.73) 
0.030 
(0.82) 
0.143*** 
(3.06) 
-0.012 
(-0.41) 
 
After crisis (+) 
-0.017 
(-0.40) 
0.103*** 
(2.74) 
0.030 
(0.76) 
0.012 
(0.40) 
0.053* 
(1.86) 
0.016 
(0.61) 
 
Renovation (+/-) 
-0.101** 
(-2.00) 
-0.104*** 
(-2.71) 
0.022 
(0.59) 
0.017 
(0.55) 
-0.093*** 
(-2.88) 
0.018 
(0.74) 
 
Multiple prime contract (-) 
0.122 
(1.49) 
-0.081 
(-1.34) 
-0.072 
(-1.32) 
-0.015 
(-0.47) 
0.007 
(0.14) 
-0.030 
(-1.05) 
 
Residential (+/-) 
0.523*** 
(3.20) 
-0.044 
(-0.60) 
0.122** 
(2.56) 
-0.175*** 
(-2.78) 
0.068 
(0.93) 
0.083*** 
(2.73) 
 
Public building (+/-) 
-0.098 
(-1.16) 
0.026 
(0.44) 
0.031 
(0.47) 
-0.252*** 
(-3.12) 
-0.043 
(-0.85) 
-0.008 
(-0.17) 
 
Intercept  
0.841*** 
(11.31) 
0.774*** 
(9.11) 
0.915*** 
(12.74) 
1.202*** 
(15.95) 
0.814*** 
(16.74) 
0.964*** 
(21.22) 
 
N  124 124 124 124 248 248  
Adjusted R2  0.172 0.252 0.152 0.160 0.207 0.160  
Significance F  0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000  
Note: OLS regressions,  t-statistics in parentheses: *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10% (p<0.1), 5% (p<0.05), and 1% (p<0.01) levels, respectively.   
 
Table 8 
  
 
85 
 
Regression analysis on factors affecting the relative number of bids received 
  Dependent variable: Relative number of bids received 
Regression  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)  
Independent variable Exp. sign Full sample Renovation New construction Residential Public building Infrastructure  
Number of bids sought (-) 
-0.018*** 
(-8.00) 
-0.019*** 
(-7.90) 
-0.015*** 
(-3.15) 
-0.024*** 
(-4.37) 
-0.019*** 
(-7.61) 
-0.003 
(-0.44) 
 
Value of the lowest bid (+/-) 
0.000 
(-0.21) 
-0.003 
(-0.52) 
0.001 
(0.65) 
0.000 
(0.02) 
-0.007 
(-1.28) 
0.007 
(0.95) 
 
Pre crisis (-) 
-0.014 
(-0.48) 
-0.029 
(-0.77) 
0.010 
(0.23) 
0.015 
(0.28) 
-0.093 
(-1.58) 
0.068 
(1.29) 
 
After crisis (-) 
-0.086*** 
(-4.13) 
-0.082*** 
(-3.44) 
-0.098** 
(-2.54) 
-0.053 
(-1.12) 
-0.106*** 
(-4.36) 
-0.044 
(-0.89) 
 
Renovation (+/-) 
0.010 
(0.46) 
  
0.040 
(0.86) 
-0.012 
(-0.40) 
-0.037 
(-0.89) 
 
Multiple prime contract (+/-) 
-0.140*** 
(-5.21) 
-0.025 
(-0.69) 
-0.232*** 
(-5.07) 
-0.219*** 
(-4.77) 
-0.023 
(-0.54) 
-0.011 
(-0.15) 
 
Residential (+/-) 
-0.041 
(-1.39) 
0.032 
(0.81) 
-0.040 
(-0.80) 
    
Public building (+/-) 
0.206*** 
(5.87) 
0.129*** 
(3.28) 
0.308*** 
(4.38) 
    
Intercept  
0.790*** 
(23.50) 
0.778*** 
(20.59) 
0.775*** 
(13.05) 
0.779*** 
(10.92) 
0.941*** 
(14.86) 
0.620*** 
(8.52) 
 
N  496 298 198 164 230 102 
 
Adjusted R
2
 
 
0.174 0.189 0.187 0.183 0.236 0.021 
 
Significance F 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.236 
 
Note: OLS regressions,  t-statistics in parentheses: *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10% (p<0.1), 5% (p<0.05), and 1% (p<0.01) levels, respectively.   
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Regression analysis on factors affecting bid variance, bid accuracy, budget overruns and the number of bids received 
  
Dependent variable:  
Bid variance 
 
Dependent variable:  
Accuracy of the pre-bid cost estimation¹ 
 
Dependent variable:  
Relative budget overrun 
 Dependent variable:  
Number of bids received 
Regression   (19)    (20) (21)     (22) 
Independent variable Exp. sign Full sample Exp. sign Full sample Exp. sign Full sample Exp. sign Full sample 
Relative bid price     (-) 
-0.162** 
(-2.16) 
  
Number of bids sought (+) 
0.001 
(0.46) 
(+/-) 
-0.005** 
(-2.44) 
  (+) 
0.482*** 
(23.93) 
Number of bids received (+) 
0.000 
(0.18) 
(+/-) 
0.010*** 
(2.88) 
    
Value of the lowest bid (-) 
-0.002** 
(-2.56) 
(-) 
-0.003** 
(-2.22) 
(+) 
-0.004 
(-0.96) 
(-) 
0.002 
(0.09) 
Pre crisis (+) 
0.032** 
(2.46) 
(+/-) 
0.000 
(0.02) 
(-) 
-0.079** 
(-2.38) (-) 
-0.354 
(-1.39) 
After crisis (+) 
-0.005 
(-0.53) 
(+/-) 
-0.035** 
(-2.44) 
(-) 
-0.004 
(-0.96) 
(-) 
-0.777*** 
(-4.16) 
Renovation (+) 
0.019** 
(2.15) 
(+) 
0.005 
(0.33) 
(+) 
-0.082** 
(-2.15) 
(+/-) 
-0.189 
(-0.98) 
Multiple prime contract (+/-) 
0.006 
(0.43) 
(+/-) 
0.012 
(0.67) 
(+/-) 
0.015 
(0.43) 
(+) 
-1.038*** 
(-4.29) 
Residential (+/-) 
-0.037*** 
(-2.71) 
(+/-) 
-0.079*** 
(-4.02) 
(+/-) 
-0.173*** 
(-2.89) 
(+/-) 
-0.461* 
(-1.75) 
Public building (+/-) 
-0.020 
(-1.20) 
(+/-) 
0.034 
(1.42) 
(+/-) 
0.091** 
(2.26) 
(+/-) 
1.277*** 
(4.03) 
Intercept  
0.118*** 
(6.97) 
 0.223*** 
(9.64) 
 
0.405*** 
(5.08) 
 1.492*** 
(4.93) 
N  366  496  183  496 
Adjusted R
2
 
 
0.130 
 
0.233  0.153 
 
0.656 
Significance F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Note: OLS regressions,  t-statistics in parentheses: *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10% (p<0.1), 5% (p<0.05), and 1% (p<0.01) levels, respectively. 
¹A negative sign stands for better accuracy 
Table 10 
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The chosen regression variables were able to explain 27.7% of the variation in the relative bid 
price, as suggested by adjusted R-square in regression (1) in Table 7. Is 27.7% a low figure? 
The answer is no, since any study that attempts to predict human behavior, such as 
economics, typically has R-square values far lower than 50%. For example Paul and Carr 
(2005), who found that there will be 3.79% increase in project costs, on average, for each 
bidder lost, had R-square value of just 10.2% for the linear regression and 38% for the 
curvilinear regression. Furthermore, even if R-square values are low, statistically significant 
coefficients still represent the mean change in the response to one unit of change in the 
variable while holding other variables constant. 
 
Regression (1) in Table 7 shows that per each of the additional bid received, the relative bid 
price decreases about 2.1%. T-value of -4.36 suggests a very strong statistical significance. 
The likelihood of this finding to be caused sheer by chance is just 0.0016%.  However, the 
client cannot decrease bids sheer by asking for more, because per each of the additional bid 
sought, the relative bid price increases about 1.1%. This is evidence of the entry effect and 
Hypothesis 4. Moreover, the finding is supported by the result of regression (13) in Table 9, 
which shows that the higher the number of bids sought, the lower the relative number of bids 
received. The null hypothesis of Hypothesis 4 can thus be rejected. It very clear that 
contractors bid less aggressively or choose not to bid at all, when the number of potential 
bidders increases. This very interesting finding and contrast with the univariate result in the 
previous section. To recall, the correlation between the number of bid sought and the relative 
bid price was -0.182. When multiple factors are taken into account simultaneously, the sign of 
the correlation changes. Previous studies have used only the number of bids received as the 
measure for the level of competition. For example the finding of Paul and Carr (2005) that 
there will be 3.79% increase in project costs, on average, for each bidder lost, is alone 
misleading. Paul and Carr did not take into account that in order to get more bids, the client 
has to seek more, which increases bids trough the winner’s curse and the entry effect. 
Since just 48.2% of the contractors whom the client asks to submit a bid, eventually submit it, 
see regression (22) in Table 10, bids have to be asked at least from two contractors in order to 
receive one additional bid. However, asking for two more bids increases the lowest bid by 
about 2.2%, which outweighs the impact of receiving one additional bid. The client cannot 
thus benefit from seeking additional bids sheer by asking for more. Benefits could though be 
obtained if the entry effect and the winner’s curse effect can somehow be simultaneously 
reduced. There are two possible solutions for the problem, of which the first one is easier to 
implement.  
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First, many academic papers have argued that the release of information regarding the seller’s 
valuation of the object in sale may cause bidders to bid more aggressively, because it reduces 
the negative impact of the winner’s curse (see Milgrom and Weber 1982, Harstad 1990, and 
Campbell and Levin 2000). De Silva et al. (2005) tested this theory empirically buy 
examining the impact of a policy change by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation to 
the release the state’s internal cost estimations of highway projects. They found that the 
average level of bids was lower after the release of additional information. The average level 
of bids and the standard deviation of bids, fell strongly for bridgework projects, but did not 
have any impact on bids for paving works. According to researchers, bridgework projects 
contain more uncertainty, common to all bidders, whereas asphalt paving projects possess 
more private-value characteristics. Although De Silva et al. did not find evidence that the 
releasing of additional information would result in statistically significant lower winning bids, 
this approach should be considered especially for complex renovation projects or projects that 
are technically very challenging. 
 
Second, it should be considered whether the second-price sealed-bid auction method should 
be put in place at least for auctions where the common uncertainty is great.
30
 Consider a first-
price sealed bid auction. Uncertain of the underlying value of the item, each bidder must bid 
significantly below one’s estimate to avoid the winner’s curse. The client thus gets the project 
with the lowest price, but the price is not as low as it were if there was not common 
uncertainty. In a second-price sealed-bid auction, instead, a dominant strategy for a bidder is 
to bid one’s true value. This is because, by bidding your true value, you will maximize the 
likelihood of winning the contract, but you will always get the project with a price higher than 
your own estimation. The second-price sealed-bid method thus reduces the negative impact of 
the winner’s curse. Although the client has to pay the second lowest price, bids are in general 
more competitive. (Chatterjee & Samuelson 2001: 306-307) The second-price sealed-bid 
auction could produce better outcomes in auctions, where the winner’s curse effect is 
particularly strong e.g. large renovation projects mixed with a lump sum price. 
 
Of the two solutions presented, the releasing of information about the pre-bid cost estimation 
is the easier way to reduce the negative impact of the winner’s curse. This is because; Public 
Procurement Act does not permit of procuring public projects by using the second-price 
auction methods, at least not to my knowledge. The using of this method would require legal 
                                                 
30 To recall, in the second-price sealed-bid auction, bidders submit sealed bids individually without seeing other 
bidders’ bids. The bidder, who submits the highest bid, gets the object at the price of the second highest bid. 
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changes at the European Union level, which is not in sight in the short-term future. Moreover, 
the using of the second-price sealed-bid method could be difficult to justify to the taxpayers 
although it would yield a better outcome. In turn, to my knowledge there are not any obstacles 
for the releasing of information about the pre-bid cost estimation. 
 
Xu (2013) argues that clients can intensify competition by making the entry costlier. Since 
this approach works only when the entry decision is made after the bidders know their 
valuations, I do not regard it a reasonable solution for the problem. If bidders make entry 
decisions before knowing their own valuations, making of entry costlier would reduce both 
the probability of entry and the expected number of actual bidders. In turn, the actual bidders 
would face less competition and bid less aggressively. Therefore, the proposed solution i.e. 
the releasing of information about the pre-bid cost estimation is the best solution for the 
problem. 
 
Hypothesis 1 states that the level of competition affects the winning bid downward more 
strongly in auctions for new construction projects than for renovation projects. Based on the 
sample of this study, this statement is not true. The null hypothesis that there is no difference 
cannot be rejected. The number of bids sought and received seem to have about the same 
impact on the relative bid price for renovation and new construction projects, see regression 
(2) and (3) in Table 7. In fact it seems that an increase in competition affects the winning bid 
downward more strongly in auctions for renovation projects than for new construction 
projects, however, the difference is not statistically significant. Each additional bid received 
appears to decrease the lowest bid by 2.4% when the project is considered as renovation and 
2.2% when new construction. These findings are statistically significant at .00004 and .007 
level, respectively. Each additional bid sought seems to increase the lowest bid by 1.1% when 
the project is considered as renovation and 1.6% when new construction. Both of the findings 
were statistically very significant. Nor there was much difference between different types of 
projects. 
 
Hypothesis 2 states that the level of competition affects the winning bid downward more 
strongly in auctions for small projects than for large projects. No evidence was found that 
would support this hypothesis. The difference in coefficients in regressions (11) and (12) in 
Table 8 were not statistically different from each other. The null hypothesis cannot thus be 
rejected. Each additional bid received decreased the lowest bid by 2.1% when the contract 
was worth less than the median and 2.3% when more than the median. Both of the findings 
were statistically very significant as suggested by t-values of -2.98 and -4.03, respectively. 
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Each additional bid sought seems to increase the lowest bid by 0.9% when the contract was 
worth less than the median and 0.7% when more than the median. Findings were statistically 
significant only at .05 and .01 level. The difference between different types of projects was 
neither found to be statistically significant. An increase in the level of competition seems to 
have more or less similar impact on the lowest bid regardless of the type of project or the size 
of the contract.  
 
The value of the lowest bid does not seem to have a statistically significant impact on the 
relatively bid price in the regression (1) in Table 1. However, the value of the lowest bid 
seems to be positively correlated with the relative bid price in terms of renovation projects, 
public buildings and small contracts, regression (2) and (5) in Table 7, and regression (11) in 
Table 8. Per each additional million in contract size, the lowest bid becomes about 1.5% less 
competitive, when compared to the pre-bid cost estimation. The impact for public buildings 
and for smaller contracts is 1.8% and 13% towards a higher price. All of the findings were 
statistically significant at least at .05 level. There are at least three possible explanations for 
the result. 
 
First, larger projects may call for more conservative bids e.g. due to the weakening 
diversification of the project portfolio. Second, competition between the contractors 
competing for large contracts might be less intense than competition between contractors 
competing for small contracts. Thirdly, and perhaps the most plausible explanation is that 
more effort is put on pre-bid cost estimation, when the contract size increases. Smaller 
contracts are estimated roughly, but conservatively to avoid budget overruns. This argument 
is supported by the fact that side-contract variable in regression (1) in Table 7 get a value of -
0.077, while being statistically very significant. This means that side-contracts in the sample 
were associated with 7.7% lower relative bid price than main contracts or contracts of 
structural works in a multiple prime contract. 
 
I found very strong evidence of Hypothesis 6. Bids really become less competitive in an 
economic upturn. Regression (1) shows that bids were about 6.7% higher before the crisis and 
about 5.7% higher after the crisis compared with the crisis in 2009 and 2010. The former 
finding is statistically significant at 0.0114 level and the latter at .0039 level. The impact is 
similar in magnitude than getting about three additional bids for a contract. Such a high 
impact cannot be explained purely by lower margins of contractors taking part in the auction. 
Besides the lower margins of the contractors, the state of the economy must affect prices in 
the whole production chain. That is to say that contractor must be able to purchase materials, 
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subcontracts and perhaps even work force with lower prices when the economy is doing 
poorly. 
 
It seems that an economic downturn does not have as strong impact on bid prices, when 
regressions are run for the subsets of data. For example, economic situation does not have any 
impact on bids for residential projects, regression (4) in Table 7. Interestingly, the state of the 
economy has a much stronger impact on bids for small contracts than bids for large contracts. 
Regression of the contracts less than median in value, regression (11) in Table 8, shows that 
bids were about 14.3% higher before the crisis and about 5.3% higher after the crisis when 
compared with the crisis. The first finding is statistically significant at .002 level and the 
second at .064 level. The state of the economy however does not have any impact on bid 
prices in the group of contracts above the median value, regression (12) in Table 8. A possible 
explanation is that large projects invoke large companies that have very effective procurement 
systems and can utilize the economies of scale. The margins of material suppliers and 
subcontractors may thus be at a very competitive level not only during the years of low 
construction volume. In turn, smaller projects call for smaller contractors, who do not have as 
effective procurement systems. During normal times, material and subcontract prices hence 
might not be as competitive as in large projects, but becomes nearly as competitive when the 
economy plummets. This finding supports the idea that weak competition between the 
contractors competing for large contracts cannot be the reason why the lowest bid is 
negatively correlated with the relative bids. The reason must be either more conservative bids 
when the project size increases or that more effort is put on pre-bid cost estimation, when the 
contract size increases. 
 
Regression (1) shows that the relative bid price is 4.6% lower for renovation projects than for 
new construction projects. Moreover, this effect seems to be limited only to smaller contracts 
as shown in regressions (7), (8) and (11) in Table 8. A reasonable explanation for this finding 
is that pre-bid cost estimations are in general more conservative for renovation projects, and 
less conservative for new construction projects. It is of course possible that some competitive 
element not captured by the competition proxies causes the difference.   
 
Variables for multiple prime contracts, side contracts and type of projects were included in the 
regressions mostly as control variables. However, based on regression (1) in Table 7, multiple 
prime contract does not have a statistically significant impact on bid prices. Residential 
projects instead seem to receive much higher relative bids on average than infrastructure 
projects. The difference between the groups is 8.6%. However, as mentioned earlier there is 
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not much point in comparing different types of projects together due to differences in the 
approach to pre-bid cost estimations. These variables were added in to the models mostly in 
controlling means i.e. to reduce statistical noise in variables of interest in this study. 
 
Table 9 shows the regression results of factors affecting the relative number of bids received. 
As mentioned earlier the higher the number of bids sought, the lower the relative number of 
bids received as shown by the regression (13) in Table 9. When the number of bids sought 
increases by one, the relative number of bids received decreases by 1.8%. That is to say that if 
50% of the contractors asked to submit bids eventually submits it, the proportion drops to 
48.2%, when the number of bids sought increases by one. The effect is however weak though 
statistically very significant with a t-value of -8.00. Interestingly, the after crisis dummy gets a 
value of -0.086 in regression (13) in Table 9. T-value of the finding is -4.13, which suggests 
statistically a very significant correlation. Clients have thus received about 8.6% less bids 
after the crisis relative to the number of bids sought. This is a significant difference. The 
finding is furthermore supported by the results of the regression (24) in Table 10. Contracts 
received on average -0.777 less bids after the crisis than during the crisis. This finding is 
statistically significant at .00004 level. Economic situation clearly impacts contractors’ 
willingness to submit bids. This is very strong evidence of Hypothesis 5 and the null 
hypothesis that there is not a relation can be rejected. 
 
Hypothesis 7 states that bids become more volatile in an economic upturn. I found that this is 
somewhat true. Regression (19) in Table 10 shows that variance in bids was 3.2% higher 
before the crisis than during the crisis. This finding is statistically significant at .015 level. 
Since the market has not yet reached the levels before the crisis, it was not very surprising that 
no evidence was found that bids would have turned more volatile after the crisis compared 
with the crisis. Interestingly, the value of the contract appears to be negatively correlated with 
the standard deviation of bids. The relative standard deviation becomes 0.2% lower per each 
additional million in contract value. This finding is statistically significant at .0109 level. The 
larger the contract, the closer the bids are to each other. This finding indirectly suggests that 
the difference between large contractors is smaller than the difference between small 
contractors, because large contractors tend to compete for large contracts and vice versa. This 
argument is in line with the finding that a recession does not have any impact on bid prices in 
the group of contracts above the median contract value, but have a strong negative impact on 
smaller contracts. One could thus argue that although there are less contractors competing for 
large contracts, competition between these contractors is fiercer than competition between 
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contractors competing for small contracts. When the economy eventually turns in to 
downturn, competition intensifies relatively more among the small contracts than among the 
large ones, which is why the recession has stronger negative impact on bid prices for small 
contracts than for large contracts. 
 
Bids for renovation contracts seem to be more volatile than bids for new construction 
contracts. The standard deviation of bids is 1.9% higher for renovation projects. The finding is 
statistically significant at .032 level. Since renovation projects contain more uncertainty, this 
finding is not very surprising.  
 
Regression (20) in Table 10 shows that pre-bid cost estimations become more accurate when 
the value of the contract increases. This is strong evidence of Hypothesis 3 and in line with 
the univariate results in the previous section. Each additional million in contract size improves 
the accuracy of the pre-bid estimation by 0.3%. The finding is statistically significant at .027 
level. A likely explanation is that more effort is put on pre-bid cost estimations when the 
contract size increases. Surprisingly, pre-bid cost estimations have become 3.5% more 
accurate after the financial crisis. This finding is statistically significant at .015 level. Perhaps 
budgets are today tighter than they used to be. The level of competition seems also to affect 
the accuracy of the pre-bid cost estimations. The more bids received, the less accurate the pre-
bid estimate. Each additional bid received seems to be associated with 1.0% decrease in the 
accuracy of the pre-bid estimate, whilst each additional bid sought seem to improve the 
accuracy by 0.5%. The first finding is statistically significant at .004 level, and the second 
at .015 level. Furthermore, residential projects seem to be associated with 7.9% more accurate 
pre-bid cost estimations than infrastructure projects. 
 
Hypothesis 8 states that budget overruns are in relative terms greater in larger projects than in 
smaller projects. Based on the sample collected for this study, this statement is not true. The 
value of the contract does not seem to have any impact on budget overruns as evident in 
regression (21) in Table 10. I did not find evidence for Hypothesis 9 that budget overruns 
would be in relative terms greater in renovation projects than in new construction projects. 
Budget overruns were actually 8.2% lower in renovation projects compared with new 
construction projects. Although the finding was statistically significant at .033 level, I don’t 
regard it plausible, since industrial knowledge is so strong in this particular matter. The 
finding was moreover in contrast with the univariate results that showed that budget overruns 
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were higher in renovation projects than in new construction projects on absolute level, see 
Table 4. Additional research with a more controlled sample is therefore needed.    
 
The relative bid price was found to be negatively correlated with relative budget overrun. That 
is to say that the lower the relative bid, the higher the budget overrun. One percent drop in the 
lowest bid, increases budget overruns by 0.162%. This finding is statistically significant 
at .032 level. The finding is in line with the reasoning that when a possible underpricing 
becomes evident, the contractor initiates a claim strategy for seeking additional profit through 
change orders and extra works. This is not however the only conclusion that can be made 
from the results. Another explanation is the poor quality of contract documents which for the 
contractor is not able come up with a fully priced bid. When the construction begins, change 
orders and extra works are then needed to fix the situation. These two explanations are not 
mutually exclusive. However, one could perhaps argue that the effect of poor contract 
documents should be the other way around if contractors do not act opportunistically. This is 
because, if contractors are aware of these deficiencies in the contracts documents when 
preparing the bid, they should add risk contingency, not decrease it. It thus seems that 
contractors act at least somewhat opportunistically though rationally.  
 
Interestingly, budget overruns were 7.9% lower before the financial crisis than during the 
crisis, see regression (21) in Table 10. The finding is though somewhat dubious, because the 
sample contained just 55 contracts before the crisis. Thus I would not make far-reaching 
conclusions from it. 
 
Regression (22) shows the results of factors affecting the number of bids received. Obviously 
the number of bids sought impacts the number of bids received the most. Per each of the 
additional bid sought, about 0.482 additional bids are received. T-value of the finding is 
23.93. Moreover, financial crisis appears to be associated with more bids, when compared 
with the years after the crisis. As mentioned earlier, clients received on average 0.777 bids 
more for contracts during the financial crisis than after it. Interestingly, the value of the 
contract does not seem to have any impact on the number of bids received. This is because the 
variable; the number or bids sought, captures the impact of competitive situation in the 
market. Multiple prime contracts as well as contracts for public buildings seem to receive 
more bids than other type of residential and infrastructure projects. These findings are 
however somewhat noisy due to the aforementioned reasons. Overall, the timing of the 
procurement and the number of bids sought seem to be the most important determinants of 
how many bids will eventually be received. 
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8 CONCLUSION 
Researchers have found mixed evidence of how the level of competition affects bids in 
auctions. According to conventional economic theory, an increase in competition should make 
bids more competitive. This is especially true in auctions, where each bidder knows how 
much he values the object, but his value is private information and unaffected by the 
information about other bidder’s valuation i.e. private-value auction. In auctions, where the 
value of the object is the same for all bidders, but bidders have different views of that value, 
i.e. common-value auction, the winner of the auction might be the bidder with the most overly 
optimistic view and ends up paying too much for the object on sale. This phenomenon is 
generally known as the winner’s curse. In equilibrium, rational bidders should take this into 
account by bidding less aggressively. When the number of potential bidders increases, bidders 
may become less aggressive also due to the entry effect. This is because, an increase in the 
number of potential bidders decreases the likelihood of winning the contract, yet participation 
costs remain constant. Rational bidders should take this into account by deciding not to bid or 
by bidding less aggressively. There are thus three competition related effects affecting bids 
simultaneously. 
 
Auctions are rarely pure private or pure common-value auctions, instead, have components of 
both types. Auctions may though differ in how much they possess these characteristics. Some 
auctions have more common value elements and some private-value elements. In this thesis, I 
studied empirically using Finnish data, how the level of competition affects bids in auctions 
for public construction projects. Different types of contracts were expected to differ in how 
they possess common-value and private-value characteristics. The level of competition was 
thus expected to affect bids differently. 
 
If a contractor realizes that they have made a too generous bid e.g. due to the winner’s curse, 
they may initiate a further claim strategy for seeking additional revenues through change 
orders and extra works. Moreover, the contractor might has spotted inconsistencies in the 
tender documents, and decides to submit a very aggressive bid deliberately by simultaneously 
knowing that they can seek additional profit afterwards through change orders and extra 
works. Both of the above examples suggest that lower bids are associated with higher budget 
overruns. Factors affecting the competitive behavior and budget overruns were therefore also 
studied in this thesis.  
 
The full data of the study contained 496 contracts of various kinds of public construction 
projects. The data was analyzed using statistical methods such as multivariate regression 
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analysis. I found that per each additional bid received the lowest bid decreases significantly 
when compared to the pre-bid cost estimation. This finding is in line with the conventional 
economic theory. The effect was negative in all of the regressions and statistically very 
significant in almost all regressions. The client cannot though benefit from seeking more bids 
sheer by asking for more, since per each additional bid sought, the lowest bid increases. This 
is strong evidence of the winner’s curse and the entry effect. No evidence was however found 
that these effects would differ between different types of contracts. Based on previous 
findings such as those of Hong and Sum (2002), it is though hard to believe that there would 
be any difference between different types of contracts. Additional studies with a more 
controlled sample and perhaps with more sophisticated research methods are thus needed to 
confirm the finding. Based on previous studies e.g. Paul and Carr (2005) it is plausible that 
the relation between the variables is curvilinear, as depicted in Figure 15. An increase in 
competition first decreases bids due to the competition effect, but starts to increase bids after 
some point, due to the winner’s curse and the entry effect. The optimum could perhaps be 
found with more sophisticated methods assuming non-linearity. 
 
Nonetheless, since it is clear that the winner’s curse and the entry effect affect bids negatively 
regardless of the contract type, there is a major need for means to reduce the impact of them. I 
propose two solutions: the release of information about pre-bid cost estimation in advance and 
the use of the second-price sealed-bid auction method. Both of the suggested means reduce 
the impact of the winner’s curse by reducing common uncertainty. The use of these methods 
is worth considering especially for projects that possess high common uncertainty. Large 
renovation projects mixed with a lump sum price or technically very challenging projects 
would be good candidates for this purpose.  
 
I found strong evidence that an economic downturn is associated with the higher number of 
bids, lower bid volatility and more competitive bids, when compared to the pre-bid cost 
estimation. The impact of the general macroeconomic situation though seems to be stronger 
for small contracts than for large contracts. Mixed with the fact that common interest rates are 
at low levels during an economic downturn, clients should really target their procurements at 
economically weaker times. Contract types that allow the design and construction to proceed 
simultaneously should be preferred during economic downturns. In turn, the client should 
slow down the process by choosing a contract type that effectively separates the design and 
the construction processes from each other during an economic upturn. 
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Previous studies e.g. Sweeney (2009) suggest that budget overruns are greater in larger 
projects. I did not find evidence that would support this theory. However, I did find that the 
lower the lowest bid, the higher the budget overrun. The finding suggests that contractors do 
act somewhat opportunistically though rationally. Despite the reasons, the finding gives 
support for the idea of awarding the contract to the most economically advantageous bidder 
instead of the cheapest one. 
 
Pre-bid cost estimations provided by the client were used as a benchmark value for the 
competitiveness of bids in this study. Although this method has major benefits, the non-
standard nature of the pre-bid cost estimations weakens the statistical significance and the 
interpretation of the findings. Further research with more controlled samples is there for 
needed. Moreover, there is a major need for alternative measures for the price competitiveness 
of bids. If similar findings were found when approaching the issue from a different angle, it 
would be a very strong indicator that findings were not caused by sheer by change or errors in 
statistical modelling. Additional research is needed also due to the very large impact of public 
procurements on the overall economy. Just a slight improvement in the effectiveness of 
procurement processes would save millions of euro of tax payers’ money. Moreover, 
additional research may help the construction of auctions not only for construction projects, 
but also for other types of objects such as emissions trading, healthcare services, IT system. 
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Appendix A  
 
Table A: Sample data for studying Hypotheses 1 to 7 
 
Note: Hypotheses 5 to 7 were studied using a subsample of 366 contracts including price information of all bids received.  Due to practical reasons not all bids were 
shown in this table. 
Contract Year Pre-bid cost 
estimation 
Lowest bid 
 
 
Bids 
sought 
Bids 
received 
Renovation Multiple 
Prime 
Infrastructure 
works 
Residential Public 
Building 
Contract 1 2010 4 412 000 € 5 595 000 € 9 5 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 2 2012 7 573 000 € 8 230 000 € 9 5 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 3 2013 5 045 000 € 5 717 700 € 6 4 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 4 2010 15 000 000 € 16 465 531 € 8 2 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 5 2009 13 553 000 € 11 393 065 € 11 9 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 6 2009 8 496 000 € 8 280 952 € 13 10 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 7 2007 5 971 000 € 7 923 900 € 10 5 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 8 2009 9 501 000 € 7 247 844 € 10 7 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 9 2009 11 121 000 € 10 614 000 € 9 3 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 10 2006 7 254 000 € 9 053 000 € 12 2 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 11 2005 4 409 000 € 4 857 000 € 13 9 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 12 2009 5 374 000 € 5 132 090 € 13 12 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 13 2013 4 000 000 € 3 753 724 € 8 4 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 14 2014 10 000 000 € 12 879 752 € 14 10 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 15 2008 5 000 000 € 4 057 720 € 8 7 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 16 2014 38 963 000 € 35 411 453 € 4 3 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 17 2013 9 028 000 € 8 734 752 € 7 5 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 18 2013 11 590 000 € 8 815 160 € 12 9 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 19 2002 4 742 000 € 5 282 000 € 11 3 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 20 2002 3 752 800 € 4 161 900 € 11 3 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 21 2003 11 010 200 € 11 074 000 € 9 2 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 22 2011 14 038 240 € 15 147 000 € 6 2 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 23 2011 10 772 230 € 12 585 305 € 8 3 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 24 2012 5 883 040 € 5 496 700 € 9 3 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 25 2012 8 730 200 € 8 798 000 € 5 2 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 26 2004 14 938 870 € 13 992 000 € 8 2 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 27 2008 8 008 417 € 8 099 000 € 10 2 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 28 2011 11 523 645 € 11 757 000 € 10 4 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 29 2012 8 944 300 € 10 657 000 € 9 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 30 2012 11 331 600 € 13 075 796 € 10 2 0 1 0 1 0 
  
 
 
 
Contract 31 2012 16 786 220 € 16 979 434 € 8 2 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 32 2007 16 879 700 € 18 983 200 € 3 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 33 2007 27 904 458 € 32 309 260 € 4 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 34 2007 6 530 000 € 7 716 225 € 4 2 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 35 2007 11 229 000 € 14 026 340 € 3 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 36 2007 16 950 000 € 15 071 000 € 4 2 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 37 2007 15 047 000 € 13 684 740 € 3 3 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 38 2008 14 850 000 € 13 822 289 € 3 3 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 39 2008 10 155 600 € 10 212 000 € 4 2 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 40 2008 15 228 500 € 12 987 456 € 4 4 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 41 2008 17 318 939 € 15 264 080 € 3 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 42 2008 10 579 940 € 9 352 459 € 9 6 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 43 2008 5 938 558 € 4 254 150 € 7 4 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 44 2008 9 049 183 € 6 517 742 € 5 3 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 45 2009 13 310 000 € 12 244 364 € 13 3 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 46 2009 11 238 628 € 10 123 367 € 8 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 47 2009 17 528 300 € 16 566 969 € 4 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 48 2009 3 219 100 € 2 987 048 € 4 3 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 49 2009 20 068 000 € 19 154 894 € 8 4 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 50 2009 14 415 000 € 13 157 410 € 7 5 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 51 2009 3 562 500 € 3 578 775 € 3 2 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 52 2009 17 675 000 € 18 886 116 € 5 3 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 53 2010 6 616 200 € 6 754 918 € 5 3 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 54 2010 11 897 000 € 13 384 860 € 5 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 55 2010 7 508 000 € 7 546 050 € 6 2 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 56 2010 5 002 000 € 4 989 132 € 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 57 2010 4 919 000 € 5 705 064 € 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 58 2010 20 986 000 € 21 720 500 € 5 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 59 2010 18 242 402 € 16 398 581 € 5 2 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 60 2010 13 548 300 € 15 740 310 € 5 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 61 2010 8 288 300 € 8 253 300 € 5 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 62 2010 14 245 000 € 15 624 690 € 4 2 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 63 2011 11 158 000 € 12 405 534 € 4 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 64 2011 15 541 000 € 15 566 671 € 6 2 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 65 2011 24 868 000 € 26 655 427 € 4 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 66 2011 3 730 000 € 3 698 712 € 5 4 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 67 2011 6 899 000 € 7 195 095 € 3 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 68 2011 15 871 440 € 16 901 430 € 7 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 69 2011 25 053 000 € 25 563 000 € 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 70 2011 48 124 000 € 49 549 000 € 4 3 0 0 0 1 0 
  
 
 
 
Contract 71 2011 9 719 000 € 11 230 000 € 5 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 72 2011 15 100 000 € 16 092 090 € 4 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 73 2011 10 821 400 € 11 350 498 € 3 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 74 2011 6 587 000 € 6 579 270 € 6 3 0 1 0 1 0 
Contract 75 2011 20 401 000 € 20 721 684 € 6 2 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 76 2011 4 532 300 € 5 206 000 € 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 77 2011 26 279 600 € 25 452 495 € 6 2 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 78 2011 31 106 000 € 29 081 107 € 7 2 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 79 2011 2 537 500 € 2 647 000 € 4 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 80 2011 3 452 000 € 3 852 163 € 4 2 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 81 2012 12 760 000 € 13 347 960 € 10 3 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 82 2012 5 987 000 € 5 975 000 € 8 5 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 83 2012 20 331 000 € 21 997 000 € 8 4 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 84 2012 8 578 000 € 8 991 300 € 6 2 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 85 2012 6 317 500 € 6 452 558 € 7 6 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 86 2012 35 358 000 € 37 035 000 € 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 87 2012 15 943 000 € 16 890 000 € 4 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 88 2012 4 871 000 € 5 098 350 € 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 89 2012 14 720 000 € 13 396 914 € 8 5 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 90 2012 8 628 000 € 9 489 450 € 7 2 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 91 2012 9 564 500 € 9 046 497 € 8 5 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 92 2012 3 807 100 € 3 675 235 € 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 93 2012 13 774 100 € 12 683 977 € 8 4 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 94 2013 10 060 000 € 8 399 072 € 9 6 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 95 2013 12 180 000 € 11 808 520 € 9 7 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 96 2013 4 842 000 € 5 203 950 € 6 4 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 97 2013 20 731 000 € 18 268 705 € 3 3 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 98 2013 20 926 550 € 20 926 550 € 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 99 2013 23 604 000 € 21 235 000 € 8 3 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 100 2013 7 998 000 € 6 454 200 € 7 6 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 101 2013 11 520 000 € 11 285 333 € 8 4 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 102 2013 8 155 000 € 9 481 000 € 7 2 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 103 2014 20 905 000 € 21 673 900 € 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 104 2013 10 065 000 € 5 565 641 € 8 3 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 105 2014 12 790 000 € 13 870 640 € 7 2 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 106 2014 9 975 808 € 10 991 360 € 8 4 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 107 2014 43 201 000 € 45 317 957 € 3 3 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 108 2014 56 631 000 € 50 419 640 € 4 4 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 109 2014 7 067 500 € 8 025 000 € 4 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Contract 110 2014 11 166 300 € 9 977 283 € 8 2 0 0 0 1 0 
  
 
 
 
Contract 111 2001 5 141 815 € 5 462 000 € 13 6 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 112 2003 956 860 € 951 600 € 16 5 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 113 2003 1 131 843 € 1 197 500 € 17 5 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 114 2008 2 360 985 € 2 659 600 € 14 4 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 115 2011 3 079 864 € 3 623 400 € 12 5 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 116 2001 5 842 589 € 5 930 000 € 9 5 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 117 2004 856 009 € 644 000 € 11 4 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 118 2005 5 824 976 € 6 100 000 € 11 7 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 119 2005 3 401 851 € 2 984 218 € 12 2 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 120 2009 2 199 419 € 2 592 000 € 12 3 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 121 2010 1 307 633 € 1 173 000 € 13 6 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 122 2001 8 273 723 € 7 900 000 € 9 5 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 123 2002 1 818 655 € 2 537 600 € 18 5 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 124 2011 284 663 € 379 908 € 20 10 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 125 2001 1 549 435 € 1 576 000 € 14 7 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 126 2005 12 844 942 € 10 451 740 € 7 4 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 127 2009 4 991 978 € 5 072 000 € 9 4 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 128 2010 2 641 085 € 3 280 580 € 10 5 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 129 2011 8 088 949 € 8 259 000 € 10 5 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 130 2011 3 266 150 € 3 983 537 € 10 5 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 131 2010 1 699 213 € 1 915 400 € 9 6 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 132 2011 6 003 169 € 6 351 320 € 9 6 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 133 2012 3 125 914 € 3 174 000 € 11 8 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 134 2003 7 586 728 € 7 557 000 € 10 6 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 135 2005 1 361 509 € 1 360 000 € 6 4 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 136 2006 446 404 € 519 000 € 9 5 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 137 2009 6 535 732 € 6 164 660 € 5 5 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 138 2012 996 618 € 956 000 € 6 5 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 139 2012 208 052 € 235 000 € 3 2 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 140 2012 4 156 985 € 3 940 600 € 8 4 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 141 2001 6 413 080 € 4 722 620 € 8 3 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 142 2002 838 318 € 598 500 € 10 7 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 143 2002 3 875 624 € 4 064 000 € 8 6 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 144 2003 1 347 026 € 1 110 000 € 7 4 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 145 2008 6 731 389 € 8 728 310 € 12 11 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 146 2011 4 486 769 € 4 452 600 € 12 8 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 147 2011 3 847 579 € 2 872 050 € 13 7 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 148 2003 6 074 918 € 4 697 000 € 7 5 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 149 2004 7 467 364 € 7 800 000 € 9 6 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 150 2011 7 506 747 € 7 523 664 € 6 3 1 0 0 1 0 
  
 
 
 
Contract 151 2011 1 255 654 € 1 298 345 € 7 7 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 152 2012 11 313 515 € 11 106 900 € 5 3 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 153 2013 9 238 962 € 8 874 000 € 7 5 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 154 2013 14 206 477 € 13 341 667 € 7 4 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 155 2013 1 283 677 € 1 429 961 € 5 2 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 156 2013 7 276 536 € 6 564 903 € 6 3 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 157 2013 8 010 955 € 7 178 386 € 6 4 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 158 2013 12 335 327 € 12 376 647 € 5 3 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 159 2013 3 357 767 € 3 546 400 € 7 4 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 160 2014 8 543 645 € 8 366 280 € 6 4 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 161 2014 7 437 054 € 7 896 395 € 7 3 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 162 2014 11 545 017 € 11 805 792 € 7 4 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 163 2014 5 661 330 € 5 796 000 € 3 2 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 164 2014 19 400 293 € 15 793 800 € 6 6 1 0 0 1 0 
Contract 165 2010 125 000 € 128 000 € 4 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 166 2010 175 000 € 153 111 € 7 2 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 167 2010 250 000 € 185 520 € 12 8 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 168 2011 250 000 € 245 429 € 6 3 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 169 2013 250 000 € 366 828 € 4 3 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 170 2013 270 000 € 179 000 € 3 3 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 171 2012 300 000 € 339 900 € 5 2 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 172 2007 335 000 € 460 000 € 9 5 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 173 2007 340 000 € 199 477 € 8 4 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 174 2007 348 000 € 474 600 € 8 3 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 175 2011 350 000 € 326 600 € 8 6 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 176 2010 350 000 € 206 000 € 7 4 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 177 2007 400 000 € 539 000 € 9 4 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 178 2006 410 000 € 527 705 € 6 5 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 179 2010 500 000 € 287 000 € 11 7 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 180 2010 500 000 € 351 500 € 14 7 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 181 2011 500 000 € 439 000 € 6 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 182 2012 500 000 € 358 800 € 9 6 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 183 2012 500 000 € 500 700 € 5 4 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 184 2010 509 000 € 401 530 € 5 2 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 185 2010 600 000 € 566 560 € 8 4 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 186 2012 600 000 € 320 000 € 5 3 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 187 2007 603 190 € 577 000 € 11 8 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 188 2008 620 000 € 682 000 € 11 6 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 189 2007 650 000 € 495 300 € 8 5 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 190 2010 656 347 € 487 500 € 11 5 0 0 1 0 0 
  
 
 
 
Contract 191 2008 685 000 € 843 091 € 8 4 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 192 2011 700 000 € 568 000 € 15 10 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 193 2012 732 000 € 248 000 € 6 2 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 194 2006 800 000 € 994 297 € 13 8 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 195 2006 849 784 € 994 297 € 13 8 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 196 2011 870 000 € 1 067 755 € 10 4 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 197 2009 900 000 € 888 295 € 15 7 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 198 2007 930 000 € 774 161 € 11 10 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 199 2010 1 000 000 € 734 914 € 15 8 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 200 2011 1 000 000 € 1 155 000 € 12 6 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 201 2010 1 000 000 € 788 800 € 10 3 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 202 2011 1 000 000 € 882 900 € 8 5 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 203 2011 1 000 000 € 734 000 € 9 5 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 204 2011 1 000 000 € 916 851 € 6 4 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 205 2011 1 000 000 € 950 000 € 4 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 206 2014 1 000 000 € 712 339 € 4 3 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 207 2014 1 000 000 € 1 067 777 € 8 5 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 208 2012 1 037 000 € 792 330 € 4 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 209 2012 1 100 000 € 939 864 € 4 2 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 210 2010 1 200 000 € 1 019 000 € 14 10 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 211 2007 1 300 000 € 1 296 556 € 5 4 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 212 2008 1 300 000 € 1 088 000 € 7 6 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 213 2008 1 300 000 € 743 263 € 7 6 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 214 2010 1 300 000 € 979 900 € 8 4 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 215 2011 1 300 000 € 990 900 € 6 4 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 216 2011 1 300 000 € 1 240 000 € 12 8 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 217 2011 1 400 000 € 1 485 000 € 11 4 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 218 2011 1 400 000 € 1 320 069 € 8 5 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 219 2010 1 450 000 € 1 287 760 € 15 8 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 220 2009 1 500 000 € 1 109 000 € 9 4 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 221 2010 1 500 000 € 1 291 700 € 8 5 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 222 2010 1 500 000 € 1 691 000 € 18 14 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 223 2011 1 500 000 € 1 066 243 € 12 8 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 224 2007 1 523 998 € 1 392 000 € 10 2 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 225 2010 1 600 000 € 1 472 000 € 9 8 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 226 2012 1 700 000 € 2 244 000 € 7 5 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 227 2010 1 750 000 € 1 647 368 € 11 5 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 228 2010 1 800 000 € 888 958 € 7 3 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 229 2006 1 852 700 € 1 695 400 € 8 5 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 230 2011 1 900 000 € 1 680 807 € 11 6 1 0 1 0 0 
  
 
 
 
Contract 231 2012 1 900 000 € 2 094 800 € 6 3 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 232 2006 1 950 000 € 1 437 000 € 9 5 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 233 2007 2 000 000 € 1 274 000 € 7 4 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 234 2010 2 000 000 € 1 876 400 € 8 5 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 235 2011 2 000 000 € 2 202 250 € 12 6 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 236 2011 2 200 000 € 2 620 000 € 6 2 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 237 2008 2 300 000 € 2 342 540 € 13 10 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 238 2008 2 325 000 € 2 871 251 € 3 3 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 239 2010 2 350 000 € 1 765 092 € 15 6 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 240 2010 2 800 000 € 1 809 752 € 14 8 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 241 2011 2 800 000 € 1 899 000 € 9 4 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 242 2004 2 900 000 € 2 058 999 € 8 7 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 243 2008 2 900 000 € 2 184 150 € 14 7 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 244 2006 3 000 000 € 2 727 000 € 6 3 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 245 2008 3 200 000 € 2 173 165 € 7 7 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 246 2009 3 300 000 € 2 121 400 € 12 7 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 247 2010 3 500 000 € 1 935 000 € 9 8 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 248 2007 3 600 000 € 3 095 000 € 8 6 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 249 2009 4 107 900 € 3 098 000 € 9 7 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 250 2012 5 000 000 € 5 182 500 € 9 5 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 251 2012 5 300 000 € 7 127 000 € 7 2 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 252 2008 7 300 000 € 4 188 000 € 12 9 1 0 1 0 0 
Contract 253 2014 45 000 € 46 580 € 4 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Contract 254 2010 12 000 € 17 900 € 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 255 2010 28 000 € 15 100 € 6 5 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 256 2009 32 000 € 28 500 € 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Contract 257 2008 33 000 € 39 000 € 9 4 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 258 2008 33 000 € 38 300 € 15 10 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 259 2011 33 500 € 25 964 € 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 260 2011 35 000 € 29 950 € 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 261 2009 37 000 € 28 500 € 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 262 2009 39 000 € 33 800 € 6 5 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 263 2010 44 000 € 34 250 € 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 264 2010 45 000 € 37 800 € 4 3 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 265 2009 50 000 € 44 200 € 10 5 1 1 1 0 0 
Contract 266 2008 50 000 € 45 960 € 9 6 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 267 2011 51 000 € 39 000 € 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 268 2012 51 000 € 48 000 € 5 4 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 269 2010 66 000 € 56 700 € 13 7 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 270 2010 67 000 € 82 000 € 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
  
 
 
 
Contract 271 2014 68 000 € 48 150 € 3 3 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 272 2011 75 000 € 47 200 € 4 4 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 273 2010 77 000 € 59 900 € 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 274 2009 79 100 € 42 615 € 7 3 1 0 0 0 1 
Contract 275 2014 80 000 € 76 000 € 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 276 2009 82 000 € 57 500 € 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 277 2010 85 000 € 69 500 € 6 4 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 278 2011 88 000 € 67 828 € 10 9 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 279 2010 102 000 € 65 000 € 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 280 2013 102 000 € 42 700 € 5 5 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 281 2012 105 000 € 69 134 € 4 3 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 282 2011 105 000 € 61 500 € 9 5 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 283 2013 107 000 € 55 514 € 7 6 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 284 2010 108 000 € 70 400 € 6 4 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 285 2011 109 000 € 55 389 € 4 4 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 286 2014 133 000 € 99 000 € 9 5 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 287 2009 138 000 € 35 610 € 19 11 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 288 2013 144 000 € 114 790 € 5 5 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 289 2012 147 000 € 107 475 € 6 4 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 290 2009 149 000 € 94 910 € 19 6 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 291 2008 154 000 € 48 900 € 5 5 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 292 2013 157 000 € 67 620 € 8 7 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 293 2010 161 000 € 98 000 € 11 7 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 294 2009 163 000 € 120 425 € 17 12 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 295 2014 164 000 € 143 350 € 9 4 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 296 2012 168 000 € 75 750 € 3 2 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 297 2009 170 000 € 43 900 € 8 8 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 298 2011 172 000 € 79 700 € 7 5 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 299 2010 172 000 € 96 980 € 17 13 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 300 2012 175 000 € 81 770 € 6 4 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 301 2010 176 000 € 120 300 € 15 7 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 302 2010 182 000 € 142 800 € 22 16 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 303 2012 185 000 € 98 700 € 6 2 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 304 2009 185 000 € 168 000 € 14 7 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 305 2010 208 000 € 144 900 € 14 6 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 306 2014 210 000 € 204 644 € 12 6 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 307 2011 223 000 € 198 700 € 6 5 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 308 2009 228 000 € 128 000 € 19 10 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 309 2013 237 000 € 317 488 € 12 3 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 310 2013 237 000 € 146 500 € 8 6 1 1 0 0 1 
  
 
 
 
Contract 311 2008 244 000 € 136 000 € 16 10 1 0 0 0 1 
Contract 312 2014 255 000 € 214 000 € 10 3 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 313 2014 259 000 € 120 800 € 12 5 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 314 2014 266 000 € 209 700 € 7 4 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 315 2009 268 000 € 112 300 € 16 12 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 316 2011 288 000 € 227 000 € 5 4 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 317 2009 288 000 € 225 000 € 12 8 1 0 0 0 1 
Contract 318 2009 308 500 € 364 000 € 18 7 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 319 2013 315 000 € 239 800 € 16 11 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 320 2010 316 000 € 94 720 € 4 3 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 321 2010 317 000 € 219 500 € 18 12 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 322 2011 319 500 € 323 200 € 7 5 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 323 2009 362 000 € 243 900 € 13 10 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 324 2013 366 000 € 215 000 € 17 10 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 325 2011 391 000 € 279 370 € 18 8 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 326 2010 392 000 € 368 000 € 21 11 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 327 2014 401 000 € 437 000 € 8 3 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 328 2012 407 000 € 364 300 € 11 5 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 329 2012 421 000 € 312 600 € 12 6 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 330 2010 428 000 € 367 300 € 11 7 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 331 2009 437 000 € 211 000 € 18 9 1 0 0 0 1 
Contract 332 2013 455 000 € 319 400 € 18 9 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 333 2008 456 000 € 507 000 € 9 8 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 334 2013 471 000 € 438 800 € 18 13 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 335 2009 473 000 € 368 800 € 16 7 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 336 2010 474 000 € 335 000 € 15 7 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 337 2012 477 000 € 543 200 € 12 6 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 338 2011 478 000 € 298 700 € 11 8 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 339 2012 485 000 € 317 000 € 12 6 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 340 2009 492 000 € 459 000 € 13 8 1 1 1 0 0 
Contract 341 2013 499 000 € 355 000 € 12 9 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 342 2008 511 000 € 523 400 € 13 5 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 343 2009 514 000 € 298 500 € 9 6 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 344 2010 533 000 € 333 000 € 10 7 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 345 2014 541 000 € 508 600 € 9 3 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 346 2009 545 000 € 337 400 € 9 5 1 1 1 0 0 
Contract 347 2013 548 000 € 356 000 € 13 6 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 348 2010 548 000 € 308 900 € 16 10 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 349 2013 553 000 € 346 000 € 17 12 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 350 2012 571 000 € 435 000 € 13 4 1 1 0 0 1 
  
 
 
 
Contract 351 2011 579 000 € 520 000 € 14 5 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 352 2008 580 000 € 528 400 € 8 2 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 353 2011 584 000 € 441 000 € 10 5 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 354 2014 586 000 € 342 670 € 15 8 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 355 2012 588 000 € 625 983 € 10 3 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 356 2010 591 000 € 427 000 € 11 6 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 357 2009 598 000 € 448 000 € 10 9 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 358 2012 601 000 € 459 000 € 6 3 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 359 2010 618 000 € 452 277 € 15 10 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 360 2010 618 000 € 445 528 € 17 11 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 361 2011 619 000 € 486 000 € 4 4 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 362 2011 619 000 € 489 150 € 17 8 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 363 2009 631 000 € 386 800 € 6 5 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 364 2011 645 000 € 784 390 € 18 10 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 365 2009 646 000 € 369 000 € 8 7 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 366 2011 650 000 € 409 126 € 15 10 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 367 2011 658 000 € 498 800 € 12 6 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 368 2010 681 000 € 403 279 € 21 12 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 369 2014 683 000 € 547 000 € 8 3 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 370 2008 686 000 € 576 167 € 11 8 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 371 2009 688 000 € 477 700 € 13 2 1 1 1 0 0 
Contract 372 2012 692 000 € 624 000 € 18 11 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 373 2013 703 000 € 795 000 € 13 11 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 374 2010 704 000 € 558 100 € 12 7 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 375 2009 707 000 € 530 000 € 19 18 1 0 0 0 1 
Contract 376 2011 709 000 € 772 800 € 14 4 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 377 2010 711 000 € 498 600 € 9 6 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 378 2011 734 000 € 422 000 € 8 3 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 379 2009 739 000 € 484 800 € 18 9 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 380 2014 740 000 € 543 000 € 6 5 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 381 2013 750 000 € 657 328 € 16 6 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 382 2011 750 000 € 421 400 € 16 6 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 383 2014 751 000 € 537 000 € 8 4 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 384 2009 751 000 € 539 000 € 10 7 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 385 2011 755 000 € 683 600 € 18 9 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 386 2010 757 000 € 766 000 € 9 6 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 387 2012 757 000 € 632 520 € 18 10 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 388 2011 800 000 € 673 800 € 10 5 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 389 2010 828 000 € 718 000 € 12 8 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 390 2009 830 000 € 482 000 € 9 7 1 1 0 0 1 
  
 
 
 
Contract 391 2012 853 000 € 911 600 € 16 9 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 392 2009 858 000 € 641 600 € 19 16 1 1 1 0 0 
Contract 393 2011 860 000 € 678 380 € 16 9 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 394 2013 864 000 € 678 000 € 13 6 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 395 2013 867 000 € 575 700 € 11 6 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 396 2011 871 000 € 763 000 € 4 4 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 397 2009 872 000 € 756 000 € 10 7 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 398 2010 872 000 € 522 900 € 14 13 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 399 2012 873 000 € 796 300 € 11 4 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 400 2010 884 000 € 420 000 € 19 10 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 401 2009 894 000 € 530 000 € 11 6 1 1 1 0 0 
Contract 402 2012 904 000 € 565 000 € 19 11 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 403 2014 912 000 € 632 800 € 8 3 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 404 2011 914 000 € 1 209 600 € 11 10 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 405 2013 962 000 € 675 000 € 16 9 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 406 2010 968 000 € 687 687 € 15 12 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 407 2012 975 000 € 987 700 € 10 5 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 408 2009 980 000 € 267 450 € 11 11 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 409 2014 999 000 € 897 340 € 11 4 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 410 2009 1 010 000 € 972 100 € 8 4 1 0 0 0 1 
Contract 411 2012 1 022 000 € 624 000 € 11 5 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 412 2011 1 047 000 € 988 000 € 20 7 1 0 0 0 1 
Contract 413 2013 1 089 000 € 983 270 € 9 3 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 414 2009 1 117 000 € 628 500 € 10 9 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 415 2010 1 178 000 € 857 800 € 12 8 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 416 2009 1 179 000 € 922 250 € 13 8 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 417 2009 1 191 000 € 569 000 € 8 6 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 418 2012 1 207 000 € 783 900 € 18 12 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 419 2012 1 211 000 € 1 175 000 € 12 7 1 0 0 0 1 
Contract 420 2011 1 217 000 € 1 169 000 € 10 7 1 0 0 0 1 
Contract 421 2011 1 218 000 € 678 390 € 12 7 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 422 2010 1 280 000 € 891 803 € 14 10 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 423 2011 1 298 000 € 840 000 € 11 8 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 424 2013 1 299 000 € 1 164 000 € 10 7 1 0 0 0 1 
Contract 425 2014 1 314 000 € 1 386 700 € 7 4 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 426 2014 1 323 000 € 1 129 390 € 11 7 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 427 2010 1 336 000 € 755 000 € 16 6 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 428 2010 1 337 000 € 1 123 000 € 12 10 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 429 2009 1 357 000 € 1 226 500 € 9 5 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 430 2010 1 386 000 € 1 393 000 € 17 8 1 0 0 0 1 
  
 
 
 
Contract 431 2012 1 394 000 € 879 000 € 17 11 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 432 2012 1 406 000 € 1 242 000 € 12 8 1 0 0 0 1 
Contract 433 2012 1 444 000 € 1 043 089 € 17 11 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 434 2009 1 499 000 € 1 309 000 € 12 5 1 1 1 0 0 
Contract 435 2011 1 522 000 € 1 350 000 € 20 10 1 0 0 0 1 
Contract 436 2010 1 542 000 € 1 421 800 € 12 11 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 437 2009 1 732 000 € 1 586 000 € 22 7 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 438 2010 1 849 000 € 1 098 000 € 8 5 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 439 2013 1 867 000 € 970 000 € 11 7 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 440 2013 1 888 000 € 1 184 600 € 12 7 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 441 2010 1 947 000 € 1 545 000 € 9 5 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 442 2010 1 999 000 € 1 088 080 € 13 9 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 443 2013 2 065 000 € 1 868 000 € 12 9 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 444 2011 2 128 000 € 2 169 474 € 16 10 1 0 0 0 1 
Contract 445 2013 2 138 000 € 1 868 000 € 14 7 1 0 0 0 1 
Contract 446 2014 2 180 000 € 1 830 000 € 10 5 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 447 2012 2 180 000 € 3 294 000 € 14 8 1 0 0 0 1 
Contract 448 2012 2 290 000 € 1 995 000 € 19 8 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 449 2011 2 430 000 € 3 157 000 € 12 2 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 450 2014 2 481 000 € 2 779 320 € 8 5 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 451 2013 2 490 000 € 1 690 000 € 14 8 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 452 2011 2 501 000 € 1 748 900 € 14 6 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 453 2013 2 587 000 € 2 044 402 € 8 5 1 0 0 0 1 
Contract 454 2011 2 651 000 € 2 854 800 € 6 4 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 455 2012 2 712 000 € 2 325 000 € 12 9 1 0 0 0 1 
Contract 456 2011 2 754 000 € 1 970 000 € 15 8 1 0 0 0 1 
Contract 457 2010 3 081 000 € 2 749 570 € 18 11 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 458 2013 3 129 000 € 3 029 000 € 7 2 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 459 2010 3 470 000 € 2 330 000 € 9 8 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 460 2010 3 563 000 € 3 324 300 € 10 5 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 461 2011 3 615 000 € 3 330 000 € 17 6 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 462 2011 3 633 400 € 3 131 000 € 13 10 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 463 2013 3 845 000 € 3 480 000 € 12 5 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 464 2013 4 513 000 € 3 987 000 € 6 3 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 465 2009 4 534 000 € 3 846 000 € 15 11 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 466 2008 4 554 000 € 2 571 000 € 12 6 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 467 2009 4 564 000 € 3 850 000 € 10 9 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 468 2010 4 571 000 € 4 208 648 € 15 11 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 469 2012 4 646 000 € 3 647 000 € 13 8 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 470 2011 5 304 000 € 5 117 000 € 7 3 0 1 0 0 1 
  
 
 
 
Contract 471 2010 5 369 000 € 2 146 000 € 7 5 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 472 2011 5 506 000 € 5 094 997 € 9 6 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 473 2014 5 775 000 € 7 885 500 € 4 2 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 474 2012 5 818 000 € 5 473 000 € 15 6 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 475 2010 6 000 000 € 6 641 392 € 5 5 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 476 2010 6 012 000 € 5 498 000 € 9 5 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 477 2010 6 200 000 € 7 970 000 € 8 6 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 478 2011 6 247 000 € 3 625 521 € 13 8 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 479 2010 6 378 000 € 6 628 000 € 7 2 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 480 2009 6 418 000 € 4 690 000 € 8 8 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 481 2010 6 437 000 € 4 948 000 € 10 8 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 482 2012 6 456 000 € 4 758 000 € 12 4 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 483 2011 6 552 000 € 6 454 000 € 16 8 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 484 2013 7 085 000 € 6 477 000 € 13 2 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 485 2012 7 450 000 € 6 478 900 € 14 8 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 486 2010 7 512 000 € 4 890 000 € 15 11 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 487 2014 8 010 000 € 6 545 000 € 12 6 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 488 2013 8 599 000 € 7 334 000 € 13 6 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 489 2012 8 611 000 € 6 697 000 € 10 8 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 490 2014 8 981 000 € 9 777 000 € 8 3 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 491 2013 10 226 000 € 8 324 000 € 11 4 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 492 2010 10 592 000 € 9 739 000 € 9 5 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 493 2010 10 724 000 € 8 607 000 € 7 6 0 1 0 0 1 
Contract 494 2012 11 814 000 € 8 898 000 € 11 9 1 1 0 0 1 
Contract 495 2013 26 470 000 € 23 872 000 € 7 4 0 0 1 0 0 
Contract 496 2012 26 882 000 € 18 898 000 € 
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Appendix B  
 
Table B: Sample data for studying Hypotheses 8 to10 
 
Contract Year Pre-bid Cost 
Estimation 
1.Price Multiple 
Prime 
Renovation Infrastructure 
Works 
Residential Public 
Building 
Budget 
overrun 
Contract 1 2010 125,000 € 128,000 € 0 0 1 0 0 10.4% 
Contract 2 2011 250,000 € 245,429 € 0 1 1 0 0 129.3% 
Contract 3 2007 340,000 € 199,477 € 0 1 1 0 0 14.9% 
Contract 4 2011 350,000 € 326,600 € 0 1 1 0 0 2.9% 
Contract 5 2007 400,000 € 539,000 € 0 1 1 0 0 6.1% 
Contract 6 2006 410,000 € 527,705 € 0 1 1 0 0 5.7% 
Contract 7 2011 500,000 € 439,000 € 0 0 1 0 0 11.2% 
Contract 8 2008 620,000 € 682,000 € 0 1 1 0 0 29.3% 
Contract 9 2007 650,000 € 495,300 € 0 1 1 0 0 16.3% 
Contract 10 2008 685,000 € 843,091 € 0 0 1 0 0 -24.8% 
Contract 11 2011 1,000,000 € 1,155,000 € 0 0 1 0 0 9.4% 
Contract 12 2010 1,000,000 € 788,800 € 0 0 1 0 0 0.7% 
Contract 13 2011 1,000,000 € 882,900 € 0 0 1 0 0 42.1% 
Contract 14 2007 1,300,000 € 1,296,556 € 0 1 1 0 0 6.6% 
Contract 15 2008 1,300,000 € 1,088,000 € 0 0 1 0 0 22.8% 
Contract 16 2011 1,300,000 € 990,900 € 0 0 1 0 0 21.3% 
Contract 17 2011 1,300,000 € 1,240,000 € 0 0 1 0 0 4.2% 
Contract 18 2011 1,400,000 € 1,485,000 € 0 0 1 0 0 3.0% 
Contract 19 2011 1,400,000 € 1,320,069 € 0 0 1 0 0 20.1% 
Contract 20 2010 1,450,000 € 1,287,760 € 0 1 1 0 0 9.2% 
Contract 21 2010 1,500,000 € 1,291,700 € 0 0 1 0 0 13.3% 
Contract 22 2011 1,500,000 € 1,066,243 € 0 0 1 0 0 9.9% 
Contract 23 2007 1,523,998 € 1,392,000 € 0 0 1 0 0 18.4% 
Contract 24 2010 1,600,000 € 1,472,000 € 0 0 1 0 0 8.3% 
Contract 25 2010 1,750,000 € 1,647,368 € 0 0 1 0 0 39.2% 
Contract 26 2006 1,852,700 € 1,695,400 € 0 1 1 0 0 15.8% 
Contract 27 2011 1,900,000 € 1,680,807 € 0 0 1 0 0 7.9% 
Contract 28 2007 2,000,000 € 1,274,000 € 0 0 1 0 0 4.3% 
Contract 29 2011 2,000,000 € 2,202,250 € 0 0 1 0 0 10.5% 
Contract 30 2011 2,200,000 € 2,620,000 € 0 0 1 0 0 17.1% 
Contract 31 2008 2,325,000 € 2,871,251 € 0 0 1 0 0 8.1% 
  
 
 
 
Contract 32 2010 2,350,000 € 1,765,092 € 0 1 1 0 0 13.6% 
Contract 33 2010 2,800,000 € 1,809,752 € 0 0 1 0 0 10.2% 
Contract 34 2011 2,800,000 € 1,899,000 € 0 0 1 0 0 18.1% 
Contract 35 2008 2,900,000 € 2,184,150 € 0 0 1 0 0 10.8% 
Contract 36 2006 3,000,000 € 2,727,000 € 0 1 1 0 0 44.1% 
Contract 37 2010 3,500,000 € 1,935,000 € 0 0 1 0 0 4.4% 
Contract 38 2007 3,600,000 € 3,095,000 € 0 1 1 0 0 5.7% 
Contract 39 2008 7,300,000 € 4,188,000 € 0 0 1 0 0 10.6% 
Contract 40 2010 4,412,000 € 5,595,000 € 0 1 0 1 0 1.7% 
Contract 41 2012 7,573,000 € 8,230,000 € 0 1 0 1 0 2.5% 
Contract 42 2013 5,045,000 € 5,717,700 € 0 1 0 1 0 0.2% 
Contract 43 2010 15,000,000 € 16,465,531 € 0 1 0 1 0 0.7% 
Contract 44 2009 13,553,000 € 11,393,065 € 0 1 0 1 0 0.3% 
Contract 45 2009 8,496,000 € 8,280,952 € 0 1 0 1 0 0.6% 
Contract 46 2007 5,971,000 € 7,923,900 € 0 1 0 1 0 0.3% 
Contract 47 2009 9,501,000 € 7,247,844 € 0 1 0 1 0 0.3% 
Contract 48 2009 11,121,000 € 10,614,000 € 0 1 0 1 0 1.3% 
Contract 49 2006 7,254,000 € 9,053,000 € 0 1 0 1 0 0.0% 
Contract 50 2005 4,409,000 € 4,857,000 € 0 1 0 1 0 0.3% 
Contract 51 2009 5,374,000 € 5,132,090 € 0 1 0 1 0 1.9% 
Contract 52 2010 6,200,000 € 7,970,000 € 0 1 1 0 0 9.4% 
Contract 53 2011 1,217,000 € 1,169,000 € 0 0 0 0 1 30.4% 
Contract 54 2009 1,010,000 € 972,100 € 0 0 0 0 1 4.2% 
Contract 55 2009 79,100 € 42,615 € 0 0 0 0 1 35.6% 
Contract 56 2009 707,000 € 530,000 € 0 0 0 0 1 16.7% 
Contract 57 2010 5,369,000 € 2,146,000 € 0 1 1 0 0 47.2% 
Contract 58 2010 1,386,000 € 1,393,000 € 0 0 0 0 1 12.0% 
Contract 59 2006 180,000 € 42,000 € 0 0 0 0 1 29.5% 
Contract 60 2006 108,000 € 32,377 € 0 0 0 0 1 28.5% 
Contract 61 2006 555,000 € 503,000 € 0 0 1 0 0 19.5% 
Contract 62 2006 1,398,000 € 1,048,000 € 0 0 0 0 1 18.4% 
Contract 63 2006 409,000 € 398,890 € 0 0 0 0 1 2.7% 
Contract 64 2005 251,000 € 264,000 € 0 0 0 0 1 3.2% 
Contract 65 2005 470,000 € 528,000 € 0 0 0 0 1 21.8% 
Contract 66 2005 1,631,000 € 1,389,000 € 0 0 0 0 1 21.6% 
Contract 67 2005 155,000 € 113,675 € 0 0 1 0 0 9.0% 
Contract 68 2005 682,000 € 672,000 € 0 0 1 0 0 6.6% 
Contract 69 2004 210,000 € 359,836 € 0 0 0 0 1 15.7% 
Contract 70 2004 208,000 € 207,190 € 0 1 0 0 1 119.0% 
Contract 71 2004 1,030,000 € 1,085,000 € 0 0 0 0 1 13.3% 
  
 
 
 
Contract 72 2004 1,532,000 € 1,474,000 € 0 0 1 0 0 24.6% 
Contract 73 2004 320,000 € 400,000 € 0 0 0 0 1 3.6% 
Contract 74 2004 615,000 € 624,000 € 0 0 0 0 1 0.7% 
Contract 75 2004 483,000 € 439,696 € 0 0 0 0 1 9.1% 
Contract 76 2004 608,000 € 496,311 € 0 0 0 0 1 9.5% 
Contract 77 2004 715,000 € 714,000 € 0 0 0 0 1 11.1% 
Contract 78 2003 260,000 € 179,000 € 0 0 0 0 1 5.5% 
Contract 79 2003 383,600 € 424,000 € 0 1 0 0 1 7.5% 
Contract 80 2003 896,000 € 567,900 € 0 0 1 0 0 4.2% 
Contract 81 2003 607,000 € 603,200 € 0 0 0 0 1 5.5% 
Contract 82 2011 735,000 € 685,000 € 0 0 0 0 1 10.0% 
Contract 83 2011 900,000 € 907,104 € 0 0 0 0 1 21.6% 
Contract 84 2011 1,052,000 € 1,206,000 € 0 0 0 0 1 15.2% 
Contract 85 2010 416,000 € 424,000 € 0 0 0 0 1 22.8% 
Contract 86 2010 1,967,000 € 1,920,000 € 0 0 0 0 1 17.1% 
Contract 87 2010 2,247,000 € 2,450,000 € 0 0 0 0 1 25.5% 
Contract 88 2009 707,000 € 530,000 € 0 0 0 0 1 16.7% 
Contract 89 2009 400,000 € 295,000 € 0 0 0 0 1 50.8% 
Contract 90 2009 1,453,000 € 1,250,000 € 0 0 0 0 1 146.2% 
Contract 91 2009 288,000 € 225,000 € 0 0 0 0 1 24.4% 
Contract 92 2008 244,000 € 136,000 € 0 0 0 0 1 29.9% 
Contract 93 2008 1,391,000 € 1,266,500 € 0 0 0 0 1 14.7% 
Contract 94 2008 518,000 € 336,000 € 0 0 0 0 1 11.7% 
Contract 95 2008 3,500,000 € 3,770,000 € 0 0 0 0 1 9.8% 
Contract 96 2008 2,767,000 € 2,812,000 € 0 0 0 0 1 9.0% 
Contract 97 2007 151,000 € 148,300 € 0 0 0 0 1 16.1% 
Contract 98 2007 676,000 € 701,000 € 0 0 0 0 1 19.1% 
Contract 99 2007 353,000 € 383,000 € 0 0 0 0 1 6.4% 
Contract 100 2014 3,325,000 € 2,790,045 € 1 0 0 0 1 -7.9% 
Contract 101 2008 10,080,000 € 10,123,200 € 1 1 0 0 1 19.1% 
Contract 102 2003 2,529,000 € 2,458,877 € 1 0 0 0 1 21.3% 
Contract 103 2011 7,986,000 € 7,633,097 € 1 0 0 0 1 33.2% 
Contract 104 2009 442,000 € 360,000 € 1 0 0 0 1 27.2% 
Contract 105 2007 415,000 € 392,600 € 1 0 0 0 1 30.9% 
Contract 106 2011 1,093,000 € 1,052,443 € 1 0 0 0 1 6.0% 
Contract 107 2010 8,094,000 € 7,861,150 € 1 0 0 0 1 30.9% 
Contract 108 2004 904,000 € 731,900 € 1 0 0 0 1 27.9% 
Contract 109 2006 1,422,000 € 1,552,103 € 1 1 0 0 1 12.2% 
Contract 110 2004 866,000 € 835,266 € 1 0 0 0 1 16.1% 
Contract 111 2004 2,700,000 € 1,468,000 € 1 0 0 0 1 14.1% 
  
 
 
 
Contract 112 2003 3,789,000 € 3,388,757 € 1 0 0 0 1 6.9% 
Contract 113 2007 1,204,500 € 1,188,500 € 1 0 0 0 1 21.7% 
Contract 114 2008 473,000 € 644,174 € 1 0 0 0 1 26.3% 
Contract 115 2010 6,153,000 € 5,551,949 € 1 0 0 0 1 16.7% 
Contract 116 2004 5,026,000 € 4,444,269 € 1 1 0 0 1 24.4% 
Contract 117 2003 15,079,000 € 14,379,600 € 1 0 0 0 1 14.9% 
Contract 118 2009 7,200,000 € 5,509,400 € 1 0 0 0 1 28.1% 
Contract 119 2010 9,244,000 € 7,903,703 € 1 1 0 0 1 57.6% 
Contract 120 2007 3,350,000 € 3,149,310 € 1 0 0 0 1 21.6% 
Contract 121 2006 1,944,000 € 1,715,410 € 1 0 0 0 1 17.5% 
Contract 122 2009 3,715,000 € 3,436,984 € 1 0 0 0 1 24.8% 
Contract 123 2009 1,445,000 € 1,359,016 € 1 0 0 0 1 16.0% 
Contract 124 2009 6,832,000 € 5,440,000 € 1 0 0 0 1 40.8% 
Contract 125 2008 6,430,000 € 4,231,467 € 1 0 0 0 1 26.8% 
Contract 126 2009 1,958,000 € 1,651,210 € 1 0 0 0 1 17.4% 
Contract 127 2004 1,271,000 € 1,278,761 € 1 0 0 0 1 25.4% 
Contract 128 2009 2,931,000 € 2,482,300 € 1 0 1 0 0 26.0% 
Contract 129 2007 1,334,000 € 1,608,050 € 1 1 0 0 1 16.3% 
Contract 130 2007 1,396,000 € 1,239,378 € 1 0 0 0 1 21.2% 
Contract 131 2007 1,343,000 € 1,085,800 € 1 0 0 0 1 21.0% 
Contract 132 2007 31,745,000 € 32,918,396 € 1 1 0 0 1 8.3% 
Contract 133 2007 547,000 € 397,158 € 1 0 0 0 1 36.7% 
Contract 134 2010 4,323,000 € 3,878,800 € 1 0 0 0 1 46.5% 
Contract 135 2006 6,825,800 € 6,545,877 € 1 1 0 0 1 22.1% 
Contract 136 2004 4,221,000 € 3,854,950 € 1 0 0 0 1 31.9% 
Contract 137 2003 4,207,000 € 4,101,479 € 1 0 0 0 1 11.3% 
Contract 138 2008 632,000 € 654,810 € 1 1 0 0 1 10.6% 
Contract 139 2005 4,424,000 € 4,107,598 € 1 0 0 0 1 13.4% 
Contract 140 2007 624,000 € 570,844 € 1 0 0 0 1 22.8% 
Contract 141 2006 6,288,000 € 5,040,250 € 1 0 0 0 1 41.7% 
Contract 142 2007 2,417,000 € 2,443,900 € 1 0 0 0 1 14.5% 
Contract 143 2007 24,923,411 € 27,737,205 € 1 0 0 0 1 11.3% 
Contract 144 2008 2,733,141 € 3,083,291 € 1 1 0 0 1 3.3% 
Contract 145 2007 2,045,000 € 2,022,823 € 1 0 0 0 1 14.8% 
Contract 146 2008 3,212,000 € 3,918,941 € 1 1 0 0 1 8.4% 
Contract 147 2003 1,259,000 € 1,238,810 € 1 0 0 0 1 13.9% 
Contract 148 2010 2,557,000 € 1,463,260 € 1 0 0 0 1 19.6% 
Contract 149 2005 758,000 € 648,300 € 1 0 0 0 1 16.2% 
Contract 150 2005 1,017,000 € 977,343 € 1 0 0 0 1 18.2% 
Contract 151 2007 13,096,000 € 12,951,100 € 1 1 0 0 1 18.2% 
  
 
 
 
Contract 152 2007 6,283,000 € 5,711,280 € 1 1 0 0 1 5.0% 
Contract 153 2007 1,423,000 € 1,386,800 € 1 0 0 0 1 29.8% 
Contract 154 2004 1,221,000 € 1,192,795 € 1 0 0 0 1 17.6% 
Contract 155 2003 992,000 € 706,854 € 1 0 0 0 1 76.9% 
Contract 156 2009 1,636,000 € 1,578,500 € 1 1 0 0 1 19.5% 
Contract 157 2009 594,000 € 408,200 € 1 1 0 0 1 40.1% 
Contract 158 2007 1,495,000 € 1,434,057 € 1 0 0 0 1 16.0% 
Contract 159 2003 2,598,000 € 2,446,447 € 1 0 0 0 1 17.4% 
Contract 160 2008 1,827,000 € 1,811,185 € 1 1 0 0 1 16.9% 
Contract 161 2007 313,000 € 338,000 € 1 1 0 0 1 15.7% 
Contract 162 2009 1,915,850 € 1,452,510 € 1 0 0 0 1 24.3% 
Contract 163 2003 4,843,000 € 3,898,400 € 1 0 0 0 1 18.4% 
Contract 164 2005 2,269,000 € 2,261,700 € 1 0 0 0 1 5.9% 
Contract 165 2006 1,160,000 € 1,185,350 € 1 0 0 0 1 40.2% 
Contract 166 2005 295,000 € 327,500 € 1 0 0 0 1 47.7% 
Contract 167 2006 1,101,000 € 788,850 € 1 0 0 0 1 29.5% 
Contract 168 2004 930,000 € 791,050 € 1 0 0 0 1 34.5% 
Contract 169 2009 8,988,000 € 6,079,800 € 1 0 0 0 1 60.6% 
Contract 170 2009 644,000 € 456,000 € 1 0 0 0 1 19.6% 
Contract 171 2008 1,611,000 € 1,661,432 € 1 1 0 0 1 13.0% 
Contract 172 2006 978,000 € 726,603 € 1 0 0 0 1 20.7% 
Contract 173 2007 913,000 € 869,019 € 1 0 0 0 1 19.3% 
Contract 174 2005 2,803,000 € 1,713,100 € 1 0 0 0 1 25.9% 
Contract 175 2009 17,675,000 € 18,886,116 € 1 1 0 1 0 4.6% 
Contract 176 2009 14,415,000 € 13,157,410 € 1 1 0 1 0 0.9% 
Contract 177 2008 15,228,500 € 12,987,456 € 1 1 0 1 0 0.3% 
Contract 178 2008 9,049,183 € 6,517,742 € 1 1 0 1 0 0.6% 
Contract 179 2008 14,850,000 € 13,822,289 € 1 1 0 1 0 0.4% 
Contract 180 2008 5,938,558 € 4,254,150 € 1 1 0 1 0 1.2% 
Contract 181 2008 10,155,600 € 10,212,000 € 1 1 0 1 0 0.5% 
Contract 182 2009 20,068,000 € 19,154,894 € 1 1 0 1 0 1.3% 
Contract 183 2009 3,219,100 € 2,987,048 € 0 1 0 1 0 3.3% 
 
